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Edward Said’s influential treatise on culture and imperialism, Orientalism, specifically
called out German scholars of the Islamic “Orient” as being different. The lack of a formal
German empire in Muslim lands seemed to preclude a culture of Orientalism. This dissertation
examines the lived experience of Germans who traveled and worked in the Ottoman Empire
from 1850-1918. As German interests sought their “place in the sun” during the decades before
1914, the Ottoman Empire became a major field of business investment, military-to-military
contact, and missionary endeavor for Germans acting at the behest of both state and private
interests. Their experiences formed an “applied Orientalism” that much more closely adheres to
Said’s model than the more detached German academic discourse on Islamic lands. Using both
published and archival primary sources, this project attempts to utilize these “applied
Orientalists” to reframe both the scholarly idea of German Orientalist discourse, as well as the
history of German imperialism in the Ottoman Empire before the First World War. The activities
of Germans in the Ottoman Empire recreated many of the social situations of dominance and
superiority that would be present in a formal colonial empire without the necessity of political
control over the Ottoman state.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1876, a German consul named Martin Hartmann reported to the
German consulate-general in Beirut.1 He was already a figure of Orientalist scholarship in
Germany itself, having written a doctoral thesis in Islamic studies at the University of Leipzig.2
The united German Empire was only a little more than five years old, and for a Prussian like
Hartmann, born in Breslau, the academic opportunities of this posting were both new and
immense. Hartmann was to be the dragoman of the consulate for over a decade from his arrival.3
Dragomen were institutions unique to the diplomatic services of European powers operating in
the Ottoman Empire and other Islamic and Islamicate lands.4 In this “Orient” of European
imagination, the dragomen were official Orientalists, a combination of translator and cultural
interpreter of the ways of Muslims. Dragomen were expected to be knowledgeable of Islamic
history, religion, and local culture, as well as of any number of non-European languages.5
Hartmann fit this description very well, including the stereotype that many of these academicdiplomats were prone to high levels of sympathy with the ways of the people they studied.6

1 Martin Kramer, “Arabistik and Arabism: The Passions of Martin Hartmann” in Middle Eastern Studies, vol.
25 no. 3 (July, 1989), 283.
2 Martin Hartmann, Der Islamische Orient: Berichte und Forschungen (vol. 1) (Berlin: W. Peiser, 1905), xviii.
3 Hartmann, Der Islamische Orient, 17. See also Kramer, “Arabistik and Arabism,” 290.
4 Marion Kent, “Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1900-1923,” in Kent, The Great Powers and
the End of the Ottoman Empire (Hoboken: Frank Cass, 1996), 28. Geoffrey Berridge, British Diplomacy in
Turkey, 1583 to the Present: A Study in the Evolution of the Resident Embassy (Leiden: Martjinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2007). A useful introduction to the concept can also be found in the first chapter of Geoffrey
Berridge, Gerald Fitzmaurice, Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy in Turkey (Leiden: Martjinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2007), 3-5. Marcus Musslang and Torsten Riotte, The Diplomats’ World: A Cultural History of
Diplomacy, 1815-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 407-431.
5 Hartmann, Der Islamische Orient, xviii. Kramer, “Arabistik and Arabism,” 285. Musslang and Riotte, The
Diplomats’ World, 410 uses Hartmann as an example. See also Gottfried Hagen, “German Heralds of Holy War:
Orientalism and Applied Oriental Studies,” in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East,
vol. 24 no. 4, 145-162.
6 Berridge, British Diplomacy in Turkey, 200.
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A note on terminology is appropriate here. When discussing the Islamicate societies of
the Ottoman realms, I will use the term “Orient”, capitalized, when referring to the imagined
societies as seen by the academic and applied Orientalists who studied them. Likewise,
“Orientalist” is the preferred term for those who studied the Islamic and Islamicate lands from a
Christian, European perspective. When referring to the real societies, the terms Ottoman East,
Islamic and Islamicate East, will be used interchangeably. Islamic needs no introduction, but
“Islamicate” is a less familiar term. This refers to societies that are part of an Islamic cultural and
political milieu, though they may include Christians, Jews, and others. These societies are shaped
by the presence and dominance of Islam, even among those of other faiths. The term “dragoman”
will also appear several times, as either embodied by the applied Orientalists under study, or in
reference their practices. A “dragoman” was a combination diplomat, interpreter, and cultural
guide, usually attached to a European embassy or consulate, and unique to the Islamicate East.
Dragomen could be European applied Orientalists themselves, or natives of the land in question
who knew European languages and were employed by European governments. The assumption
was that, since the “Orient” was alien to Christian Europeans, it was necessary to have personnel
who were able to bridge not just linguistic, but cultural gaps, to prevent miscommunication.
While operating at Beirut during the 1870s and '80s, Hartmann continued to publish on
his academic subject.7 While many of these were recountings of the architecture and folkways of
the Ottoman Levant, Hartmann also wrote about the people he encountered.8 In so doing, he
projected categories of nationalistic thought, which had become prevalent in Germany but had
7 Kramer, “Arabistik and Arabism,” 290.
8 Hartmann, Der Islamische Orient, vol. 1, 137, and vol. 2, chapters 1-3. These are the passages that most
capture the specifics of Hartmann’s experience and show how he related it to his later academic pursuits. Some
of the Hartmann publications in long-defunct periodicals seem to have been lost. See Kramer, “Arabistik and
Islam,” 284.
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little relevance in the Ottoman East, onto the people he studied.9 This exemplifies a pattern
among the applied Orientalists studied in this work. The projection of categories ingrained in the
applied Orientalists’ minds by previous experience at home or by encounters with an imaginary
“Orient” in European scholarship, foreshadowed errors and friction in their actual lives in the
Islamicate East. Not that this would lessen their impact on public and private organizational
policies. On the contrary, by the time he left for a teaching position in Berlin that he held until
his death in 1918, Hartmann played a major role in shaping German thought on national
distinction in the Ottoman lands, a passion of his that would influence future scholars, but also
the Germans who would make diplomatic, military, and commercial policy for the Kaiser's Reich
in the Ottoman “East.”10
This minor functionary of the late-nineteenth century German diplomatic system was
operating in a system of Orientalist discourse that has long escaped historical scrutiny. The
German Empire, from its founding in 1871, embarked upon a mostly unplanned and undirected
expansion of influence in the Ottoman and Persian Empires. It did this for several reasons. In an
era of general colonial expansion, these were regions not yet ruled by the other European
powers, which avoided the international difficulties that a partition, in the manner of Africa or
Southeast Asia, might cause. There was also a “pull” factor to German influence in the Ottoman
and Persian lands, and also the sporadic contacts between Berlin and Afghanistan.11 These lands

9 Musslang and Riotte, The Diplomats’ World, 413. Kramer, “Arabistik and Arabism,” also takes this tack,
though putting it in the context of Hartmann’s contemporaries. Hartmann, Der Islamische Orient, vol. 1, xviii is
fairly explicit however in noting this transference of national identity and structure. See also Martin Hartmann,
Unpolitische Briefe aus die Türkei (Leipzig: Unknown publisher, 1910), which if anything makes this
transference even more explicit.
10 Martin Hartmann, Metrum und Rhythmus: Die Entstehung der Arabischen Versmasse (Berlin: De Gruyter,
1896), 21. Kramer, Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East (New York:
Transaction Publishers, 2011), 82.
11 Ibid.
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were the object of imperial predation in these years at the hands of the British, French, and
Russian empires. Ottoman policy actively sought alternatives to the existing international order,
which had relied upon a British protection no longer as forthcoming as previously.12 This meant
that German assistance was welcome, especially in these years of German military and economic
success. This process led to a deepening German involvement in the Ottoman lands, both
economic and military, which would eventually have major geopolitical repercussions. When the
Ottoman Empire neared dissolution, after the “Young Turk” revolution of 1908-1909, the
Ottoman government turned to Germany as its last option to avoid partition at the hands of other
powers. This led to the German-Ottoman alliance of August 2, 1914, and the entry of the
Ottoman Empire into the First World War, with enormous impact on the future of the entire
Middle East.13
This doctoral dissertation is an intellectual history, with a materialist basis, of German
encounters with Islam in the era of the Kaiserreich, 1871-1918. I will be discussing Orientalism,
the representation of non-European, in this case Muslim, cultures in ways that furthers the
12 Stanford J. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 1 (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Press,
2006), 51-52 and 595. Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, A History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern
Turkey, Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 266. John F.V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 89ff. Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914 (Berkeley:
UC Press, 1967), p. 218. Kent, The Great Powers, p. 179-180. Frederick Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The
Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). This is borne out
by a study of the Confidential Print: Middle East files, and is referenced extensively in Matthew Penix, A
Rational Disaster: The Ottoman Empire in the First World War (MA Thesis, Eastern Michigan University,
2013), chapter 2.
13 Shaw and Shaw, A History of the Ottoman Empire, 287. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, 680.
Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), based
upon “Defending the Nation: The German-Ottoman Alliance of 1914 and the Ottoman Decision for War,”
unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2003. For similar conclusions, see also F.A.K. Yasamee,
“Ottoman Empire,” in Keith Wilson, ed. Decisions for War, 1914 (London: St. Martin's Press, 1995). Feroz
Ahmad, “Great Britain's Relations with the Young Turks, 1908-1914,” Middle Eastern Studies vol. 2 no. 4
(1966).
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economic, cultural, and political dominance of Europe. My focus will be the way in which
German imperial projects in the Muslim east altered an Orientalist discourse consisting of a
theoretical approach as well as an “applied Orientalism” composed of the writings and actions of
Germans who encountered Muslims in their own lands. Martin Hartmann, and a number of other
Germans who traveled and lived in Islamicate lands in the period between 1871 and 1918 were
part of a general German reorientation in Orientalist scholarship, as power and national unity
allowed a world influence denied even to the larger German states before that time.
I here define applied Orientalism as the discourse of Germans who had day-to-day
contact with Islamic peoples and did so in Islamicate societies. Some of those Germans worked
at the behest of private organizations. Evangelical missionaries, Catholic missionaries, and
employees of German private firms like Deutsche Bank fall in this category. Some of the
Germans were employees of the German government. In this category we find diplomatic
officials, mostly on the lower end of the foreign service hierarchy. It was these consuls,
ministers, and special envoys or state secretaries that had the most experience in foreign lands, as
opposed to the high-ranking ministers who dwelled in palatial settings in Istanbul or elsewhere,
and whose contacts were mostly among the more cosmopolitan class of Islamic elites, especially
in the Ottoman Empire. The governmental category also included academics traveling in foreign
lands, and agents of influence. For the latter sort of figure, the passage of more than a century
since the time being studied is a positive advantage. In the last two decades much more has
become known about German espionage in the Ottoman and Persian Empires and in areas under
the occupation of other powers, like Egypt.14
14 See for example Lionel Grossman, The Passion of Max von Oppenheim: Archaeology and Intrigue in the
Middle East from Wilhelm II to Hitler (New York: Open Book Publishers, 2013). For an introduction, see Max
von Oppenheim, Vom Mittelmeer zum Persischen Golf (Berlin: Reimer, 1900); a more modern secondary source
on this figure of applied Orientalism is Donald McKale, "The Kaiser's Spy": Max von Oppenheim and the
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The time period under discussion is mostly that of the Kaiserreich, the period between the
formation of the German Empire in 1870-1, and the end of the First World War in 1918, at which
time the last Kaiser, Wilhelm II, was overthrown and a republic proclaimed. This was also the
period of the partition of Africa, the near-partition of China, and the apex of the European
colonial empires in the global South. The dominance of the European powers was unquestioned
in politics, economics, and culture. The Germans, coming late to this race for empire, ended up
ruling far fewer overseas colonies than the established nation-states of Europe like Britain and
France.
The theory behind Orientalism was that the image constructed of an imagined Orient was
designed in an explicitly racist manner. The Orient was a place that was both backward and
possessed of a mysterious, exotic quality that made it nevertheless irresistible.
Edward Said asserted that this imbalance between the nation-states dictated the structure
of the peculiar literary and academic discourse of Orientalism.15 Orientalism is the image of the
“Orient”, in this case especially the Islamic regions east of the European imperial core, held by
the intellectual classes of those non-”Oriental” states.16 This image is not only false but
constructs the nature of the imagined “Orient” in such a way as to excuse and justify imperial
dominance over that region by European Christian powers that had no historical or moral reason
to insert themselves into the politics of the Islamic lands. Said's seminal study, Orientalism, not
only codified a language and framework for studying this phenomenon but launched an entire
sub-genre of intellectual and imperial history to study the ways in which culture and literature

Anglo-German Rivalry before and During the First World War" European History Quarterly 27, no. 2 (1997):
199-219.
15 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Pantheon, 1979), ix.
16 Ibid.
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could be deployed in the service of power, and the ways in which imperial power warped
academic study and literature.17
The questions I seek to answer are part of the larger study of Orientalism, as well as
German intellectual and cultural history during the Kaiserreich. Was German Orientalism
different from its British, French, and Russian equivalents? Edward Said asserted that Germany,
after unification, lacked a “protracted, sustained national interest” in the Islamic East. If
Germans truly did view Islam and Islamic societies differently, what does that imply for German
history, and especially for the nature of German imperialism? One of the major questions of
modern German history is whether Germany followed a different path, in political and cultural
development that set it apart from the rest of Europe. Did the development of German
imperialism follow a different path due to the unique nature of its Orientalist discourse? My
work also brings into question whether or not Said was correct to say that “the German Orient
was almost exclusively a scholarly, or at least a classical, Orient.” All of my subjects have an
interest in the “Orient” beyond the scholarly. They lived and worked there and had to have their
expectations meet the reality on a daily basis. Moreover, as the chapters on German imperialism,
German military missions, and German businessmen will attest, German national interests in the
Ottoman realms were important and sustained over long periods. That does not mean, however,
that Said was entirely wrong in seeing the nature of German penetration of the Islamicate East as
being a factor in German Orientalist beliefs.

17 Nina Berman, German Literature on the Middle East: Discourse and Practices, 1000-1989 (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2013), 23, 240-1. Suzanne Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire:
Religion, Race, and Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), vii. Todd Kontje, German
Orientalisms (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 4. Fatma Muge Gosek, Rise of the Bourgeoisie,
Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 12.
These are merely a few examples of the widespread influence of Said’s work in this field.
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My thesis is that German Orientalism was indeed different than that of Britain or France
and that this difference was caused by the nature of German imperialism in Islamic lands.
Because German penetration of the Ottoman and Persian Empires was economic, cultural, and
religious and did not encompass formal political control of Islamic territories, Germans of the
Kaiserreich approached Islam differently. I divide German Orientalists into “theoretical”
Orientalists, those figures in Germany who wrote about Islam without living among Muslims,
and those “applied Orientalists” who encountered Islam in everyday life and presumed to speak
to Germans at home regarding it. My work will concentrate on the applied Orientalists, to
demonstrate that applied Orientalism as practiced in the Kaiserreich era constituted a change in
the German view of Islam, and of Muslim peoples, compared to the more scholarly approaches
of pre-national era Germans. For example, the German diplomat Martin Hartmann, who was
often in trouble with home authorities regarding his support of Arab separatism, stands as an
example of the applied Orientalists.18
Hartmann was not an intellectual, but his reports are full of typical Orientalist tropes on
the “warlike nature” of the Arabs, and their utility for German international goals.19 At other
times, Hartmann believed that Islam itself was a “peaceful view of things” that would make for
docile Muslim subjects if Germany ever sought to extend political dominance over the Levant to
protect Christians converted by German missionaries.20 Despite his trouble finding an audience
among his superiors, Hartmann was enabled by his position as diplomat for a European power
seeking greater influence in the Muslim East. The writings of Hartmann contain these and many
18 Hartmann (Beirut) dispatches, BA R AA 1-13-232, Foreign Office Papers, Bundesarchiv Amt R (Deutsches
Reich), Berlin-Lichterfelde. Hartmann to Foreign Office, May 10, 1881. Hartmann (Beirut) dispatches, BA R
AA 1-13-232.
19 Hartmann to Foreign Office, May 10, 1881. Hartmann (Beirut) dispatches, BA R AA 1-13-232.
20 Hartmann to Foreign Office, December 1, 1886. Hartmann (Beirut) dispatches, BA R AA 1-13-232.
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other contradictions, and yet at no time do they agree with the views of the academic
Orientalists, whose purely scholarly interests are supposed by Said and his students to have
dominated German Orientalist thought. Hartmann was, contrary to that view, a partisan of vastly
increasing German penetration of the Ottoman lands in which he was stationed. It was his
experience in Islamicate society in the actual, not imagined, “Orient” that changed his views over
time and made Hartmann as much an agent of imperialism as any of his British or French
counterparts in their own colonies. It is this experience and the changes it worked in the minds of
Germans in the Ottoman Empire that I have termed “applied Orientalism”
The implications of this “applied Orientalism” are several. Firstly, Orientalism as a genre
of literature may have to be reconsidered to include the “applied” side of the story in greater
detail. Secondly, applied Orientalism has implications for our concepts of imperialism and
interpersonal interaction. The study of imperialism must take account of actual lived experiences
of dominance, the assertion of power, and the creation of a sense of superiority in the everyday
history of shared Christian and Muslim spaces. As I will show in the chapter on German
diplomats in the Ottoman realms, authors who assert the lack of German material interests in
Islamic and Islamicate spaces use a too-literal definition of imperialism. The German diplomats
of that chapter, though they had more equal relations with their Ottoman counterparts than a
British governor in India might have had with the rulers of the “princely states” of British India,
nevertheless were part of a developing German imperial project in the Ottoman East. By using a
more expansive definition of imperialism, however, I am not leaving behind material reality
entirely. On the contrary, despite the focus of this work on the writings of certain Germans, it is
precisely those writings’ relation to material conditions in the Islamicate East that concerns me.

9

This project does not just reconsider narrow definitions of imperial domination but also narrowly
cultural definitions of Orientalism.21
Orientalism as a concept grew out of the cultural turn in history.22 The work of Edward
Said was central. His focus on British and French literary depictions of the Arab Middle East, his
analysis of the writings of those dwelling in the imperial centers about those in the imperial
peripheries in order to determine the ways in which their words reflected colonial power
relationships, proved generalizable to other imperial powers.23 Said's major omission in
Orientalism was Germany.24 Of the major European cultural zones, the Germanic one Said found
to be unimportant to his study. Germany, he believed, ruled too few Muslims and in any event
had a very different history of interaction with Muslims due to the long Germanic crusade
against the Ottomans in the Balkans.25 This diluted the perfect ignorance onto which British and
French writers could project their fantasies of the Orient.26
Besides the influence of Edward Said, the work of Michel Foucault and Antonio Gramsci
is relevant to this project. Foucault's notion of a discourse, as Said interprets it in the context of
Orientalism, is a system of thought bent toward domination, which constrained to some extent
the thinking and writing done by European, and later American, authors. Said's distinction that
“it would be wrong to conclude that the Orient was essentially an idea”, and that material
21 Berman, German Literature, 21, calls for this.
22 Said, Orientalism, and Richard L. Cartwright, “Some Remarks on Essentialism.” Journal of Philosophy 65,
no. 20 (1968): 615–626. Bernard Lewis, “The Question of Orientalism” in The New York Review of Books
(1982). Zachary Lockman Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism,
(Cambridge University Press, 2nd Edition 2010). Alexander Lyon Macfie, Orientalism: A Reader, (New York:
NYU Press, 2001).
23 Ibid.
24 Berman, German Literature, 21, and Marchand, German Orientalism, x. Kontje agrees with reservations,
German Orientalisms, 100.
25 Said, Orientalism, 7.
26 Ibid. and Reina Lewis, Rethinking Orientalism: Women, Travel, and the Ottoman Harem (London: I.B.
Tauris, 2004), 33.
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realities consisting of encounters between Europeans and their subjects in the “Orient” did not
shape the discourse, is at the heart of what I plan to study in this work.27 For the applied
Orientalists studied in this work, material reality visibly changed their thoughts and writings
about Islam and Islamicate society over time. While Said dismisses this distinction between
discourse and material reality quickly as not being the subject of his work, my contention is that
in the German case it was precisely those material encounters that played a pivotal role in
reshaping the discourse on Islam among Germans with experience “on the ground” in the
Islamicate East.
Antonio Gramsci's notion of cultural hegemony also informs Edward Said's work but
poses a theoretical problem for my own research. Gramsci made a distinction between civil and
political society. The former was voluntary in non-totalitarian societies and the latter to some
extent compulsory. Said believed that Orientalist discourse drew much of its strength and
longevity from the fact that it was a part of civil society, in Gramsci's terms. The discourse of
Orientalist scholars in Britain and France, Said's major subjects, predominated through the
process of cultural hegemony described by Gramsci, crowding out any skeptical viewpoint that
did not assume “positional superiority” of the “Occident” over the “Orient”.28 For my own work,
this poses a problem in that many of the applied Orientalists I will study had official positions
and therefore belonged to Gramsci's category of “political” society. There are two approaches to
resolving this theoretical dilemma. The first is simply to acknowledge that political society could
have an effect on civil society. The second is to ensure that my primary sources include sufficient
figures from civil, voluntary, German organizations. The number of missionary reports included

27 Said, Orientalism, 17.
28 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: International Publishers, 1971). Said op. cit.
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in the archival sources, as well as writings of travelers on private business, ensures that both
halves of Gramsci's dichotomy of society will be represented. Also, some German figures blur
the distinctions between the two, beginning as travelers in Islamic lands due to personal or
religious commitment and then being made official diplomatic or military figures later due to
their Orientalist expertise. The “civil” and “political” categories seem, in the German case at
least, to have been more fluid than may have been the case with other nations. For example, in
the chapter concerning German businessmen in the Ottoman Empire, many of the figures I cite
had as much, or even more, authority over the local economy as a governor of an Ottoman
vilayat.29
This dissertation is also intended to build upon distinctions about German Orientalism
made by several recent works. Nina Berman's survey of German literature on the Middle East
since AD 1000 deals explicitly with the “special path” in regard to German Orientalism.
Berman's survey attempts to bridge the theoretical-textual and applied sides of Orientalism,
asking whether “textual practices” were in tension with “social, economic, and political
practices”, and finds that there is “no predictable pattern in this regard”.30 Berman, however, is
looking at a near-millennium span of time, and I plan to restrict my focus to the age of
imperialism and nationalism, when the connection originally made by Edward Said between
discourse and domination is more clear. Berman also suggests that future analysis of German
Orientalism should focus on the distinction between the “theoretical” and “applied” forms of
29 This is an approach sharply at odds with older scholarship on Germany and the Ottoman Empire. For
example, Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-18 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1968). For long the dean of German-Ottoman scholarship, Trumpener took the view that the Ottoman Empire,
though the weaker party in its relations with Germany, mostly had the upper hand, and that the Germans were
merely reacting with their policy to Ottoman initiatives. This requires, among other things, ignoring the earlier
contacts that I detail in this work, as well as limiting discussion to the political and military only. See the
rebuttal to Trumpener in Penix, A Rational Disaster, 40-42.
30 Berman, German Literature, 23 and 240-241.
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German relations to Islam, defining the latter as comprising “missionary, academic, and
travelogue sources”, which in Berman's opinion distinguishes German Orientalism from its
counterparts.31 With the addition of diplomatic sources from Germans physically present in the
Ottoman and Persian Empires, that is what this dissertation will do.
Suzanne Marchand, unlike Berman, finds an explicit theme of “imperialist hubris” in
German Orientalism, “both before and after the Kaiserreich's leap into colonialism”.32 Yet
Marchand also contends that German Oriental studies were evolving “in the direction of what we
now call multiculturalism”, and that theoretical Orientalists in Germany espoused anti-colonialist
tendencies based on “anti-British Schadenfreude and primitivist longing”.33 Marchand further
writes that German Orientalists “did not want to hear the voices or see the faces of actualexisting 'oriental' peoples” and that this explains the abstract nature of their admiration for
Muslim religion and culture.34 This leaves out Germans who chose to go among “actual-existing
'oriental' peoples” in the course of diplomatic or missionary duties, or someone like the German
spy Max von Oppenheim. Von Oppenheim, a figure who has starred more in the literature of
espionage history than in studies of Orientalism, even converted to Islam in the hope that it
would better allow him to advance German interests as a secret agent in British-occupied
Egypt.35
Todd Kontje's work on the multiplicity of German Orientalisms is more closely related to
Berman's work in that Kontje believes that German Orientalist literature was varied in a way that
defied easy categorization.36 There were both negative and positive examples for the German
31 Berman, German Literature, 241. Marchand, German Orientalism, vii.
32 Marchand, German Orientalism, 498.
33 Ibid.
34 Todd Kontje, German Orientalisms (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 4.
35 Kontje, German Orientalisms, 227.
36 Kontje, German Orientalisms, 229.
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national project in the Islamic world, a term which Kontje suggested was fluid even in its
geographical location. Even in his chapter on “Facist Orientalism” Kontje finds a complex
exchange of ideas instead of imposition of categories upon the imagined “Orient”.37 Fantasies
about bringing order to Islamic “barbarism” through German rule were countered by admiration
of the warrior virtues that Muslim society could teach “Aryan” Germany. Kontje, however,
analyzes only the theoretical Orientalist discourse of Friedrich Nietzsche, Thomas Mann, and
other philosophers writing in German. Kontje's aim is to make a case that there was a coherent
thread connecting German Orientalist writing and imperial aims in both the Kaiserreich and the
Nazi era, as illustrated by comparing German discourse on the non-European world with
Germany's “nearest East” in Poland and Russia.38 Kontje's conclusions, however, remain in the
realm of ideas about colonial conquest and subjugation. Looking at the Orientalist discourse of
Germans actually engaged “on the ground” with Muslims in Islamic lands will test Kontje's
thesis regarding the relationship between discourse and dominance.
Applied Orientalism, sometimes in the literature, “lived Orientalism”, appeared in other
areas of historical study. In the context of the treaty ports of China, opened in the nineteenth
century by European and American gunboat diplomacy, the lived experience of Western
expatriates is part of the literature of Orientalism of the last decade.39 This study aims at different
goals than the literature on applied Orientalism in China. Much of the study in the Chinese
context is focused on the role of language, specifically on the expatriate traders' and missionaries'
refusal to learn Chinese.40 Furthermore, the element of Christianity is treated considerably
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Chi-Ming Yang, Performing China: Virtue, Commerce, and Orientalism in Eighteenth Century England,
1660-1760 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 27.
40 Yang, Performing China, 20.
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differently than in the Ottoman context of this dissertation, where Christianity enjoyed high
status as one of the native religions of the empire. Periodic attempts by the Qing government of
China to limit or control Christian missionaries had more to do with fears of widespread
conversion and memories of the somewhat Christian-inspired “Taiping Heavenly Kingdom”
revolt of the mid-nineteenth century, which was a major manifestation of Han Chinese discontent
with Qing rule.41 In the Ottoman context, Christian missionaries and other religious figures were
often preaching among other Christians of the Armenian or Chaldean Churches or acting as
protectors of those Eastern Christians, with implicit political backing, which was not as much
evident in China.
Another departure from my study and the post-Said literature on Orientalism is a lesser
emphasis on the distinction Said made between “manifest” and “latent” Orientalism.42 In Said's
view, manifest Orientalism comprises the “various stated views about Oriental society,
languages, literatures, history, sociology, etc.”43 Latent Orientalism is the more subtle modes of
thought that permeate otherwise not explicitly didactic Orientalist literature. The difference
between this manifest Orientalism and applied Orientalism as discussed here lies in the nonacademic nature of applied Orientalist writings. Very rarely did a traveler or missionary, for
example, have time to expound upon Ottoman literature. Moreover, when the sources used in this
work spoke of Islam and Muslims, they rarely intended their words to be a comment upon the
entire ummah, the world community of Muslim believers, or upon Islamic civilization as such.44
41 Ibid.
42 Said, Orientalism, 12.
43 Ibid.
44 Jan Schmidt, The Orientalist Karl Süssheim Meets the Young Turk Officer İsma’il Hakkı Bey: Two
Unexplored Sources from the Last Decade of the Reign of Abdulhamid II (New York: Brill, 2018), 207. This is
also the point of Mutafa Aksakal, “Holy War Made in Germany? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad” in War in
History, vol. 18 no. 2 (April 2011), 184-189.
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Rather, their words were usually a reaction to their particular circumstances. While some of the
sources used here did generalize about Islam and its history, the smaller audience and less
academic tone of the writings used here seems to merit a departure from Said's manifest and
latent dichotomy. The relevance of Foucault, already mentioned, deserves a closer discussion as
well. The Orient of the imagination has a similarity, in Said's view, to the discourse within
Europe about the clinically insane, the poor, “hysterical” women, and other submerged or
denigrated classes. The “Orient” was classified as indelibly effeminate.45
Race and gender are also central focuses of this study. The period of the correspondence
studied in this work was the high water mark of scientific racism in the popular mind. Most
educated Europeans would have been exposed to race science and eugenics or at least a vulgar
social Darwinism that sought to create ever more distinctions among human beings.46 These
gradations of humanity were almost always explicitly hierarchical. Many of the subjects of these
chapters viewed the peoples they lived and traveled among as being of separate races.
Sometimes their observations paralleled those of other observers, both Christian and Muslim, as
in the differences between the semi-nomadic, and mostly Muslim Kurds of the Anatolian
mountains, and the sedentary, and mostly Christian, Armenians. Sometimes, as for instance with
the Maronite Christians of the Ottoman Levant, European observers attempted to create a “race”
where there was no real ethnic or cultural distinction between Christian and Muslim.47 In these
cases, outsiders in an Islamicate society enhanced differences that were meaningless or non45 Michel Foucault the Orientalist: On Revolutionary Iran and the “Spirit of Islam” in South Central Review,
vol. 12 no. 2 (Summer 1995), 16-40.
46 Kontje, op cit. See also background in the intro to Robin Riley, ed. Feminism and War: Confronting US
Imperialism (London: Zed Books, 2008).
47 Examples of this “creative” process are in Gerald Henry Fitzmaurice, edited by G.R. Berridge, Tilkidom and
Ottoman Empire: The Letters of Gerald Fitzmaurice to George Lloyd, (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2008), xi. See also
Hartmann (Beirut) dispatches, Box 1-13-232, undated document 32.
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existent to local people. In the case of the Maronites of Lebanon, this distinction had far-reaching
consequences during the French colonial period after the First World War, and on into the
troubled history of independent Lebanon.
Gender is also a part of Orientalism and one that Said did not neglect. Since Said,
gendered discourse in Orientalist studies has featured in a number of other works. Gender
constructions of Islamicate societies and how those were perceived or distorted by Europeans is
an important category of analysis. Gender roles in the Islamic world are in an important factor in
imperialist or Orientalist discourse today. Some observers have even identified a “war feminism”
in Western analysis of gender roles in places like Afghanistan.48 In this view, projects of conquest
and domination, like the American occupation of Afghanistan since late 2001, can be justified as
part of a program of women's liberation from the oppressive strictures of the previous rulers. For
this project, the view is not so simple. Some male European observers of the role of women in
Islamicate societies like the Ottoman Empire admired a system of sex segregation that was
purported to be in the interests of, and for the protection of, women. In light of the prevailing
European concept of gender in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that relegated women
to a “reproductive” role in motherhood, child education, and household maintenance, European
men viewed traditional restrictions in the Arabian Peninsula on women’s mixing with men as
healthy, though sometimes creating in the observer pity towards the female subject. When the
applied Orientalists turned their European gaze on Islamicate societies, it was often the male
roles that they viewed more harshly.49
There is a lively literature on the discourse of the “effeminate” Oriental.50 Said and some
48 Riley, Feminism and War, 183.
49 Ibid.
50 Joseph Boone, The Homoerotics of Orientalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 12 gives an
overview.
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of his followers have argued that all of Orientalist literature is meant to make the Orient a
“female” entity, weak, inferior, and possessed of lesser faculties for rational thought than the
virile “male” Christian European society.51 This discourse makes the entirety of the Orient a
male sexual power fantasy, with a weak and effeminate society awaiting colonial penetration by
the more vigorous civilization, a notion that also dovetails with social Darwinist conceptions of
hierarchy and competition among human societies.
Specific instances of this sort of gendered Orientalism proliferate in the literature as
gender studies and queer studies combine with the post-Said study of Orientalism to deepen
knowledge of gender constructions in the past.52 Joseph Allen Boone's study of Orientalism has,
for example, centered a European vision of “deviant” male sexuality in the depiction of the
Orient as a different world from the “civilized West”.53 Depictions of Ottoman Egypt or Qajar
Persia as hotbeds of homoerotic imagery and illicit male desires appear again and again. Boone
says that this indicates a more mutual, more reciprocal Orientalism, one that served to open
European male eyes to the possibilities of societies that did not stigmatize homoerotic literature
and art in the same way as Christian Europe, is a promising example of the possibilities of
applied Orientalist studies.54 It is far easier for travelers to encounter such attitudes and
differences than for the academic and literary Orientalist writing at a distance from Islamicate
societies.
There are issues in engaging with these sexual aspects of Orientalism that deserve special
mention. Some academic practitioners of modern queer studies have taken issue with the way
51 Boone, The Homoerotics of Orientalism, 9. Joseph Massad, “Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International
and the Arab World” in Public Culture vol. 14 no. 2 (Spring 2002), 14.
52 Boone, Homoerotics of Orientalism, 9.
53 Ibid.
54 Boone, Homoerotics of Orientalism, 50.
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that Orientalist analysis reifies norms in Islamicate societies that may be repressive to LGBTQ
persons in the modern era and risks erasing such persons from the Islamic past. Joseph Massad,
for example, argued that Orientalism was at work in the form of a “Gay International” when
scholars and activists objected to the mass arrests of Egyptian homosexuals on a river cruise in
Cairo in 2002.55 Massad went on in subsequent publications to generalize that experience to an
Orientalist impulse to read very modern Euro-American notions of LGBTQ rights and practices
into both the Islamic present and the Islamic past.56 In this reading, non-governmental
organizations protesting the torture and imprisonment of LGBTQ Egyptians, or academics
uncovering a queer past for Egypt through the gaze of male European visitors, were alike
engaged in a project of projecting very recent Western norms onto a society with a different
history and a different system of gender.57 Fear of this idea of a “compradora of local Egyptians”
who were “hopelessly subordinated” to an international human rights movement that cared
nothing for Egyptian norms and history was enough to limit Egyptian NGO protests and spark a
serious reconsideration of the legacy of Said's Orientalism for queer and gender studies
proponents.58
For the purposes of this study, full account must be taken of the above difficulty, in order
that the criticisms of Orientalist studies be included, and the pitfalls they identify avoided. Few
of the sources used here were commonly using the “Cairo locations” of Boone's study.59
Nevertheless, when touching upon these issues it is important to lay out the theoretical basis of a
partial break from the Massad thesis laid out above. To the extent that non-Muslim visitors to
55 Massad, “Re-Orienting Desire,” 17.
56 Ibid. For the controversy that ensued, see Amr Shalakany, “On a Certain Queer Discomfort with
Orientalism” in the ASIL Annual Proceedings, vol. 101 (2007), 125-129.
57 Massad, “Re-Orienting Desire,” 12.
58 Ibid.
59 Boone, Homoerotics of Orientalism, 24.
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Islamicate societies perceived in the different gender roles and erotic possibilities of that society
alternatives beyond what they had imagined, it was as part of a discourse of biopower in the
sense laid out by Michel Foucault in The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1.60 Rejecting the “repression
hypothesis” of European sexuality, as Foucault does, means that Europeans who found
“perversity” in the Orient, whether repulsive or tantalizing to their minds, were simply
regulating where such desires or possibilities could be expressed, as was done in their home
societies. In the same way in which Foucault sees the rules of sex and the limits of “perversity”
as part of a system of power within European society, so it was in the Islamicate Orient.
European views on Islamicate sexuality and gender relations are therefore another attempt at
regulating “improper” relations.61 This fits in with an Orientalist concept of exerting power and
defining the Orient in subordinate terms without imagining, as Massad did, that this was a desire
to impose European gender and sexual norms onto Islamic societies.62
Another issue that Germans abroad in the Kaiserreich period had to address was
reconciling their essentialist views of Christianity and Islam with the softer boundaries of an
Islamicate society like those of the Ottoman Empire. Marshall Hodgson's concept of Islamicate
societies details the ways that even non-Muslims have their culture shaped by civilizations in
which Islam is a predominating element. Hodgson refers to “Islamicate” forms as being cultural
structures derived from the “complex historically associated with Islam and Muslims […] even
when found among non-Muslims”.63 Thus, Germans working in Islamicate lands had to discard
pre-existing notions of the nature of Islamic influence, which had previously been seen as

60
61
62
63

Michel Foucault, A History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction (London: Allen Lane, 1979), 29.
Ibid. and Shalakany, op cit, 126.
Massad, “Re-Orienting Desire,” 13.
Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 58-9.
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salutary.64 For applied Orientalists in the Ottoman Empire, this change in opinion about
Islamicate societies led directly to calls for overt imperial missions to free Ottoman Christians
from Islamicate influences.65
This dissertation will be divided into chapters that will illustrate the diversity of applied
Orientalist roles, as well as the sometimes striking similarity of their intellectual journeys. The
second chapter will trace the tradition of intellectual Orientalism in Germany, to give a baseline
for comparison with the applied Orientalist subjects. Chapter 3 will detail the role of diplomats,
not only high-ranking ambassadors and plenipotentiaries, but the consuls and special envoys who
carried out German government policies on the ground in the Ottoman Empire, day to day. The
fourth chapter will discuss the role of missionary organizations, which in a German context
predate our discussion but became increasingly part of the Orientalist discourse in Germany as
they found themselves enmeshed in the politics of the late Ottoman Empire, especially with
regards to that state's restive non-Muslim minorities, such as the Armenians. Chapter 5 will
discuss the role of German businessmen in the Ottoman realm. These envoys of German
economic power played a more and more prominent role after the decision to compete with the
British Empire in Middle Eastern transport and trade. The Berlin-Baghdad Railroad, never fully
completed in the Ottoman period, was only the largest and best-known of the investments made
by German firms in the Ottoman lands. These included telegraphs, spur railroads, steamship
services in the Persian Gulf and the rivers of Ottoman Mesopotamia, and projects of great
political and religious sensitivity to the Sultan in his role as Caliph of Sunni Islam.

64 Ibid. as well as Kontje, German Orientalisms, 207.
65 Shaw, Ottoman Empire in the First World War, vol. 2, 874.
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The German project in the Ottoman Empire was in no way a classically imperialist
endeavor. At no point did Germans exercise direct political control over the Ottoman state or any
portion thereof. Rather, they saw the Ottoman realm predominantly in terms of a field of conflict
with other European powers, notably Britain, France, and Russia, the states that would by 1907
form the Triple Entente. No one decision animated German interests in the Ottoman lands.
Historians who attempt to find a turning point in German policy end up emphasizing the
personality of Kaiser Wilhelm II. While it is true that Wilhelm II took a keen interest in Islam,
mostly because he saw it as a handy club to beat his imperial rivals with, others at the
Auswärtiges Amt, the German Foreign Office, believed the same and had more control over the
activities of their department than the Kaiser.66 The 1898 tour of the Levant by Wilhelm I and his
speeches in Jerusalem highlighting a German interest in the protection of Sunni Islam gave rise
to little more concrete than rumors of a secretly converted Kaiser, “hajji Wilhelm”.67 No historian
has proven that these rumors, or Wilhelm II's speeches, had any material effect on policy.68
The relative lack of German influence in Ottoman affairs can be seen in three instances
after the formal alliance of the two nations was concluded on August 2, 1914. The terms of the
alliance were concluded in haste, and the German government seems to have neglected to extract
from its new ally concrete assurances of action.69 While the Ottoman ruling class had committed
their state to war, the timeline of that commitment was unclear.70 So was the aim. The German
government was eager for an Ottoman attack on British-occupied Egypt, a nominally Ottoman
66 Aksakal, “Holy War Made in Germany?” and Ottoman Road to War, 28
67 Aksakal, “Holy War Made in Germany?” 29.
68 The closest to doing so was probably Gregor Schoellgen, “Dann müssen wir uns aber Mesopotamia sichern!
Motive Deutscher Tuerkenpolitik zur Zeit Wilhelms II in Zeitgenoessischen Darstellungen.” Saeculum 32, no. 2
(1981): 130-145.
69 Shaw, Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 1, 233. Trumpener also believes this, Germany and the Ottoman
Empire, 21.
70 Aksakal, Ottoman Road to War, 50.
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vassal state that would shortly be transformed into an independent British protectorate. The
Ottoman ruling party, the Ittihad ve Teraki, or Committee of Union and Progress, was more
interested in solidifying ethnic-Turkish support by the recovery of the borderlands lost to Russia
in the war of 1877-8.71
The Committee government won the conflict over the timing of Ottoman entry into the
war. After endless delay and the soliciting of multiple rounds of funding in hard currency by the
German government, the Ottomans finally managed to wait out the opening blows of the larger
European conflict of 1914. After the Battle of the Marne and the halting of the German Army's
advance toward Paris, the Ottoman statesmen seem to have gotten cold feet. They delayed
further. While some historians maintain that the eventual arrival of the German warships Goeben
and Breslau put the Ottoman capital at Istanbul “under the guns” of their allies, there is no
evidence this was the deciding factor. Rather, the Ottomans had simply run out all clocks and
extracted all imaginable concessions, including a solid German promise to continue the war until
all Ottoman lands that might be lost were returned. The Goeben and Breslau sailed into the Black
Sea to commit overt acts against the Entente, not as a fait accompli, but after a secret vote of the
Committee of Union and Progress Central Committee. The Ottoman government faced no
defections as a result of this. The decision was Ottoman, not German. The first Ottoman
offensive would occur in the Caucasus, not across the Sinai toward Egypt.72
The second incident showing the lack of German political control over the Ottoman state
was over the declaration of jihad.73 The formality of this was accomplished in November 1914,
when the Sultan, as khalif of Islam and successor to the Prophet Muhammad, declared that all
71 This is an area where Shaw and Aksakal agree.
72 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 1, p. 595.
73 Kent, The Great Powers, 179-80. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, disagrees on 84. Aksakal has a
synthesis of these positions in “Holy War Made in Germany?”
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Muslims everywhere in the world were obliged to join the Ottoman cause against Britain,
France, and Russia, which between them controlled the political fate of the vast majority of
Muslims on Earth. Though there was considerable German desire for this, it was a choice
ultimately made for Ottoman political reasons. The jihad “Made in Germany” is a myth, and in
any event, it never amounted to as much as its supporters in Berlin believed.74
The third instance of high-level German-Ottoman friction over politics and conflict
during the high point of their relations concerns the massacres of Ottoman Armenians during the
First World War.75 The conflict between the Christian Armenians and their Muslim Kurdish and
Turkish neighbors had vexed Ottoman politics for decades before the final conflict began in late
1914.76 The decision to deal with the Armenian rebellion of 1914 by deportation of the entire
Christian population of Ottoman Armenia was taken at the highest levels of the Ottoman state,
though this is still disputed by Turkish historians. In the context of the alliance with Germany,
the Ottomans made this a point of discussion between the two. German authorities did not bother
to hide their intense disgust at Ottoman cruelty to the Armenians.77 More pragmatically, they
worried that it would be an issue that would reinforce atrocity propaganda from the Entente
powers and weaken the cause of the German side in the war. The Ottomans never responded to
German entreaties with anything like deference. They expelled Germans, both civilian and
military, who attempted to interfere or merely to report on the atrocities.78 Despite that, we do
74 Aksakal, “Holy War Made in Germany?” 18.
75 Norman Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2001), 17ff. Ronald Suny, Fatma Muge Gocek, and Norman M. Naimark, A Question of
Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
The international dimensions to the Armenian issue are explored in Manoug Joseph Soumakian, Empires in
Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers, 1895-1920 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995).
76 Margaret Lavinia Anderson, “Down in Turkey, Far Away”: Human Rights, the Armenian Massacres, and
Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany.” The Journal of Modern History 79 (2007), 80-111.
77 Ibid. See also Chapter 3, below.
78 This is a controversial conclusion of Shaw, Ottoman Empire and World War I, vol. 2, 909.
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have a substantial record from German consular reports concerning the Armenian massacres and
deportations. These reports were heavily censored by Ottoman demand and not circulated openly
during the conflict.79 German efforts, at high governmental and lower, applied Orientalist levels,
failed to mitigate the fate of the Armenians in any significant way. Once the decision was taken
in Istanbul, German influence over a policy seen as vital not just to the war effort, but to the
survival of the Ottoman Empire long after the war, was nil.
It can be seen from these examples that German political and diplomatic leverage over
the Ottoman state was weak. This does not mean that the Ottoman lands were not fields of
German imperial endeavor. Rather it emphasizes that looking at high-level diplomatic
interactions or the comings and goings of the German general officers that staffed the Ottoman
Army before and during the war gives an incomplete picture of the nature of the German
encounter with the Ottomans in this period. A secondary feature of this dissertation, therefore, is
to argue for a more granular approach to relations between states, one that does not merely prize
the easily discovered diplomatic and military dispatches that form the key sources of GermanOttoman relations in many of the works cited here. German policy in the Ottoman Empire was
effectively made at lower levels, and the real long-term lessons for historians of Germany lay in
their opinions. After all, an ambassador in Istanbul or a Foreign Minister would see GermanOttoman relations as one step in a longer career or as one aspect of a much larger job. For the
missionary, the work in a station like Maras was the focus of their lives, and therefore their
writings, can tell us much more about the situation.
Finally, the more detailed approach described here is also useful in the sense that it deals
with the much more difficult to quantify human factor in international and inter-societal
79 Ibid.
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relations. In his study of British diplomacy before and during the First World War, A Peace to
End All Peace, David Fromkin relates anecdotes from the exact sort of low-level officials in
Ottoman lands that this study is examining from the German side.80 The surviving papers,
diaries, and letters of functionaries, consuls, and spies in British-occupied Ottoman Egypt
Fromkin uses form an interesting antidote to over-reliance on the conventions of diplomatic
history.81 Fromkin illustrates how it was these smaller figures, and not the British ConsulGeneral, and effective ruler, of Egypt, Sir Henry MacMahon, who made policy regarding the
Ottomans. They were key to relations with the Ottomans in the critical period after the revolution
of 1908-9, which brought the Committee of Union and Progress to power.82 British interests, and
sympathy for the people they lived among, did not animate these officials. They were convinced
that a secret cabal of Jewish financiers had seized control of the Ottoman government in the form
of the CUP and that its influence was felt in every market riot in Cairo and Alexandria. Their
intuition that shadowy forces controlled the world and their view of the Muslims of Egypt and
the Ottoman Empire proper as weak-minded and easily-led brought them to a conspiratorial
worldview that may have played an essential role in the British decision to open relations with
Arab figures like Sherif Hussein of Mecca.83 Continuing this instinctual and highly personal sort
of international relations, these low-ranking figures assumed that Sherif Hussein had a much
larger influence on Sunni Muslims than was actually the case. The implications of this mistake
for subsequent British policy and for Middle Eastern history are enormous. It led British
policymakers to rely on Hussein and his descendants, rather than making any sort of outreach to
80 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-1922 (New York: H. Holt,
1989).
81 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 487-488.
82 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 82.
83 Ibid.
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the more cosmopolitan Arab nationalists in Damascus and Beirut, and to the broad alienation of
the Arab masses that would lead to endless revolts from 1920 onward. It is also a powerful
illustration of the power of Orientalist imagination over policy, and the danger that Orientalist
ideas can override experience. Many of the applied Orientalists featured in this dissertation
similarly fell back on Orientalist ideology when confronted with difficult political and social
realities.
The bifurcated nature of German Orientalism has sometimes obscured its objective of
dominance. A similar problem afflicts discourse in Germany and the United States today, as
discussion of Islamic “radicalization” in Germany and Europe remains divorced from a
discussion of the German soldiers and contractors who work with factions in the Iraqi and Syrian
civil wars. The place of German Orientalist discourse in German politics, German culture, and
German imperialism cannot be understood without examining those whose words actually
shaped German relations with Islam day to day.
The Germans acted like colonial overlords in the realm of lived experience and culture,
even if they did not exercise such dominance in the political realm. By ignoring the material
aspects of German Orientalist discourse, the “on-the-ground” experience of these diplomats,
missionaries, and others, scholars miss the possibility of a German route to Orientalism that did
not follow the more distant, academic view in the British and French Orientalist literature that
was more familiar to Said. The problem may lie in a false distinction between a materialist
reading of history and the cultural turn of recent decades. The argument that these views are in
conflict with one another serves to obscure the fact that many cultural and intellectual changes
have deeply material roots. The German missionaries and consuls who ran an Ottoman
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orphanage system for children orphaned by the intercommunal fighting in Anatolia in the 1890s,
for example, developed a pro-Christian and anti-Islam view of the fighting only gradually.84 Not
only did these applied Orientalists change their mind about Armenian Christian victimhood, but
they also changed their minds on the role of Islam in the fighting.
The present work also contributes to a study of the late-period Ottoman state. As the
centenary of that empire's dissolution approaches in 2023, a number of studies reevaluating its
end have appeared. The German role in the late Ottoman state has been particularly contentious
in the historiography of the First World War.85
The first, and most simplistic, view of the German role in the end of the Ottoman state
focused overmuch on the role of military affairs and force.86 Much of this is based on the work of
Ulrich Trumpener, who pioneered the study of German-Ottoman relations in this period, and
established a narrative that was largely unchanged until the 1990s. The key points in this
narrative were the appointment, in early 1914, of the German general officer Otto Liman von
Sanders to the Ottoman General Staff and the arrival in August 1914 of the German warships
Goeben and Breslau. Liman von Sanders was hired as part of the modernizing influence of the
Committee of Union and Progress and had orders to reform and modernize the Ottoman military,
just then near to dissolution after losses in war against Italy in 1911-12 and the Balkan League of
Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece in 1912-13. The Goeben and Breslau, on the run from
the British Mediterranean Fleet in the early weeks of the First World War, were eventually added
84 See Chapter 3 below.
85 See Aksakal, Ottoman Road to War, 3 for a comprehensive citation.
86 Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952-7), vol. III, 166ff and
605ff. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis: 1911-1914 (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1923), vol. I, 208-9,
539-40. Ulrich Trumpener, in “Turkey’s Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities,” Journal of
Modern History 32: 4 (1962), 369-80 lays out the basic thesis. Trumpener did not add much to it over the
subsequent decades. See also “Liman von Sanders and the Ottoman-German Alliance” in Journal of
Contemporary History 1: 4 (1966), 179-92.
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to the Ottoman Navy under a fictitious sale, to compensate for warships under construction in
Britain that were confiscated on the outbreak of the world conflict.87 Both of these events implied
to British observers an overweening German influence over the Ottoman capital. This narrative
also often incorporated the presence of Enver Pasha, one of the leading lights of the CUP
government and hero of the Second Balkan War. Enver Pasha's service as military attaché at the
Ottoman embassy in Berlin before the war somehow also opened him up to German influence.
This was the point of view of the major Entente leaders of the war, including Winston Churchill
in his history of the Great War.88
The second interpretation of late-Ottoman history developed in the 1960s, as part of a
two-fold backlash. Firstly, Germans like Ulrich Trumpener who reacted strongly to Fritz
Fischer's Griff Nach der Weltmacht, which blamed German territorial and economic ambitions
for the outbreak of war in 1914, de-emphasized the German role in the Ottoman story.89 In this
new narrative, it was the Ottoman government, especially Enver Pasha, who manipulated the
German government into providing resources it could not spare to an ally that was not good for
anything from the German point of view except to tie down German resources on battlefields far
from the centers of decision on the Western Front in Europe.90 This critique inspired the desire of
a new generation of Turkish historians to reclaim the Ottoman past and especially Ottoman
agency.91 Whereas European views continued to emphasize the centrality of war and the German
alliance, these authors looked more holistically at late-Ottoman politics and the formation of
87 F.A.K. Yasamee, “Ottoman Empire,” in Keith Wilson, ed. Decisions for War, 1914 (London: St. Martin’s Press,
1995).
88 Churchill, The World Crisis, 208-9.
89 Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 2. Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, (Düsseldorf: Droste,
1961) and War of Illusions: German Policy from 1911- 1914 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975).
90 Churchill, op cit, is especially fond of this very personalist view.
91 Aksakal, Ottoman Road to War, 20.
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national sentiments among Arabs, Turks, and Armenians in the core regions of the empire. In this
view, the “Young Turk” revolt of the CUP in 1908-9 was the key point in unleashing a political
and national awakening that could only end by destroying an anachronistic, multi-ethnic empire
that had to be “modernized” for its own good in the face of economic stagnation and European
colonial predation.
The final turn of late-Ottoman historiography includes European disciples of
“development” economics, which label the Ottoman state as “Third World” or “peripheral” and
Turkophone writers who now believe that the Ottoman Empire destroyed itself, as part of a
conscious project of modernization which always risked dissolution92. The work of Mustafa
Aksakal has been instrumental in reimagining the Ottoman participation in the First World War
and the entire late period of Ottoman history. For Aksakal, the Ottoman state was less analogous
to the corrupt “Oriental” state imagined by European interlocutors and more akin to the
modernizing states of Meiji Japan or late Qing China. Faced with insoluble diplomatic, political,
and economic conundrums, the Ottoman ruling class embarked on a high-risk, high-reward path,
inserting itself into a global conflict on the side of one European great power and in opposition to
three others. The Ottomans pursued this course as part of a process of elimination after all other,
safer courses proved unworkable. For example, the Ottoman state attempted to gain British
protection, and even entered into extremely unfavorable territorial settlements with the British
Empire in Kuwait and South Arabia in order to placate British interests in expectation of alliance.
When this did not work, only then was the much higher risk course of alliance with Russia or
Germany contemplated.

92 For this and the following paragraph, Mustafa Aksakal, Ottoman Road to War is the indispensable volume. See
also Roberto Mazza "The Ottoman Road to War in 1914" in Middle Eastern Studies, 45 no. 4, 681–683 (2009).
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If Aksakal’s work is key to the narrative of the late-Ottoman period, the final works of
Stanford Shaw provide the primary source references. Shaw’s two-volume work on the Ottoman
Empire and the First World War, published in Ankara, took advantage of unprecedented access to
the Ottoman archives. Political sensitivities had long kept non-Turkish scholars out of the
archives, and it seems doubtful that Shaw had complete access. What he did manage to peruse,
however, he used thoroughly, often quoting entire translated Ottoman documents in his
mammoth work. The sources thus published are indispensable for understanding the lateOttoman political and diplomatic situation and contributed greatly to the recent spate of Englishlanguage works about this period, many of which build equally on Shaw and Aksakal. In Shaw’s
work we can see an Ottoman state that only reluctantly followed the lead of its German ally and
which often dictated the terms of that alliance. Shaw’s documentation sheds new light on
Trumpener’s arguments from a previous period of Ottoman historiography and extends as much
as it corrects Trumpener’s views. Shorn, however, of Trumpener’s desire to absolve Germany of
guilt for the extension of war into the Ottoman East, Shaw’s work centers an Ottoman view
lacking in the earlier historiography, which was forced to use German documents to look at
Ottoman motives. It is uncertain whether Shaw’s access to the Ottoman archives was unique or
something that may be repeated with future studies.93
This work seeks to add to the discussion of studies of the late Ottoman Empire and its
German partners and allies by examining, in several of its chapters, the ways in which that
partnership worked on the ground. The vast preponderance of the evidence here points toward
the idea that Germans had little political sway over any aspect of Ottoman society and politics.
However, as important as the German alliance was for the Committee for Union and Progress'
93 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, 255ff. Shaw and Shaw, A History of the Ottoman Empire, 260.
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plans to save the Ottoman state, this study also presents some aspects of a breakdown in relations
at the local and individual level. To the extent that many of the Germans here reinterpreted their
views of Islam and of Islamicate society, many of them also turned implicitly against the survival
of the Ottoman state. That was nowhere truer than in the accounts of those Germans most
intimately aware of the Armenian massacres from 1915 onward, and the German military
officers whose influence in preserving a German-controlled Ottoman state once loomed so large
in the historiography of this period.
The implications of this study for the history of German imperialism and European
Orientalism are in the realm of expanding the definitions of both and of rethinking the influence
of cultural contact on the suite of prejudices that constitute Orientalist thought. There are also
implications for the modern world. Since 2015, the German government has responded to the
refugee crisis in Syria and Turkey by admitting hundreds of thousands of mostly-Muslim
migrants fleeing violence and terror in their homelands. The standard narrative of the European
world, the narrative of liberalism and tolerance, would have it that closer contact with an
imagined “Other” inculcates understanding and greater acceptance in the majority population.
This narrative is so essential to cosmopolitan liberalism that it often is unquestioned. This study
points the way to a contrary conclusion, that closer contact does not necessarily create
compromise and tolerance. Familiarity may, in fact, breed contempt. The majority of the
Germans depicted in this study began with a (relatively) sympathetic depiction of Islam in their
cultural diet, bred of the peculiar German narrative of Islam and the “clash of civilizations”
between the Dar al Islam and Christendom. Most of them, upon experiencing Muslims in their
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day-to-day lives from a position of strength, abandoned these more tolerant modes of thought for
the essentializing and “Other”-izing forms of Orientalism.
Hartmann, the German consul at the start of this chapter, had, by the time his mission in
the Ottoman Levant was complete, changed his mind about the Ottoman state completely. His
was an idiosyncratic journey in some ways but of a piece with many of the applied Orientalists
whose stories are related in the following chapters. Having gained extensive experience in the
multi-confessional Ottoman city of Beirut, Hartmann began to conceive of an Arab identity
beyond the associations of religion and dynasty that were the actual core of local political belief.
He dedicated the rest of his life to denigrating the Islamicate society that had ensured the
Lebanon region's religious diversity for centuries and instead to creating from his own
imagination an Arab nationalism. Ambitious young Arab politicians who found themselves
frozen out under the Ottoman system soon referenced his points. Hartmann had made himself an
indispensable part of the German Orientalist tradition regarding the Ottoman Empire and a key
player in that empire's dissolution. Though in some ways he bridged the divide between
academic/literary and applied Orientalism, it was his experience as a diplomat in Ottoman spaces
that made him intolerant of those spaces and inspired his dreams of remaking the Middle East
along lines more pleasing to European minds.94

94 Kramer, “Arabistik and Arabism,” 292.
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CHAPTER 2: GERMAN THOUGHT ON ISLAM
In order to better understand the ways in which applied Orientalists constituted a category
separate from, and different to, traditional Orientalist scholarship, it is necessary first of all to
conduct an overview of Orientalist discourse in Europe, and especially Germany, before the age
of nationalism and empire that are the subject of the present work. German discourse on
Orientalism began in the Middle Ages, but reached full flower in the Enlightenment of the
eighteenth century. By the time of German unification in 1871, a vast scholarly apparatus on the
“Orient” existed in German higher education.
Early German discussions in an academic setting were often literary and philological,
and geared toward pre-Islamic times, especially for an understanding of the Christian Bible, the
languages it was written in, and the societies it was birthed from. This discourse was extremely
arcane, and often was part of debates within and among factions of German Christianity,
especially as regard the authenticity and meaning of parts of the sacred texts.95
However, a distinctive German Orientalism gradually grew out of earlier French
influences in the early modern era. Some scholars, such as Suzanne Marchand, have seen a
problem with this distinction: what constitutes “German” discourse before the era of German
nationalism?96 To other scholars, such as Todd Kontje, this is a feature of German discourse
itself. German literature on the “Orient” sought to selectively identify with “Eastern” elements
against the “rest of the West” in order to establish a distinctive German identity that had not
previously existed. There are elements of this view in other European Orientalisms, for example
95 Nina Berman, German Literature on the Middle East: Discourse and Practices, 1000-1989 (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2013), 23. Suzanne Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire:
Religion, Race, and Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), vii. Todd Kontje, German
Orientalisms (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 15.
96 Marchand, German Orientalism, 3.
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the paradox of Spanish identification with Christianity and the legacy of the reconquista that
ended with the extinction of Islamicate society in the Iberian peninsula in 1492. In Kontje's
reading, German Kultur could not be married to the implicitly imperialist aims of British and
French Orientalism that were identified by Edward Said, because Kultur was by its nature about
setting the boundaries of the nation, at least in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.97
German Orientalism owed much to its French predecessors, and so this chapter will first
delve into the nature of Enlightenment Orientalism and its real-world counterpart in the invasion
of Muslim Egypt by the French Republic in 1798. This experience only deepened the German
tendency to establish links between Islamicate East and Germany, as early German nationalism
defined itself against the conquering French of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic years. The
process of building German nationalism required moving beyond French Orientalist thought, but
also brought German Orientalists into conflict with each other along the religious lines that
divided Germany. It would, in the end, be Marxist thought that brought German Orientalism out
of the realm of religion and scholarship inherited from the French.
The eighteenth century brought not only changes in how Europeans viewed themselves
and their society, but in how European intellectuals viewed the Muslim civilization that had for
centuries been the primary rival, threat, and mirror for Christian Europe.98 The decline of formal
religion, at least among the European intellectual classes, removed one major barrier to
understanding Islamic civilization. This did not mean uncritical acceptance of Islam as a way of
life, and indeed may have hindered understanding in favor of a rigid taxonomy of Muslim laws.
Muslim strictures upon women were noted, often disapprovingly, though a more nuanced

97 Kontje, German Orientalisms, 17.
98 Nasir Khan, Perceptions of Islam in the Christendoms: A Historical Survey (Oslo: Solum Forlag, 2006), 17-18.
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understanding of the liberality of inheritance and other laws in Islamic lands also entered the
discourse. The eighteenth century would close, however, with a European invasion of Egypt that
would bring the French Revolution, the culmination of the Enlightenment, to a Muslim land for
the first time. The disillusionment, on the part of both French and Egyptians, from that violent
encounter would then again alter the European relationship with the lands of Islam. This chapter
will describe the pre-Enlightenment view of Islam and of Muslims within Europe, followed by
the changes in European views during the long eighteenth century, and will end with a brief view
of how those views stood up, or failed to stand up, to the reality of contact with actual Muslims
in Egypt. Though encounters with Persian and Indian Islam were an important part of the
European experience in this age, it was the Arab lands, ruled in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries by the cosmopolitan Ottoman Empire, that remained most familiar. “The Turk”
represented Islam in both its old sense of threat and its newer sense of counterpart to European
culture.99 Therefore, this paper will focus on European views of Islam in its Middle Eastern
heartland. This study is not intended to be taken as comprehensive, but forms the first draft of an
introduction to a much longer project which intends to study European views of Islam in the
German-speaking lands of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Before the process of secularization that formed a part of the broad spectrum of
intellectual changes in eighteenth-century Europe, Islam was seen not as a competing
civilization, but as a heretical offshoot of a common Judaic monotheistic tradition. There was
even a great deal of variation in what Muslims were named in Christian European works.
“Hagarenes” and its related term, Saracens, alternated with “Ishmaelite” and many other labels

99 Ibid. and Michael Curtis, Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East
and India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 2-3.
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drawn from Judeo-Christian mythology to explain the origin of a rival Abrahamic sect.100 The
primary differences noted by European authors were theological, and the “race of Hagar” was
made of “faceless creatures, uninteresting infidels” who were a grave threat to Christendom.101
Medieval Europeans made gendered analyses of their Muslim rivals as well, praising the
presumed warrior masculinity that had built the medieval Caliphate.
Possibly the earliest European writer of the early modern age to attempt to find admirable
practices among Muslims was Henry Stubbe, an English writer of the late seventeenth century.102
Stubbe remained tied to theological explanations of the Islamic eruption from Arabia, and
preferred a novel theory that Muhammad had been “a convert to the Judaizing Christians” of the
early church, only later splitting from Christianity entirely. Islam was to Stubbe a return to the
“Christian republicanism” of the early period after Christ, and therefore closer to the “Noahetic”
laws of the biblical patriarchs than the later dogmatic accretions of the Roman Church.103 Stubbe
is notable not only for rejecting the traditional view of the “deadly Saracen” as the antithesis of
godly Christian life, but also for being an early example of a European philosopher using Islam
as a foil for arguing against aspects of European culture he found distasteful, in this case
“popish” Catholicism. Repeated invocations of the masculine prowess of early Muslim warriors,
and the “wise and just” laws set down by the Prophet Muhammad show the virtuous society
Stubbe believes will follow the adoption of a Protestant “Christian republic” to replace the

100 J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, ed and trans. The Fourth Book of the Fredegar and Its Continuations (New York:
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Catholicizing English monarchy of the late Stuarts.104 As late as 1799, Samuel Taylor Coleridge's
“Mahomet” would continue this tradition of expropriating Muhammad's rebellion against
idolatry in the service of English radicalism.105 Stubbe's and Coleridge's work has, in this way,
less to do with Islam than with English Christianity, a pattern of analysis that will be repeated in
the eighteenth century.
Deism, and the Enlightenment critique of formal religion generally, generated another
opening toward Islam. Deism implied not just a rejection of the more rigid formalities of
Catholic Christianity, but an open-ended investigation of religion, inviting the use of Islam in a
comparative sense. The French philosophe Charles-Louis Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu
would take on this comparison in his satirical Persian Letters, noting the similarity of Muslim
ritual ablutions to the baptism rites of the Catholic Church.106 More seriously, Montesquieu
would in the same passage make light of the theological differences between Christianity and
Islam that loomed so large to earlier writers. Noting the commonality of afterlives, angels,
demons, and the monotheistic tradition inherited from Judaism, Montesquieu would have his
invented Persian Usbek declare that in coming days all French Christians might convert to Islam
without knowing they had done so!107 For all the similarities found by Montesquieu and other
authors, however, it was difference that excited the Enlightenment intellectuals more. In Islamic
law and practice European intellectuals could find a gender hierarchy that was decidedly “other”,
yet remained patriarchal and paternalistic.

104 Stubbe, An Account, 57.
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The differing system of gender relations in Muslim lands did not go without comment
among eighteenth-century intellectuals. Denis Diderot, the famous encyclopedist, recounted to a
female correspondent discussions he had with several noblewomen who frequented salons and
took part in discussions on issues of politics and natural philosophy with their male
counterparts.108 Whereas Diderot displayed a condemnatory attitude to Islam, calling it “reason's
greatest enemy”, his female companions loudly insisted that Islam instead be known as
“woman's greatest friend.”109 Aware of the relative equality of women in matters of inheritance
and property-ownership under Muslim religious law, these women of means contrasted their own
situation with that of a similarly placed Muslim woman, and found themselves the worse off.
Diderot's jocular reply that were he a Muslim he could just tell his companions to “get back to
your harem” provoked the retort that “[a Frenchwoman's situation] would be the same there.”110
The sexual license implied, at least in European minds, by the secretive harem chambers also
prompted commentary, and gave rise to the idea that Muslim women were treacherous schemers
who dominated their husbands. There was a kernel of truth to this, as early-modern Muslim
women who owned or inherited property often ran substantial affairs from within the harem
chambers.111 The equality of inheritance and maintenance of widows and divorced women
provided for by Quranic law prompted Enlightenment feminists like Mary Wortley Montagu to
proclaim Ottoman women better off than English.112 So common was such speculation that
Immanuel Kant felt the need to speak out against it, warning that the end result of such thinking
108 Peter France, trans. Diderot's Letters to Sophie Volland (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).
109 Ibid. 47-48.
110 Peter France, trans. Diderot's Letters to Sophie Volland (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).
111 Juan Cole, Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 79
112 Malcolm Jack, ed. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu: The Turkish Embassy Letters (London: William Pickering,
1993), Letter XLVIII, 138.

39

would be an “overturning of all boundaries”, including gender boundaries. At other times Kant
dismissed Islamic gender roles by reminding his audience of “Muhammad's paradise”, which
was in the European imagination a realm of sexual depravity, rewarding the faithful with
debauchery after death.113
Eighteenth-century European authors often remained condemnatory of Islam as a religion
and a culture, but increasingly they were denouncing its sins against reason, rather than God.
Diderot believed Muhammad “hated knowledge of all kinds” because the Prophet had been an
illiterate.114 Echoing the English authors noted above, however, Diderot could also create an
Islam of the imagination that served the needs of the French social and political scene he was a
part of. Enlightenment, Diderot thought, would spread even to “the Turk”, and when it did it
would spell the end of Islam as a religion: “the more thinkers there are in Constantinople, the
fewer pilgrims will go to Mecca.”115 This was not an alien religion any longer. Muslims might, in
some distant future, take part in the Enlightenment. This did not mean, however, that eighteenthcentury European intellectuals were not aware of the differences between their culture and that of
the Muslim lands.
The general Enlightenment trend toward taxonomy and categorization applied also the
European discourse on Islam. The eighteenth-century tendency to view Islam as a different, but
not necessarily overwhelmingly threatening, civilization allowed a renewed emphasis on the
differences among Islamic sects, something rarely noted in earlier European writings. Diderot
compared Muslim sufi and Alawi groups to the Jansenists and Deists that complicated French
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religious life in his time.116 Kant would later incorporate Islam into a proto-racial classification
system, determining that Muhammad, like all Arabs, was prone to fantastic visions. The
Protestant work ethic was equally alien to all types of “Orientals”, according to Kant, but like
Diderot the German philosopher was able to find a familiar European category in which to place
such outsiders. They were, thought Kant, much like the Anabaptists that had rejected Luther, and
like the Anabaptists represented a threat to sexual and political order that was frightening in its
possibilities.117
The eighteenth century closed with a practical demonstration of just how much had
changed in European views of Islam and of Muslims. In the summer of 1798, a French army
under Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Ottoman Egypt. The military rationale for invading a Muslim
land so far removed from the main theaters of Anglo-French conflict concerned disrupting
British trade and communications with India, but there was also an element of fantasy involved
in an Alexandrian march to the Orient. The Enlightenment lent to this pining for the classical
Egypt a modernist tinge. Bonaparte's unusual expedition included large numbers of scientists,
historians, and even mapmakers, all to bring “the genius of liberty” to the “most distant lands.”118
That distance was ideological as much as real. In planning the invasion, French statesmen
repeatedly invoked the “duty” of the “heirs of Voltaire” to restore Egypt to the imagined
Ptolamaic glories of its pre-Islamic past.119 The French imagined that the ancient monuments had
“fallen into nothingness” during centuries of “domination by the Turk”. The “chaotic” Mamluk
governorship in Cairo “never repaired anything”, and was a fair target because it withheld the
benefits of enlightened civilization from the “tyrannized inhabitants of the Nile”, especially by
116
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restricting French trade in Egypt that might otherwise have brought prosperity to the ancient land
of Cleopatra.120
Yet this was not the religiously-based prejudice against Muslim rule so common in earlier
European commentary. Indeed, one leading scholar of the French invasion believes that the
“dethroning of the Catholic Church in France” was a prerequisite for Bonaparte's “civilizing
invasion” of Egypt.121 The general himself was at pains to stress to his troops the necessity of
respecting Islam, and his speeches to representatives of both nomadic bedouin and sophisticated
Cairene intellectuals upon landing near Alexandria promised not only to uphold Islam and its
traditions, but specifically to respect the harem, something Europeans from an earlier and less
secular era would have found abhorrent. In his Arabic-language proclamations, Bonaparte went
even farther in demonstrating his instrumental view of religion, by disingenuously conflating his
own Deism with Islam. Because the Deists among the French denied the divinity of Christ, as
Muslims did and do, Bonaparte craftily implied his own conversion to Islam without saying
anything explicitly untrue. The scholars of al-Azhar, the most theologically influential Sunni
mosque in the Muslim world, were not impressed, but the crafty pamphlets prepared by his
savants allowed Bonaparte a brief honeymoon with the populace as his army marched up the
Nile.122
The conquest of Egypt was swift, and French casualties light. The occupation after was
rather more onerous, but little organized opposition remained after the initial battles. Instead, as
they went about installing a republican government in Cairo, the French found themselves falling
120 Ibid., 43. Jacques Miot, Memoires pour servir a l'histoire des expeditions en Egypte et en Syrie (Paris: Le
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out of love with an Egypt that could not live up to the myths they had carried in their heads
across the Mediterranean. The French found Cairo dirty, carrying the “odor of mummies”, a turn
of phrase that may imply that modern realities had begun to corrupt even the rosy view of
classical Egypt held by members of the invading forces.123 Though Alexandria was a large city
with a busy port, the French were overall uninterested in the actual economy of Egypt, and
continued to attempt to re-create European forms of land ownership through decree and changes
to the tax code that were much resented among the landowning classes. Despite Bonaparte's
warnings before the invasion that Muslim men treated their women in ways that European men
would not, French soldiers confronted with Egyptian gender realities manifested increasingly
hostile attitudes to the conquered population, though not in ways that are familiar to modern
eyes. Poor Egyptian women were derided as “immodest” and “indecent” for being unable to
afford the veils that covered the heads of the urban upper classes, or for wearing tattered rags that
bared their breasts.124 At the same time, the “unnatural” segregation of women in the harem was
derided, and incidents of French soldiers violating the boundaries of the harem increased as the
occupation wore on, in one case driving an upper-class Egyptian man to fit his black slave
concubines with chastity belts in an attempt to protect bodies he regarded as property. Not all
parts of the Egyptian gender system appalled the French conquerers, however. A French soldier
who witnessed a gruesome honor killing involving a reluctant young bride who became involved
with a young man in her husband's household seemed to understand the impulse behind the
murder. French law, after all, contained many clauses designed to ensure the honor of husbands
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and the certainty of paternity.125 The Code Napoleon of later years would only strengthen this
aspect of French legal culture.
The rejection of General Bonaparte's claims to be saving Egyptian Islam from Mamluk
and Ottoman tyranny by the ulema of al-Azhar marked a turning point in Franco-Egyptian
relations. Stories of French soldiers invading harems gave way to lurid tales of Egyptian women
stabbing their foreign paramours with scissors while they slept.126 A distinctive Enlightenment
essentialism began to color French views of the Egyptians. They were now all “half-savages”
who rejected Enlightened government under the newly proclaimed republic. Distinctions
between the “Arab” nomads of the desert and the “Ottoman” Cairene intellectuals no longer
interested the French. Their “fanaticism”, common to all Muslims, was behind their rejection of
such reforms as the nationalization of the waqfs, the charity endowments peculiar to Muslim
lands, which formed the basis the ulema's power. To placate the ulema, Bonaparte, heir to the
politics of 1789, made the Muslim clergy privileged under the law in a manner reminiscent of the
old French 1st Estate.127
This desperate attempt to co-opt Islam rather than embrace it did not halt the deteriorating
French position. Trapped in Egypt by British naval power, soon abandoned by Bonaparte, the
French expedition was doomed. Its surrender in 1801, however, marked the end not just of
French Egypt, but of the Enlightenment fascination with Islam. The growing secularism and
frenzy for classification of difference among Enlightenment intellectuals created a more than
century-long re-examination of Islam and of Muslims. Though such musings were often more
about questioning the religious and gender norms of Europe than about Islam itself, this
125 Ibid., 39-40.
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nevertheless marked a change in the relationship between two neighboring civilization groups.
The rivalry and fear that characterized the earlier phase did not return after the French surrender
in 1801, at least not in its religious form, but the “Orientalist” intellectuals of the nineteenth
century owe much to that formative experience. The Enlightenment taught European thinkers
that Islam could be studied, classified, and, perhaps, remolded into a more progressive shape, all
without soliciting Muslim input at all.
German engagement with Orientalism in literature and poetry in a different manner as
well. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe did not seek to equate Germany with Christianity in the
realm of ideas, but rather in cultural affiliations that were purely voluntary. After having his faith
shaken by the massive destruction in the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, Goethe would wander
further afield in search of cultural traits that could be incorporated into the German tradition.
Goethe would build upon French Orientalist sources as many of the German late-Enlightenment
figures of Orientalist writing did, translating Voltaire's Mahomet for performance at Weimar in
1800. Goethe's primary contribution to the German tradition of conversation and inspiration from
Islamic writing, however, came after he tried and failed to teach himself to read Arabic. From
these studies, however, he was able to translate enough “Oriental” poetry into German to author
the West-Östlicher Divan, published in 1819.128
The Divan was a collection of poetry inspired, like Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall's work,
by the Persian author Hafiz. Using von Hammer-Purgstall's translation of Hafiz, Goethe
managed to combine Christian European poetic tradition with the fourteenth-century mysticism
of Hafiz's Sufi beliefs. This was the culmination of the Enlightenment Orientalist project in
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Germany, and had a huge influence even on those German Romantic poets who would later wish
to define Germany as a Christian nation. Goethe's work of synthesis, however, repudiated such
views, and sought to emulate the style of medieval Persian poetry. The historical and
biographical allusions sprinkled throughout the work draw from Islamic and Christian culture
indiscriminately.129
Yet, this fascination with Islam on the part of Goethe remained a “cultural conversation”
rather than being about “political power”. It is here we see the German tradition of distant
admiration for Arab poetry and Islamic traditions that caused Edward Said to believe that
German Orientalism was fundamentally different from British and French Orientalism, because
it was less exploitative in its views of the mysterious “East.”130
Contemporaneous with Goethe, Johann Gottfried Herder was more explicit about the
unique place of Germans both in European history and culture, and with respect to the “Orient”.
Herder saw French culture as decadent, partly because of its rapacious imperialism, of which the
German lands were a chief victim. While civilization had long since abandoned its home in the
Mediterranean world for western and northern Europe, this allowed Germany a central place, the
interface between East and West. While Germany owed much to the Greco-Roman tradition,
Herder believed that other “Oriental” cultures could offer as much, or more, and that finding a
uniquely German way between East and West was essential if the politically fragmented German
nation was to ever find a way out of French cultural domination.131
In the German lands after the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, Orientalist
scholarship was part of the general trend toward “scientific” history, and the professionalization
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of history and academia in general. Leopold von Ranke, who would do so much to assist this
trend in history in particular, started his career using Italian sources to study the Ottoman
Empire.132 Von Ranke would give several lecture series on Ottoman history in his early career,
and devote some time to an Orientalist attempt to put the Ottoman state in its Mediterranean
context, alongside Christian empires such as that of Spain. Some authors have detected in this
period of von Ranke's work a tendency to empathize with “losing” factions in history, for
instance in telling the history of Ireland from a pro-Catholic viewpoint. While von Ranke always
approached his Ottoman studies from the point of view of developing Christian nationalism in
the Balkans, Marchand nevertheless sees the “defection” of historians like von Ranke and Johann
Gustav Droysen as abandoning the field of Orientalism to philologists, making German
Orientalism part of a radical Christian project that secularized historical writing and the social
sciences.133 This polemical need on the part of German Orientalists would leave them
increasingly out of touch with the actually existing Orient. The poet and translator of the
Bhagavad Gita, August Schlegel (1767-1845) believed that German Orientalists were therefore
unsuited to take on the task of spreading German culture into Islamic lands. This general
principle would be held, even if Schlegel cannot be credited with it, for the applied Orientalists
discussed in later chapters.134
The most lasting contribution to German Orientalist scholarship in these years was the
gathering of a German-language base of knowledge about Islam, both in its early manifestations,
and in the form of histories of the Ottoman state that provided a basis for later analysis. In this
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24 (2010), 80-94.
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capacity, the Austrian-born Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall stands out. Hammer-Purgstall was
above all a great scholar of Middle Eastern languages, and his major works of translation
included both rendering Ottoman poetry into German, as well as translating Latin- and Germanlanguage works into Farsi and Ottoman. Hammer-Purgstall believed, and that literary and
historical scholarship could not be separated. His major work, completed over the course of eight
years, from 1827-1835, was his ten-volume Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches. For decades
the standard reference for Orientalists, the Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches approached its
subject from a cultural standpoint above all, Hammer-Purgstall largely eschewed analysis of
differing politics and intellectual traditions in favor of religious and literary analysis. This was
completely in keeping with the tradition inherited from France.135
A lesser-known work of Hammer-Purgstall's, however, is more indicative of his
contribution to the pattern of German Orientalism in the academic sphere. Hammer-Purgstall's
short history of the hashashin, the Assassins, must of necessity deal with the early Islamic
schism into Sunni and Shi'ite branches, since the Assassins belonged to the latter. HammerPurgstall thus spends the first section of the book detailing the lineage of the Assassin Order,
from the Sunni-Shi'a split to the branching of the Nizari Shi'ites from the Ismailis, the second
most common form of Shi'a belief after the “Twelver” Shi'ism that predominates in Iran.136 Here
Hammer-Purgstall simply imposes upon the Ottoman- and Farsi-language histories and
chronicles that were his sources a story fitting with his own severe prejudices against certain of
the early Sunni caliphs. Hammer-Purgstall blamed 'Umar, in particular, for purging pre-Islamic
influences from the Arab poetry that Hammer-Purgstall so admired, and which he believed
135 Hammer-Purgstall, op cit. Berman, German Literature, 200.
136 Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Die Geschichte der Assassinen aus Morgenlandischen Quellen (Stuttgart:
Unknown, 1818). See especially 35.
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contained the “core and essence” of Arab civilization.137 'Umar was, in Hammer-Purgstall's
telling, the ruler who introduced “the stamp of fanaticism and despotism” to the Islamicate lands.
Muhammad had “certainly” within his lifetime intended to confer the leadership mantle upon his
son-in-law 'Ali, and therefore the early Sunni rulers like 'Umar were usurpers. To say that this is
a contested viewpoint is a serious understatement, and there cannot have been any source that
could definitively prove this assertion, which lay at the very heart of the Shi'ite secession from
what would become Sunni Islam. Though not admiring the Assassins of over six centuries later
in Islamic history, Hammer-Purgstall would draw a fanciful parallel between the closely
entwined fall of the Assassin Order and that of the Abbasid caliphate, both at the hands of the
Mongols of Hulagu Khan.138
Hammer-Purgstall continues the pattern of German Orientalism in using the “Orient” to
tell stories sympathetic to Islamic and Islamicate societies, but also using the history of those
peoples to further objectives in European historical scholarship. Therefore, Hammer-Purgstall
spends the conclusion of his book on the Assassins comparing them to Freemasons and Jacobins,
and blaming their excesses, the “prostitution of religion to the horrors of unbridled ambition” on
the “iron grip” of the Sunni caliphs that persecuted Ismaili Shi'a. Of this Marchand is especially
critical, calling it part of a pattern of “instrumentalization” of Islamic history.139 Other writers
have compared this part of Hammer-Purgstall's work to that of Michael Cook and Patricia
Crone's Hagarism, which attempts to recast the early history of Islam as a heretical offshoot of
Judaism, indigenous to Palestine, and not to Arabia.140 This criticism must be taken with a grain
of salt. The German tradition of Orientalist scholarship never neglected, as Cook and Crone
137
138
139
140
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would, among other English-speaking authors, sources of Islamic origin. While Cook and Crone
were as well-versed in regional languages as Hammer-Purgstall, the latter never questioned the
provenance of Islamic source material, whereas the former believed that most Islamic traditions
about the origins of the religion dated to centuries after its founding. This difference is not to say
that the two differed in their use of the “Orient” as an imaginary construct useful in academic
debates in Europe, merely that there is in the German tradition a greater sympathy and respect
for Islamicate societies, and this is reflected in Hammer-Purgstall's work, but not in that of Cook
and Crone.
Many of the philologists were only interested in Islamic writings in to the extent they
could be used as a contrast with biblical sources, and to explicate the latter text. This was the
reason that German Orientalism found its home in the 1820s and 1830s in more radical
Protestant writers, who were willing to interrogate the foundational texts of Christianity more
than was permissible for German Catholics in this period. The next generation would branch out
even further from there, and come to embrace Arabistik and Islamic studies more thoroughly.
Chief among the new scholars of the latter half of the century was Ignaz Goldziher, whose
seminal Muhammadanische Studien attempted to graft Islamic law and the hadith onto older
Roman forms.141 Goldziher was of Jewish extraction, and admired the traditions of Islamic
jurisprudence and legal debate as a model for Judaism to emulate. Goldziher would actually
travel at one point to the great Islamic legal center of Al-Azhar in Cairo to observe Islamic
scholarship and legal ruling at first hand.142 His studies were, thus, largely limited to Sunni
traditions, and Egyptian ones at that, and lacked the comprehensive views of earlier scholars on
141 Ignaz Goldziher, Muhammadanische Studieren, (Halle: Trond, 1890), vol. 1, 168. See also Ignaz Goldziher,
trans. Andras and Ruth Hamori, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1981), 27.
142 Goldziher, Introduction, xii.
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the diversity of the Islamic world. Goldziher was part of the German Orientalist tradition of
mining Sunni Islam especially for “lessons”, though in this case for Judaism and not for
Christianity, and therefore remained instrumentalist, and in the opinion of modern scholars of
early Islam like Patricia Crone, oversimplifying. Ironically, Goldziher would prefigure Crone,
whose controversial work (with Michael Cook) on early Islam took much from Goldziher's view
that the hadith reflected, not the founding of Islamic tradition, but the practical debates of the
later Sunni caliphates as they attempted to rule over religiously heterogenous societies facing
problems not foreseen by the founders of the religion.143
Goldziher was thus firmly a part of mainstream German-language scholarship on Islam,
though strangely seen as different by none other than Edward Said. Said believed that Goldziher
was considerably more tolerant and understanding than most European scholars of the “Orient”,
and based this opinion on Goldziher's willingness to travel to Egypt. However, Said's
misunderstanding of the German tradition due to his lack of knowledge of the language
prevented him from understanding the instrumentalist origins of the tributes paid to Islamic
scholarship by Goldziher and other German Orientalists of the nineteenth century. Placing Sunni
scholarship on a pedestal as an object of emulation was superficially more tolerant of nonChristian religious thought than French and British scholars of the day. However the simplifying
and eliding of the actual history of Islamic thought and tradition was also a way of “otherizing”
Sunni traditions, of placing them outside of the “Western” tradition. As will be shown in the
chapters to follow, the idea that travel experience in the “Orient” would lead to greater

143 Compare Goldziher, op cit to Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78.
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understanding of Islamicate society might have been correct. The idea that this also lead to
greater tolerance, or a less-instrumental view of Muslim culture, is not borne out by the evidence.
The next major innovation in German Orientalism would come from outside the
academic world, and would prefigure the applied Orientalists under study in this work. Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels, in formulating the basic ideas of Marxist political economy, would
eventually turn to the idea of generalizing about systems of class and production outside of
Christian Europe. In doing so, Marx would reject for the “Orient”, as for the Occident, the idea
that culture, religion, and other differences in the “superstructure” of a society were more than
the reflection of a foundation built on the relations of a society's classes to the means of
production.144 This attempt to ground a German view of the Orient in the material world could
not, however, completely escape the tropes built up by a century of German-language writing on
Orientalism.
Marxist thought, therefore, had a German tradition of serious, but not especially
practical, Romantic and religious overtones to react against when it turned to Orientalism.
Marxist Orientalism began with Marx himself, in the 1830s, but despite rejecting the philological
tradition of the Romantic period, Marxism would from the beginning seek to “otherize” the
Islamic and Islamicate East in order to use the “Orient” as a useful contrast to the bourgeois
capitalist societies of the “West”. Early German Marxist thought therefore was often of little
more practical use as a guide to actually existing Islamic societies as its predecessors.
Islamic and Islamicate societies appear in the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
as part of a larger “Asiatic mode of production”, whose existence and characteristics would be
debated by Marx's successors in Germany for generations. For Marx and Engels, “Oriental”
144 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, (Moscow:Progress Publishers, 1977), 2.
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political economy was distinctly different from European modes of capital accumulation. The
key difference was due to the absence of the concept of private property in land.
In keeping with their materialist analysis of society, both Marx and Engels were sure that
the importance of cultural differences could be explained by economic ones. Marx acknowledged
a debt to previous French and German Orientalist scholars, but also thought their analysis
lacking in rigor. “Why does the history of the East appear as a history of religions?” Marx asked
in a letter to Engels of 1853.145 “Eastern” societies were not backward by the nature of the people
within them to Marx, and yet he identified their societies as “stationary”. This is an odd omission
of the importance and omnipresence of change, considering the historically grounded analysis
for which Marx was famous in his writings on European political economy.146
In attempting to explain the lack of a system of private property that would enable the
ascendence of a European-style bourgeoisie, Engels at first turned to climate and agricultural
differences. Less fertile soils made agricultural units larger, and kept societies organized along
communal lines, “stuck” in a more primitive mode of accumulation. These material realities kept
agriculture rather overmanned, and prevented the formation of a surplus labor pool, thereby
retarding the development of an urban society with a more pronounced division of labor in the
Islamic Orient and Mughal India. Engels' ideas in this matter were mostly taken from French
traveler accounts and earlier Orientalist writings, and not based upon any first-hand evidence.
Especially influential on Marx was the account of Francois Bernier, a French traveler who visited
the Muslim Mughal court in the mid-seventeenth century. Relying on “old Bernier”, Marx

145 Marx to Engels, June 2, 1853, in Marx and Engels Collected Works vol. 39 (Berlin, 1922), 330.
146 Ibid., 332.
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identified “Oriental” despotism as corrupt and personality-driven, brutal in its justice, and
primitive in its bureaucratic governance.147
It is notable that, in keeping with Marx's dissatisfaction with religious and social
explanations for the supposed differences in the “Orient”, both Marx and Engels refused to
classify Islamic and Islamicate societies as a category of their own. Most early Marxist writings
that fall under the rubric of Orientalist scholarship talk about India and China as much or more as
Iran and Ottoman Arabia.148
If the above sets out a Marxist contribution to German Orientalism, some authors have
also seen an Orientalist contribution to Marxism. Michael Curtis, in Orientalism and Islam,
believes that Marx's musings from the early 1840s onward about the difference in systems of
property between the European and “Oriental” worlds contributed to the classical formulation of
stages to history defined by the relationship of different classes to the means of production, and
different modes of capital accumulation.149 By the time of the Communist Manifesto, in 1848,
Marx would identify these in European history as primitive accumulation, the form of classical
antiquity based upon slavery, the feudal society of the Middle Ages, and finally the present-day
bourgeois society, with its large-scale capital accumulation, and stratification based upon private
ownership of property. Curtis believes that the primacy of the role of private property in the
bourgeois society was something Marx was able to note because of seeing its absence in lands
consigned to the “Asiatic” mode of production.
There is a serious contradiction in this formulation, however. Marx and Engels were not
of one mind on the subject of the “Asiatic mode” of production, and their opinions also seemed
147 Ibid.
148 This is the conclusion of Kontje, German Orientalisms, 187.
149 Michael Curtis, Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and India
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 54.
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to change over time. Marx was more drawn to the idea that the Orient was still in a communal
and tribal system of organization, ignoring the long-established contemporary states in Mughal
India, Qajar Iran, and the Ottoman Empire, which had highly sophisticated governments and
bureaucracies ruling over vast lands.150 Engels remained entranced by the idea that geographical
conditions, even the quality of soil, made farming, and therefore social organization in the
“Orient” somehow more primitive.151 Marx and Engels were here stymied by their desire to avoid
singling out Islamic and Islamicate societies as a special category of Other. In refusing to do so,
their “Asiatic mode of production” encompassed too vast and varied a region to make the
drawing of conclusions a simple matter. Nor was the material analysis an antidote to biased
Orientalist conclusions. However, the emphasis on material reality, such as extraction of wealth,
land tenure, and so forth make a welcome contribution to more total model of Orientalism. In
this way, the chapters to follow, which combine writings of cultural contact with material “lived
experience” are a synthesis of classical Orientalist analysis, and the early Marxist emphasis on
following the use of land and the flows of wealth.
Early Marxist analysis was therefore attempting to make classic Orientalist conclusions
appear to have a more sophisticated reality. Marx's rejection of religious explanations meant a
break with previous Orientalist thought, but was actually a return to pre-Romantic form in that it
saw the “Orient” as inevitably other. It is not clear from either Marx's writings, or his letters to
Engels whether he saw the Asiatic mode of production as having examples or lessons for his
analysis of capitalism. Nevertheless, Marx, in breaking with the Orientalist tradition of seeing the

150 Curtis, Orientalism and Islam, 57-8. Kontje, German Orientalisms, 190.
151 Ibid.
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Islamicate lands in terms only of culture and religion, is a bridge between the Orientalist tradition
in German scholarship and the applied Orientalism studied in the following chapters.
Subsequent Marxist historians have differed widely on the implications of the “Asiatic
mode of production” in the thought of Marx and Engels. Vladimir Lenin would draw much on
Marx's fragmentary discussion of this, agreeing that there was indeed an Asiatic mode of
production and capital accumulation that had material differences from European forms.152
Lenin, however, was using this as an instrument. In his arguments for the necessity of a
revolutionary vanguard party, Lenin found it useful to argue that Russia was itself “Asiatic”, and
the way this was reflected in material terms was in the self-sufficiency of village life and the
absence of a system of freehold tenure in land until very late in Russian history. Despite the fact
that Lenin wrote this decades after the abolition of serfdom in Russia, in the middle of the
Russian Empire's late experiments with bourgeois capitalism, helps make the argument that
Lenin was here not seriously taking into account historical fact, but simply using the language of
Marx to further his own political needs in the 1890s. By 1899, Lenin would write that the
“threads both of merchant's capital and industrial capital” were dependent in Russia on the
“degree to which the Asiatic” mode was eliminated in Russian society. Lenin agreed with Marx
that an Asiatic mode of production was both distinct and antithetical to a bourgeois model, and
that whichever was triumphant in a society must necessarily eliminate the other.153
Here we have the bridge between academic and applied Orientalism in a very pure form.
“Asiatic backwardness” is denounced in Lenin, drawing on Marx and Engels, with a vehemence
that would have shocked cultural synthesists like Goethe or Herder. The earlier intellectuals like
152 Lawrence Krader, “The Asiatic Mode of Production” in International Jounral of Politics vol. 10 no. 2 (Summer
1980), 99-128. Boris I. Nikolaevsky, “Marx and Lenin on the Asiatic Mode of Production” in Society and
History (London: De Gruyter, 1978), 57ff.
153 Ibid.
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Goethe had been at pains to incorporate the Islamicate tradition into their ideas of “civilization”,
not to read it out of modern society, as Lenin did. This is what German academic Orientalisms
might have developed into if applied in the way British and French imperialist culture applied
them, as a useful system for dominating colonies “East of Suez”, in British colonial service
parlance. Lenin showed that Marxism was not yet free of the constraints of Orientalism, despite
Marx thinking that the problem with previous academic analysis of the “Orient” lay only with its
emphasis on the superstructural, on religious culture. The applied Orientalists studied in the
subsequent chapters would recreate Lenin's analysis from a different, and less intellectual,
standpoint, but come to much the same conclusion.
The ultimate example of Marxist thought on the “Orient” would come in the 1950s, and
from Karl August Wittfogel.154 After an early career writing Marxist plays and essays, Wittfogel
became a serious scholar of the “Asiatic mode of production”. In his Oriental Despotism: A
Comparative Study of Total Power, Wittfogel would identify what the “Oriental” system of
government as “hydraulic dictatorship”. Divorcing completely from the idea that the societies of
the contemporary “East” were in any way beholden for their governmental and societal
structures on Islam, or any other religion, Wittfogel identified the key point in the development
of the “Asiatic mode” as the invention of irrigation in prehistorical Mesopotamia, India, and
China. In Wittfogel's mind, only a top-down bureaucratic officialdom, exercising unchecked
power over an immiserated mass of population, could allow for the complex engineering of the
river valley irrigation works of the earliest civilizations. The marks of this in the modern world
were a much weaker system of private property than developed later in Europe, a much greater

154 Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1957).
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reliance on state officialdom, an early development of a complex division of labor. Throughout it
all, the greatest mark of the “hydraulic empire” was its relentless despotism. Wittfogel agreed
with Marx that such societies would be unchanging without outside stimulus. The material
necessity of maintaining precarious agricultural systems, and in later ages the entrenched nature
of the bureaucratic dictatorship, would make any attempt at developing the property rights of
bourgeois society in Europe futile. Any attempt at social revolution might succeed in
overthrowing a dynasty, or in wrecking for a time an “Oriental” civilization, but what was built
in place of the overthrown regime would be fundamentally of the same nature.
Criticism of Wittfogel has focused on his factual mistakes. Generalization of the entirety
of the “Orient” from the Nile to the Yangtze meant that, in the fashion of earlier Orientalists,
much nuance was missed, especially regarding the origins of the Chinese bureaucratic state.
Other authors would take issue with Wittfogel's refusal to countenance any role for Islam in the
creation of Abbasid or Ottoman governance structures, though the attempt to inject religion back
into Wittfogel's Orientalist analysis is really a criticism of the entire Marxist project of the
describing and delineating the “Asiatic mode of production”. Wittfogel's sins were also seen as
historical in nature. Later academic analysis of the rise of the bureaucratic state in the ancient
East would identify state structures and a complex division of labor as the necessary precursors
to mobilizing societies and labor forces for irrigation projects, not the other way around, as
Wittfogel's analysis had it.
This shows us the trap into which Marxist thought fell when it came to the “Orient”.
While determined to replace religion with material factors to explain perceived differences in
government and society, Marxist German writers replaced a religious determinism with a
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geographic one. Marx and Engels remained enamored of the idea that “Asiatic” civilizations had
a fundamentally different mode of production from capitalist Europe, an idea taken wholesale
from previous Orientalist discourse from the Enlightenment that emphasized the vast gulf
between European and Islamicate cultures. While a Goethe or a Herder might have believed that
Germany had something to learn from these civilizational neighbors, or that aspects of modern
Islamic and Islamicate cultures might be admirable, they never escaped the idea that these were
different peoples. While Marxist scholarship would help end the sterile rule of the philologists in
German Orientalism, it also cemented these ideas into German scholarship, something that
would last until the mid-twentieth century.
This, then, was the state of German Orientalist thought from the origins of its modern
version in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century to the period under discussion. If the
essential characteristic of Orientalism in Europe was its abstracting and instrumentalizing of the
“Orient” for European purposes of social and political domination, the German version was a
strange version of the field. There had been a major attempt to reconcile German culture with the
“Oriental”, first because of the attraction of the alien and other in an era of increasing
secularization, and later as part of the project of building a German nationalism that could unite
the disparate German states in a nation-building project, giving an example outside the French,
as well as serving the purpose of proclaiming Germany as an intermediate realm, between Orient
and Occident. This use of the alleged exoticism of the “Orient” to further German national
aspirations, as with Herder, is a classical example of the discipline in that it was always about
European cultural needs, but it lacked the elements of cultural domination identified by Edward
Said as characterizing Orientalism. The philological digression in the Romantic and nationalist
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period was similar, but also became a scholarly dead end as far as studying the uses to which
Orientalism was put in German academia.
It is in the Marxist tradition that we find the bridge between the Enlightenment and
Romantic schools, and the applied Orientalists studied in the following chapters. Marx and
Engels were determined to put Orientalism on a sound materialist footing, and they and their
disciples over the next century were successful in this endeavor. The instrumental portion of the
Orientalist formula remained. The “Asiatic mode of production” frame was, above all else,
intended as a contrast with Marx's developing critique of bourgeois capitalism in Europe. When
Karl August Wittfogel attempted to actually use it to analyze the “Orient”, the multitude of his
historical errors brought the project to a final end. It was only the non-German, Lenin, who was
able to put the new Marxist Orientalism to good use, allowing him to identify Russia's “Asiatic”
backwardness and barbarism as an intellectual support for deviating from previous Marxist ideas
in his advocacy of a “vanguard party” that would bring the masses of society in Russia more in
line with, presumably more civilized and revolution-ready, European societies.
The study of applied Orientalism relies heavily on this explication of what came before it.
The cultural synthesis practiced by Goethe and Herder provides the necessary comparisons for
the following chapters. The applied Orientalists would not always agree that the cultures they
lived and worked among had anything to offer German or European civilization, and would often
start from the viewpoint indirectly inherited from these intellectuals, only to have their thoughts
evolve through their lived experiences. The Marxist turn in German Orientalism is also useful,
less as a contrast than as a bridge between the academic and applied versions of Orientalism. The
material basis of Marxist thought is mirrored in the analysis presented here, in that it is important
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not to neglect the material when speaking of an intellectual movement or trend. In this way, the
applied Orientalists serve the same purpose as Marx's plea to separate religious history from
analysis of non-European cultures. In this case, the method of observing German Orientalism
through the everyday lives of those actually on the ground in the “Orient”, in Islamic and
Islamicate societies in particular, eliminates the academic distance that had characterized
previous German Orientalism. That does not mean abandoning the realm of ideas for the purely
material, as Marx complained to Engels the study of Orientalism had never done before. Rather,
studying applied Orientalism integrates the material reality of the missionaries, soldiers,
diplomats, and businessmen at the vanguard of the German imperial project with the ideas of
Orientalism, and the way in which Orientalist thought was designed to otherize, to use, and to
dominate non-European societies. If putting materialist analysis alongside Orientalism in a
distant, academic fashion lead to the mistakes of Wittfogel, the present analysis aspires instead to
ground material analysis with ideas formed in contact with non-European cultures. The result is
an Orientalism that bears the marks of other European systems of cultural and intellectual
domination, but is different from both them, and from the peculiar German strain of academic
Orientalism before it.
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CHAPTER 3: GERMAN AID SOCIETIES AND MISSIONARIES
The grip of the “Holy Land” on the Christian European imagination was strong. The
possibilities of the “aborted” civilization of Eastern Christianity, supposedly ended by the rise of
Islam, became mixed with the lingering historical fear of the rise of the Ottoman state in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.155 By the eighteenth century, the major and minor European
powers discovered that exercising protectorates of various kinds and strengths over the
Christians of the Ottoman lands gave them an entry for mercantile and other interests as well.156
Missionaries and their infrastructure were therefore as much diplomatic tools as they were
spiritual ones.157 As shown in the last chapter, religious considerations were rarely far from the
study of Islam and from Orientalist literature in the scholarly realms of German thought
generally, whether as a positive or negative influence. Therefore it is important to begin the
discussion of Orientalism in its applied form through the study of the mission records of the
German Empire. These records are not as complete as those of diplomats and soldiers, and are
much more scattered, much more contingent on their perceived importance at the time of their
writing for their preservation. Many more than in governmental archives are in the form of
recollections and memoirs, with all the distortions that memory can introduce into a primary
source. No doubt many missionaries and aid workers in Ottoman lands found it difficult to find
the time to do more than carry on correspondence or perhaps keep a journal, and no doubt much
155 The classic formulation of this Christian European lament is in Arnold J. Toynbee, “The Forfeited Birthdright
of the Abortive Far Eastern Christian Civilization” in A Study of History, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1932), 237.
156 See Chapter 6.
157 This is the thrust of the “negotiated spaces” Alltagsgeschichte study of German women in mission stations,
Julia Hauser German Religious Women in Late Ottoman Beirut: Competing Missions (London: Brill, 2015), xi.
See also Hayk Martirosyan, “Frankfurt Commitee of the German Aid Society for Armenian Relief and its
Activities in the Armenian populated Territories of the Ottoman Empire (1896-1919)” (Unpublished PhD thesis,
Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences, Yerevan). A monograph based on this important
work is unlikely to be translated into English at this time, according to author communication with Dr.
Martirosyan.
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of what they did write is lost. This does not mean that the records examined for this chapter are
so incomplete or imperfect as not to contain worth to this study, however, just because those
examined for later chapters are more immediate to their subject matter, and more thoroughly
preserved. The sources used here still show the change over time from a more open to a more
closed view of the Islamicate society of the Ottoman Empire.
The history of missionary work in the Ottoman Empire has been rewritten several
times.158 Religious workers from Christian Europe had found a home in the Eastern
Mediterranean region, which they referred to as a “holy land”, since the Crusades of the Eleventh
through Fourteenth Centuries. After the Ottoman conquest of the Levant, alongside the rest of the
Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, in the early sixteenth century, the care of the holy places of
Christianity came under the purview of the sultan’s government, the “Sublime Porte”. Historians
of church activities were, in the nineteenth century, the first historical professionals to tackle this
subject.159 Their views were that missionary activity was an unalloyed good, and highly separate
from political or imperial interests, even when states were sponsors or protectors of missionaries.
The repeated attempts, most successful, of the French state to make itself protector of Catholic
missionaries, and the Russian state the protector of the Orthodox priests and missions of the
“holy land,” starting in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Centuries, did not for these
church historians alter the character of the religious activities. These activities included not just
the care and maintenance of the faithful, or the repair and operation of religious institutions and
158 Herb Swanson, “Said’s Orientalism and the Study of Christian Missions” in International Journal of Mission
Research (July 1, 2004), 107. For an overview of the historiography with an emphasis on Armenian issues, see
Margaret Lavinia Anderson, “Down in Turkey, Far Away: Human Rights, the Armenian Massacres, and
Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany” in The Journal of Modern History 79 (2007), 80-111.
159 Swanson, “Said’s Orientalism” 110. Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, A History of the Ottoman Empire and
Modern Turkey, Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 100.

63

reliquaries, but also interventions in local politics from Jerusalem to Beirut, and beyond.160 These
historians took it for granted that Christians were persecuted in all Islamic and Islamicate
societies, and that the Ottoman Empire was no different in this. Overall, the church historians
depended overly on the records of the religious denominations they were studying, and
referenced little to none of the Ottoman civil law, or even religious law aimed at Muslim
communities. This would change in the next wave of historical revision.
By the mid-twentieth century, historians attempted a more balanced view of the nature of
Ottoman-Christian relations, and missionary work in the Ottoman lands. These historians took
the view that, to quote missionary historian Jeremy Salt, these missionaries found “trouble
wherever they went.”161 Or, perhaps, caused it. Mid-twentieth century diplomatic historians
concentrated on the nexus between missionary activity and diplomatic pressure on the Ottoman
Empire, especially in its last century and a half of existence, starting from the 1775 Treaty of
Kucuk Kainardji. This treaty had first allowed the Russian government the right to advocate, and
in the Russian interpretation, intervene, on behalf of the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman
Empire. While there is some evidence that the Ottoman Porte intended this merely to put the
Russian state on the hook for the behavior and financial upkeep of the Orthodox churches and
shrines in and around Jerusalem, it was soon taken as a blank check to intervene on behalf of all
Orthodox Christians throughout the Ottoman realms. Since a large proportion of even the
population of Istanbul were adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church, this was the legal and
moral underpinning for decades of Russian aggrandizement at Ottoman expense.
160 Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 104.
161 Jeremy Salt, “The Missionary Impact” in Salt, ed. Imperialism, Evangelism, and the Ottoman Armenians, 18781896 (London: Routledge, 1993), 10. See also Jeremy Salt, “Trouble Wherever They Went: American
Missionaries and Ottoman Syria in the Nineteenth Century” in Muslim World vol. 92 no. 3, (Fall 2002), 287289.
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This new generation of histories was much more sensitive also to the intricacies of
Ottoman internal politics, or at least of the millet system. Under this system, the Ottoman state
had long allowed a theoretical equality between religious communities to replace equality before
the law. This balanced the needs of a multi-confessional empire with the interests of the Sunni
Muslim elite that surrounded the royal family. Under the millet system, personal status laws, and
most civil affairs such as marriage or inheritance, were under the control of the religious
community to which an Ottoman subject belonged.
The final turn in the historiography of mission work in the Ottoman Empire has been
focused on the late Ottoman Empire, and takes a much more critical approach to the activities of
the missionaries in question. These studies are part of the general reevaluation of the late
Ottoman period, and its rehabilitation of the reputation of the Ottoman state. Many of the figures
of this newest turn are Turkish, and these Turkish scholars’ language skills, and easier access to
sensitive archives from the late Ottoman period, have revolutionized the field, as is shown as
well in the chapters on business, military, and diplomatic affairs in the late Ottoman Empire.
However, this latest reevaluation is also a part of the multidisciplinary turn in Ottoman studies,
with political scientists, students of modernization and state-building, as well as religious and
political historians making contributions that have led to a new understanding of the relations
between the Ottoman state and its non-Muslim subjects, as well as the political impact of
missionary activities in Ottoman spaces.162

162 Salt, op cit, as well as Emrah Sahin, Faithful Encounters: Authorities and American Missionaries in the
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The major finding is that missionaries in late Ottoman times were often beset by a
conflict of “several allegiances and nationalities.”163 Missionaries of the French and British
religious organizations, wherever they were present, “interfered not only as agents of their own
interests, but as agents of their originating states.” This is not to say that all missionary
organizations, all the time, were acting as agents of government action on behalf of authorities in
Paris, London, or Moscow. They could, and did, assert their independence at key points, and
realized all too well the way in which a too-close connection with home governments could
compromise their missions, or even endanger the missionaries themselves. Nor is it to say that
these missionaries did not take their religious work, and the imperative of saving souls, and
tending to the already-faithful’s needs, seriously. This remained a key part of their missions, and
only on the thorny issue of proselytization did they nearly always find themselves at odds with
the local authorities. It is rather a case of power tending to corrupt.164
The main problem was the long aftermath of the Treaty of Kucuk Kainardji. With every
major Christian power asserting equality in “protecting” their own religious subjects, in imitation
of the asserted rights of Moscow over the Orthodox subjects in the Ottoman Empire,
missionaries found that they could increasingly call upon powerful state forces to assist them in
difficulties. A good example is in the problem of proselytization, which was always an issue of
great friction between the Ottoman state and the missionary groups that worked within its
borders. Ottoman Muslim communities looked down on converts, and rumors of conversions
happening at the behest of wealthy foreign institutions repeatedly caused local disturbances. The
Ottoman state’s interest in keeping the peace among its subjects brought it repeatedly into
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conflict with the mission organizations, including and especially the more assertive Catholic
organizations in the French sphere of influence around Mount Lebanon. The mission
organizations were accommodating and understanding of these needs, “in reference to [their]
vulnerability,” but that changed over time.165 The readiness of the French government to
intervene, with military displays, diplomatic threats, and economic action, grew. Crises in the
Mount Lebanon region in 1830, 1858, and 1860, saw increasing amounts of French intervention,
and modern historians perceive a change on the part of the missionaries as well. The missions
more and more realized they were able to call upon the resources of the French state, and, when
their interests coincided, were increasingly willing to do so.166 Interventions on behalf of
missionaries began to bleed into the more general interventions of the European powers into
Ottoman affairs after the reforms of the 1850s and 1870s began to move the Ottoman Empire
toward equality before the law. It got to the point where diplomatic dispatches between Istanbul
and London discussed whether commercial treaties, or treaties granting protection to religious
groups, should be used in particular interventions on behalf of subjects considered to be under
British protection.167
The Ottoman response to missionary and other state-sponsored religious activity
thereafter would be dependent on the political balance between the Ottomans and the Christian
powers. As that balance tipped ever more decisively against the Ottomans by the end of the
nineteenth century, the Ottomans began to become more and more resistant to mission activity.168
The exceptions, at times, were the religious representatives of powers that were not seen as
165 John F.V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 89. See
also Shaw and Shaw, A History of the Ottoman Empire, vol. 2, 230.
166 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 1, 36 and 57-8.
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having overt territorial or diplomatic interests in Ottoman lands, such as the United States and,
after 1871, Germany. Scholars have paid more attention, even now, to American missionary
activities in the Ottoman Empire, although from a point of view of late-Ottoman conflicts, these
feature far fewer international fireworks. The literature often compares these relatively quiescent
relations, which were even more so on behalf of denominations that had no state support at all,
such as the American Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, which had planted Mormon
missionaries in many Ottoman vilayets by the turn of the twentieth century.169 Even where the
literature does not take an overtly comparative or political view of the missionary stations, the
clear thread is that late Ottoman hostility to missionaries increased in step with state intervention.
The final problem with the historiography is tying of missionary activities to the larger
study of the “weaponization” of early “human rights” rhetoric on behalf of intervention in the
Ottoman Empire.170 This has been a part of Armenian Genocide studies as well, in view of the
connection between the massacres and death marches inflicted upon the Armenian people from
1915 forward, and the prewar British and Russian interventions on behalf of the Armenian
people. It would be too neat to simply say that the Armenian massacres were a result of the
prospect of territorial dismemberment to create an autonomous Armenian space within the
Ottoman Empire, something that was pushed for, and achieved, in the summer of 1914, just
before the Great War intervened. However the role of missionaries alongside diplomats in using
reports of local outrages against Armenians to inflame international sentiment, and invite Great
Power intervention in Ottoman affairs, have received scrutiny in the last twenty years. The
diplomatic history of the Armenian interventions of 1913-1914, like those on behalf of the

169 Ibid.
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Bulgars in 1876-1877, and the Macedonian Slavs in 1912-1913, especially in British press and
government circles, is also the history of missionary and diplomatic interests coinciding. The
result was the loss of sovereignty over large areas of the Ottoman Empire, even areas with
Muslim majorities in the case of the “six vilayets” of Ottoman Armenia.171
German missionary work in the Ottoman Empire dated to the 1830s. Germans were “late
to this land, and therefore had to build where others had not already built”, according to an early
donation circular preserved in governmental archives.172 Unlike the other European powers,
which had long viewed their missionary work, especially in Ottoman Palestine, as an extension
of diplomacy, the German government did not seem to take much interest in the period when
Otto von Bismarck remained Chancellor, up to 1890.173 Afterward, this seems to have changed,
and correspondence between the German Foreign Office and mission organizations and aid
stations increased. By 1898, when Kaiser Wilhelm II undertook a tour of Ottoman lands
including Jerusalem, German mission activities there had assumed the form of a “friedliche
Kreuzzug,” a “peaceful Crusade.”174 It was the mission aid stations outside of the main field of
missionary contention in Palestine, though, that would become the most important religious
institutions to German soft power in Ottoman domains during the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries. These mission aid stations were charitable organizations located mostly
among the Muslim Kurds and Christian Armenians of Cilicia and other parts of southern and
eastern Anatolia, and competed mainly with the much better supported Russian missions in those
lands, rather than the British and French. The applied Orientalism of these missions and aid
stations displayed a pattern of increasing antipathy to local Muslims over time, and moved from
171 This can be followed in Shaw and Shaw, A History of the Ottoman Empre, vol. 2.
172 BA R 142-IV 10229.
173 German missions 12; Marchand, German Orientalism, 1-21.
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evangelical activities to a relationship of patronage and protection with Ottoman Armenian
citizens that was, by the First World War, completely at odds with German scholarship on
Muslim-Armenian relations, as well as with German governmental policy regarding those
peoples.
In this way, German missions would be much like the diplomatic and economic
imperialism of the Kaiserreich in Africa and Asia. As a latecomer power, the new German
nation-state had to prove itself, and to muscle aside longer-established competitors. Much time
and archival material therefore deals with this struggle, and led also to an unusual amount of
governmental interest in the mission stations in the period before the First World War. The most
notable contribution to the historical record of this late-blooming German missionary effort,
however, is that it was forced to direct itself into areas of the Ottoman Empire neglected
somewhat by other societies, namely to the Anatolian and upper Mesopotamian lands in the
mountainous foothills of the neglected eastern vilayats of the Ottoman Empire. There the
German missions would find themselves amidst the German efforts to build a Berlin to Baghdad
Railway in the early twentieth century (as detailed in Chapter Five). They would also be
bystanders at the genocide of the Armenian Christians during the First World War, and would
before that conflict be caught up in the complicated tribal and confessional politics of eastern
Anatolia, between Muslim Kurds and Turks, and the Christian Armenians, between Ottoman,
Russian, and German political interests. This made the mission stations, and their
correspondence both with German governmental patrons and the private sources of funding from
churches and businesses that sustained them rich sources for these ill-documented times and
regions, as well as fodder for the study of applied Orientalism.175
175 Swanson, “Said’s Orientalism,” 111.
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The German Aid Society for Armenian Relief was founded in July 1896.176 It was the
outcome of the previous autumn's agitation in the Kolonialgesellschaft periodicals.177 The events
in Ottoman Armenia were the cause of a serious split in opinion among correspondents to the
Colonial Society. “Armenian agitation will be the cause of partition,” was the opinion of P.
Hahn.178 Such a thing could not be easily countenanced, due to the “known friendly opinion of
this state toward Germany.”179 Though Armenian Christians did have their partisans among those
informed about extra-European affairs: “Fellow Christians cannot be mistreated without German
action,” was the opinion of H. Hühne, “All other Christians look on!”180
The overwhelming sentiment in the letters of the Colonial Society periodicals addressed
the issue of the Armenians being fellow Christians, despite differences of doctrine and
allegiance.181 The differences between Armenian rites “was nothing compared to the differences
of Christianity and Islam.”182 Nevertheless, it was important to avoid the appearance of
impartiality. No favor was to be attached to the Armenians' Christianity, as this was a sentiment
that would not be abided by the Ottoman government. Despite the distinction being drawn, the
chief organ of the Colonial Society acknowledged that the Ottoman lands were a field of
“business and trade, but not candidates for direct control” “friendly relations with Islamdom”
were as important as any help to be afforded to Christians on account of assumed common
religion with Germans.183

176 Marchand, German Orientalism, 212. There is a notice to this effect in the Kolonialgesellschaft archives, a
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The end result of this was the creation of a private relief agency, the German Aid Society
for Armenian Relief, which established headquarters in Maras (modern Kahramanmaras) the
following summer.184 This society was funded by contributions from interested parties in both
Frankfurt and Berlin, and began immediately spinning off smaller outposts in the towns and
villages of Ottoman Armenia, such as Van, Bitlis, and Diyarbakir.185 Their immediate goal was
seeing to the material needs of refugee Armenians with handouts in both cash and relief supplies
such as food and blankets. The records of the aid society, copied to the archives of the Foreign
Office's liaison for mission activities, indicates that in the first five years of its operation nearly a
third of recorded gifts of relief supplies were for either Muslim families, or those of an
indeterminate origin unlikely to be Armenian.186
Due to conventions of personal naming, handouts to Armenians could be, and were,
recorded by the family name of the head of household.187 For Muslim names, which are often
either in the form of a place name indicator or group affiliation, entries differ widely. For
example, in the Maras aid station, entries recorded to prove the work of the station indicate that
for May 1900 assistance of food and blankets was given to “Artikian family”, an obviously
Armenian name and entry style, but also to “Sammars”, probably an odd spelling of Shammar, a
large grouping of clans in northern Mesopotamia and Cilicia. That this was aid not to a family
but probably a semi-nomadic grouping of Muslims from the region is attested to by the much
larger recorded charity to “Sammars” than to any other entry for that period.188
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It was in the period that the Maras station and its sub-stations were being established that
the Armenian issue was becoming internationalized.189 The massacres of 1896 in Cilicia were
repeated in areas further west in 1900, and in eastern Anatolia in 1908. German sources were
unabashed in their antipathy to international calls for protection of the Armenians. The formation
of committees advocating German intervention in the Near East was noted by the Colonial
Society with some disdain. “The interest in Armenian affairs in other nations is but a prelude to
war with the Turkish state. No German should help this program, which is designed to bring
about another war [like 1878].”190
Diplomatically, the situation of Ottoman Armenians did lead to discussion of partition.
Despite religious splits among the Armenians, the Russian government in St. Petersburg had long
claimed protection of all Armenians, even Latin-rite Armenians.191 This quasi-protectorate did
not have the legal force of the protection established by all the European Christian powers over
their respective missions in the Palestine establishments, but the Russians became eager to
acquire legal powers over Armenians in the last two decades before the outbreak of war in
1914.192 In early 1914, a pact between Russia and its Entente allies in Britain and France
recognized Russian influence over the “six vilayets” of Ottoman Armenia in Van, Erzerum,
Mamuret-ul-Aziz, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, and Sivas.193 In these lands, though none of them had an
Armenian ethnic or Christian religious majority, the police were to be drawn from Armenian
communities, including exile communities of Armenians within the Russian Viceroyalty of the
Caucasus. Laws were to be changed to undo the post-1908 revolutionary Ottoman government's
189
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recognition of equality for all millets (religious “nations”). This included an exemption from
certain taxes and from conscription for the Ottoman Armenians.194 Behind the scenes, the
Russian government pressed for autonomy of the six vilayets region as a Russian satellite. Once
Russia was at war, in late October 1914, the Russian government would ask its allies for
permission to annex Ottoman Armenia after victory, a demand that was not dropped while the
Tsarist government survived, and which was only revealed by the Bolsheviks after the October
Revolution of 1917.195
German policy recognized the threat to the Ottoman state and its territorial integrity that
the “Armenian Question” represented. While there was not much of a response to the Armenian
massacres of 1896, two years later on the occasion of the Kaiser's state visit to the Holy Land,
German diplomats reiterated their support to the Ottoman state on issues of integrity even where
“Macedonia and the Armenians are concerned.”196 This was an explicit acknowledgement that
Germany recognized the issue of Armenian status was related to the potential disintegration of
the Ottoman Empire. This contrasts with British policy of the time, which tried to de-emphasize
the link between Armenian separatism and the massacres.197 British popular media fanned the
flames of outrage over the killings of Christian Armenians in the same way as the they had the
“Bulgarian horrors” of 1876, which William Gladstone had used to attempt a political comeback
by criticizing the pro-Ottoman stance of the Conservative government of Benjamin Disraeli. The
Armenian issue was portrayed as part of the general “frightfulness of the Sultan's despotism”,
and portrayed as the inevitable consequence of “the rule of the Crescent over Christians” in the
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Near East.198 The German press at home followed the government line in Berlin, reporting that
Russian agents had been responsible for stirring up animosity in Ottoman Armenian
communities.199 Despite the pan-Islamic sympathies of the Hamidian administration, and their
direct subsidies to Kurdish militias that were responsible for most of the massacres of
Armenians, the Ottoman state was said to be a neutral party that wished to end the bloodshed.
It was in this charged situation that the Maras aid station was established in 1896. Maras
had been one of the epicenters of anti-Armenian purges in that year, but nevertheless the initial
intent of the aid station was to foster “peace through charity and good actions” among all the
religious and ethnic communities in southern Anatolia.200
Ironically, the missionary activity of the Maras establishment was more problematic for
its Armenian charges, as the Germans now saw the Armenian populace, than with the Ottoman
authorities. The Armenian Church had an ambivalent attitude about missionary activity from
Russian Orthodox agents before this. In the opinion of the missionary staff, including G. Becker,
this was due to the “ineffective nature” of Russian activities, as well as to the national question
that pitted Armenians against the Russian state on the other side of the border, in the Russian
Viceroyalty of the Caucasus.201 Though the Germans were aware in the Armenian case of the
generally secular nature of the Armenian nationalist underground, in the opinion of German
consuls in Ottoman Armenian the Armenian Church was at least a “passive collaborator” and
“sometimes of help to” the Armenian nationalists.202 At first the Germans seem to have believed
that the Protestant nature of the establishments in Ottoman Armenia would shield them from the
198 McMeekin, Russian Origins, 73. Constantinople to Berlin, BA R AA-37:5, December 1, 1896, enclosure.
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202 Ibid.

75

hostility felt to the Russian missionaries.203 In reality, the Armenian Apostolic Church hardened
its stance against the German missions over time. Yet during this period the Germans actually in
these mission stations were telling their home audiences a very different story.
The German mission aid station at Van was equally implicated in the turn away from
Ottoman Muslims in the years before and during the Great War. This mission station, established
in 1900 was sponsored by the Evangelical Church, and the devoutly Lutheran establishment
there arrived with a desire, according to their missives to the German government, to “minister to
the needs of the Turks and give them an idea of Christian charity”. This mission was determined
not to cause trouble with the largely Armenian population of the Van region, and recognized in
their mission statement to the German government, which was copied to the German mission in
Istanbul, that they were not seeking to revise the “religious character” of the region. This seems
to be a boilerplate reference to apostasy among Muslims and aid to Christian minorities, and is
found in literature concerning British and French missions elsewhere in the Ottoman realms.
The 1909 pogroms against Armenians in the eastern Anatolian plateau were not as severe
as those of the Cilician region, but nevertheless they left a mark on the aid station. Georg
Schmidt, chief of the mission aid station, reported to a correspondent in the Kolonialgesellschaft
archives that his mission had previously mostly given medical and food aid to the Kurdish tribes
in the hills around Lake Van.204 With the events of 1908-9, this aid shifted. The Armenians were
now seen as needy, and Schmidt reported that even though material want still lay with the
Kurdish nomads of the countryside, the aid station was now duty-bound to “assist these poor
Christians who come from the other provinces.”205
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There is a clear change in policy at the Van station, and it is only partly a material change
based on circumstances beyond the control of the aid station. Like the other aid stations, the
archives of both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Society contain numerous letters indicating
both the activities of the aid station staff and hints of their attitudes. In this case, there is a clear
change after 1909. In an enclosure to a routine report on the status of German citizens in the area
of Van to the Foreign Office in June 1910, for example, Schmidt is said to have decided that “the
[Muslim] Kurds will destroy the Christians in this province if they can.”206 The withdrawal of
central government funding to Kurdish militias, a policy of the pre-revolutionary regime of
Sultan Abdulhamid II, was not considered the cause of Kurdish Muslim hostility to the Armenian
Christians of the Van district.207 “The cause of their actions is only religious hatred and desire to
end Christianity. This is the end of Muslim desires.”208 The essentialism is striking, since the
1908 missive to the Foreign Office was instead full of sympathy for Kurdish plights, and took
great pains to emphasize the amount of charity distributed to the local Muslim Kurdish tribes.209
This, along with the original mission statement at the establishment of the aid post, contribute to
a picture of a staff that grew less nuanced, and more essentialist, in their view of local Muslims
over time.
By this point, German diplomatic activity regarding the Armenian issue within the
Ottoman Empire was largely directed at minimizing the local violence and emphasizing the
Russian ties of the major Armenian nationalist groups like the Dashnak and Hunchak parties,
both of which were organized on Russian territory in the Caucasus.210 Though both of these
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parties were to some extent opposed to the Russian government by reason of socialist sympathies
and nationalist separatism, respectively, the German government's line was to minimize these
anti-Russian ideas and to portray efforts to play up Armenian troubles as tending toward the
disintegration of the Ottoman state.211 Expressions of support for the integrity of Ottoman
territory became the primary way in which the German state responded to the anti-Armenian
riots in Anatolia.212 In 1914, the German and Austro-Hungarian governments, united by their
decades-old alliance, were the only European powers to object to the imposition of autonomy on
the Armenian vilayets of the Ottoman Empire.
The final sign of a pro-Armenian tilt in the previously neutral mission stations was the
creation of Armenian-only orphanages.213 Despite the foundation of the aid stations in the
aftermath of anti-Armenian massacres, correspondence with a leading German sympathizer of
Armenian causes indicates that the missions' home churches and supporters had believed that
orphanages for Christian children only would indicate a dangerous partisanship in a volatile
situation.214 As of 1901, it was thought that permission to run the aid stations might be
withdrawn, or that the foundation of Christian-only orphanages might bring about a new round
of communal conflict in Cilicia and eastern Anatolia.215 A major driver of the orphanages was a
Norwegian-born missionary who took on the cause of Armenian children as her life's work.
“Mother Katherine”, born Bodil Biorn in Norway, was another missionary present in
Ottoman Armenia during the events of 1909 and after. Biorn went to university in Germany, and
afterward was recruited as a Lutheran missionary for the Ottoman station. Like many of our
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other figures here, she was based in Mus, and arrived with ideas that her mission house could not
only care for Armenian Christians, but foster respect among the different religious groups in the
vilayet of Mus. Upon arrival in the Ottoman lands in 1905, Biorn started a lively correspondence
with the sponsors, both religious and secular, of the mission station.216
At the time of her arrival, relations between the Turks, Kurds, and Armenians were
peaceful but uneasy. The local situation was disrupted in 1909, when a large group of refugees
from the Balkans was settled in the vilayet. 1908 had seen Bulgaria proclaim itself an
independent kingdom, throwing off thirty years of quasi-independence under Ottoman
suzerainty, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after a
similar period of occupation and Ottoman suzerainty. This caused another of the periodic waves
of Muslim out-migration from the Balkans, especially from Bulgaria. The number of Muslims
entering the Ottoman realms from outside in this period was at least 300,000 according to Justin
McCarthy, whose work has analyzed these refugee flows.217 The German diplomats at the capital
estimated it to be only somewhat less than this figure.
Mother Katherine recorded the arrival of a Turkish family from Bulgaria on June 10,
1909. The family was settled in a village in the Mus region, and was the first of several. Mother
Katherine's initial response to the arrival of so many additional Muslim refugees was to express
hope that their settlement in the area meant they had survived a terrible situation. As time went
on, closer contacts seem to have changed her mind. By August 20 she would write to the nearest
consulate that the German government should be enjoined to ask that no further refugee families
216 For the outline of her life, see Inger Marie Okkenhaug, Christian Missions and Humanitarianism in the Middle
East, 1850-1950, 90ff. See also Julia Hauser, “From Transformation to Negation: A Female Mission in a ‘City
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be settled in the region, as this was a question related to “the safety of the mission located among
so many Muslims”. By September 10, this was reiterated as an aside in another report on nursing
activities at the mission house, and this time was related not just to the safety of the European
missionaries, but also to the survival of the local Christian Armenian population.218
Mother Katherine was increasingly in sympathy with Christian subjects of the Ottomans.
She initially, like many Europeans, welcomed the “Young Turk” revolution of 1908-9. The
seizure of power by the Committee of Union and Progress (Ottoman: Ittihad ve Teraki) was
initially a subject of joy for her. “The late events,” she wrote in German to the German consul in
Aleppo, “are perhaps for the better. Development will help all the people here, both Muslim and
Christian”. Just after the proclamation of equality before the law for all peoples, she was equally
enthusiastic, proclaiming that even the burden of conscription would help the Armenian and
Assyrian Christians find a place in Ottoman society on par with Muslims. Mother Katherine also
seemed to recognize the harm that might be done by a close association with the Christian
powers of Europe. “Russian help will not make the Christians here better off.”219
This began to change in the last years before the war. Mother Katherine's letters,
preserved in consulate records that were copied to Berlin, indicate that she increasingly feared
for the Armenian orphans. She endorsed theories that the pan-Islamic sympathies of the Ottoman
government would lead to a return of the ancient and long-suppressed Janissaries. While
attributing this to rumors among the Armenian populace, Mother Katherine expressed to the
German consulate disquiet about “whether this can be expected soon or later”. In reality, the
post-1908 revolutionary government had proclaimed equality before the law for all Christians in
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the empire, and indeed it had be the previous regime of Abdulhamid II's absolute rule that had
emphasized Islamic identity and the importance of the Sultan's role as Caliph of all Islam to
preserve imperial unity.220
The changes came about not because of any new violence in this part of the Ottoman
realm, but instead went hand in hand with the increasing political and economic penetration of
the empire by German capital, German soldiers, and private German individuals. Mother
Katherine records the arrival of a German economic mission in 1913, which included telegraph
engineers and construction foremen to create the infrastructure that, by treaty, was to be provided
by Germany along the route of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway in return for the Ottoman
government's permission to undertake that massive project. A missionary letter home
republished in a church circular tells of the salutary effect of “German workers, who show the
local [Muslim Kurdish] tribes the benefits of civilization”. Mother Katherine herself believed
that the presence of Europeans “ensured tranquility”, a great contrast to previous correspondence
that emphasized the need to avoid adding too many non-locals to the aid station staff for fear of
antagonizing Muslim residents wary of imperial encroachments.221
The same issues we have seen in other aspects of the German presence in Ottoman lands
now shows itself here. Greater contact with the realities of German power and Ottoman
weakness, and familiarity with Ottoman citizens and the Ottoman government produced, not
greater tolerance in German applied Orientalists, but less. What began as a mission to alleviate a
communally violent situation without partisanship, a mission already controversial due to its
requiring going against a government seen as friendly to Germany in international affairs, had
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already by the time Biorn arrived turned into an attempt to protect local Armenians
exclusively.222 As in Maras, this involved an orphanage attached to the mission house, which took
in Armenian children. In her letters, Biorn indicates that rumors among the Armenians indicated
that these children might, without foreign protection, be given to Muslim families to convert
their religion.
Missionaries were as much applied Orientalists, as much a part of the negotiation of
German views of Islam and of Muslims, as more traditional agents of state power. It is clear from
German governmental sources that the Auswärtiges Amt viewed missionaries as potential agents
of influence, but also as interpreters of the “East” for the authorities.223 This was a practice with a
long history in the Ottoman Empire and in Persia. The Russian Orthodox and French-sponsored
Roman Catholic missionaries in Syria and Palestine had long been a part of their respective
nations' strategies for economic and political influence on the eastern shores of the
Mediterranean Sea.224 The correspondence here, and the involvement of colonial pressure groups
in religious activities like the mission stations in Maras and Mus demonstrate the German
commitment to utilizing these eyes on the ground, as does the reports given to the diplomatic
stations in Aleppo and Iskenderun.
The initial hopes for a German role in reconciling Christian to Muslim in these troubled
regions of the Ottoman Empire gave way to a much more narrow and partisan view over time. If
this were all, it would suffice to note the increasingly violent pogroms against the Armenians,
and the rising ethnic and religious tensions due to the end of Kurdish tribal subsidies after the
revolutionary overthrow of Abdulhamid II's absolute rule in 1908-9. It is when we examine the
222 Ibid.
223 Consul Alexandretta to Berlin, BA R AA 28: 2, July 7, 1905.
224 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 30.
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beliefs of our historical subjects about Islam as a religious system that we can arrive at further
conclusions. For example, the belief held by both Biorn and the German consulate handling his
case that “Abdalla”, an Arab from Damascus who had converted along with his family at Maras,
would be subject to Muslim law, and in danger of death due to apostasy for having been
baptized, is undoubtedly false.225 The Ottoman millet system had been abolished in 1909, and
thereafter the new civil courts did not recognize such a crime.226 There is an increasing tendency
to believe these stories among the subjects of this chapter. The more they become acquainted
with Muslims on the ground, the more they become part of a larger theme in German Orientalist
thought. As Germany gained greater material contact and control over Muslim lands, the
previously notable tendency toward German tolerance began to taper off into a new narrative that
made of Ottoman and other Muslims an alien Other, irreconcilable with Christian co-existence.
This tendency increased even to the point of advancing Armenian causes when those were being
studiously ignored by the German Foreign Office.227 Even during the World War, and Germany's
struggle to survive a two-front struggle in Central Europe, German missionaries endangered their
lives and careers in order to bring accounts of the Armenian genocide to their audiences.
The most well-publicized version of the Armenian massacres for a German audience was
that written by Dr. Johannes Lepsius. As chair of the Deutsch-Armenischen Gesellschaft from
1914, which he helped found, Lepsius had tried since at least 1909 to influence the German
government against the Ottoman measures to control the Armenian population, including even
being against the Committee of Union and Progress government's measures to count Armenian
225 Biorn to Consulate Mus, August 14, 1911, in BA R AA 43: 7.
226 Shaw, Ottoman Empire in the First World War, vol. 1, 222, and Shaw and Shaw, A History of the Ottoman
Empire, vol. 2, 29.
227 Ernst Jäckh, The Rising Crescent (New York: Farrar, 1944), 18. The source is invaluable for providing an inside
view of German debates about the Ottoman and Turkish “Orient,” but the author’s political grudges stand out. It
must be used with caution.
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numbers and extend legal equality to Armenians after the end of the ancient millet system's
discrimination among differing kinds of religious legal regimes.228
Lepsius is also a complicating factor in this analysis of German Orientalism, in that he is
the one figure among the Armenian aid societies that never seems to have seriously considered
his pro-Armenian position to be compatible with a pro-Ottoman and pro-Muslim one.229 Even
before leaving for work among the Armenians, Lepsius was scathing in his denunciations of
Ottoman government over the Armenians, believing that Christian peoples could not be ruled
successfully or peacefully by a Muslim power.230 This theme continued all during the war years,
with his correspondence with the diplomat Ernst Jäckh indicating that he never changed his mind
regarding the situation of the Armenians.231 He agitated for a German protectorship of Armenians
under Ottoman control, though he was careful to tell Jäckh and others that he “did not mean this
to be the end of Ottoman rule in Asia Minor.”232 This was likely to be politically prudent at the
time written (1914), considering that the main concept for Armenian autonomy in international
politics was being advanced by the Russian Empire.233
Lepsius was responsible for the primary German civilian narrative of the Armenian
massacres. In a series of accounts that read like journal entries, compiled between 1914 and
1917, Lepsius meticulously documented the entire enterprise of forcibly deporting the Armenian
population of eastern and central Anatolia. The “death marches”, a term Lepsius may have

228 Johannes Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenien, Sammlung Diplomatischer Aktenstucke (Potsdam: Tempelverlag,
1919) is useful even for the earlier thoughts and writings of its author, though it concentrates on the war years.
The Lepsius papers are archived in Munich, and were being converted from microfiche to a more modern
format at the time of this writing.
229 Ibid., 171.
230 Jäckh, Rising Crescent, 89.
231 Ibid., and 110.
232 Lepsius to Jäckh, April 10, 1914, BA R AA 52: 2.
233 Ibid. and McMeekin, Russian Origins, 88.
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coined, of these populations across the desert to Deir-ez-Zor in the Syrian badia (steppes or
“wastes”) was an inconvenient fact for the wartime German government.234 Lepsius' narrative
was censored in Germany, but thousands of copies were distrubuted through the
Kolonialgesellschaft and other Orientalist organizations before the book was fully suppressed.235
It is notable that Lepsius' narrative drew on German sources that could not have been
Lepsius himself. The account of Ottoman atrocities in Van, for example, cannot have come from
Lepsius or anyone in his organization, as their aid stations were located only in southern
Anatolia. His sources may have been diplomatic, as most German diplomats in the Ottoman
Empire were well aware of the atrocities against the Armenians.236 There were, however, also
Armenian aid stations of German origin in Van, as we have seen. It is more plausible that
Lepsius' sources were from here, especially as none of the German ambassadors and consuls in
the Ottoman lands were open about their knowledge of the Armenian genocide until well after
the war. While this can only be conjecture, if the sources were within the German aid station in
Van, this is further proof of their disaffection from the Ottoman (and Muslim Kurdish) cause.
The Armenian aid stations were a prime example of applied Orientalism. Germans
motivated by humanitarian and religious concerns, but nevertheless anxious at the start of their
missions to maintain a neutrality regarding the religious balance of power within the Ottoman
realms, came to hold very different opinions as they became actors in the discourse of
Orientalism. Contact with the predominantly Kurdish and Turkish Muslim populations created an
antipathy and sense of superiority. “These Turks and Kurds are not as clean, nor as intelligent as
the Armenians, and little can be done with them.”237 Over time, sympathy at the aid stations
234 Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenian, 401.
235 These are found in BA KG 1916 misc.
236 Anderson, “Down in Turkey, Far Away” and Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenien, 377.
237 BA R 50 II 10274 (April 1914), Consulate Adana Report on Missionary Stations, ii.

85

became more and more overtly pro-Armenian. The solution to the “Armenian Question” came
less and less to be seen as a function of Christian charity and inter-religious reconciliation after
great violence, but instead on the realization of Armenian political goals. After the violence of
early 1914, the aid stations became openly desirous of Armenian separation from the Ottoman
Empire, even though that was explicitly not the goal of the German government.238 There is no
evidence that the German aid stations, unlike their Russian counterparts, and the consulates run
by the Russian government, openly sheltered Armenian revolutionaries.239 The documentary
record examined here only reveals a deep and growing divide between the German government's
goals in the Ottoman Empire and those of the mission aid stations in the zone inhabited by mixed
Muslim and Christian populations in Anatolia. Considering the pressures of the World War, it is
surprising that the German government, in its correspondence with the aid stations that were an
arm of its own soft power, did not attempt in any serious way to control the growing anti-Muslim
and anti-Ottoman sentiment. The censorship of German aid stations' records of the Armenian
genocide, beginning in the second half of 1915, was the only action the Berlin authorities used to
control what amounted to a small-scale rebellion against official thought and policy on the
ground in Ottoman lands.
By 1915, Lepsius and the other German mission leaders ran half a dozen stations in the
Anatolian regions of the Ottoman Empire. They were therefore in a position to report accurately
on what was happening, and did so both through official channels and through other countries'
diplomats. Lepsius himself, for example, had a conduit through Henry Morganthau, the
American ambassador to the Ottoman Empire during the war years.240 Morganthau reported early
238 BA R 50 II 10274 (April 1914), Consulate Adana Report on Missionary Stations, ii.
239 Nothing in the consulate archives or Colonial Society mission correspondence indicates this. There is a mention
of Armenian “bandits” in the hills around Van. These may have been Dashnak fighters.
240 Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (New York: Doubleday, 1918).
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on in the period of the Armenian massacres that Armenians being deported from Anatolia were
being “massacred” after their removal from their homes in the villages around Erzurum, the main
Ottoman garrison town in eastern Anatolia. In communications with the United States
government, Morganthau specifically names his source as “Doctor Lepsius, President of the
German-Orient Mission”, and provides some details of times and places that were not even
available in extant communications with the German government at this time.241 This shows that
the mission stations were in communication with foreign governments as well, possibly
indicating that they did not perceive German ambassadors as reliable conduits for information
that might prove detrimental to a wartime ally of Germany like the Ottoman Empire.
German missionary stations were not closed down during the war, and operated in
concert with other aspects of the German presence in the Ottoman realms. For example, German
businessmen and engineers associated with the Berlin to Baghdad Railway project were afforded
rooms in mission stations in the Anatolian hills during early phases of the route-scouting and
construction.242 Not all German missionaries were comfortable with this changed role as agents
of what some thought to be German “imperialism”. In an initial communication concerning
housing railway engineers on a scouting and surveying expedition at a station near Ankara, a
German missionary expressed their concern that the mission's relations with the local Muslims
would be effected by the presence of Germans who were not part of the station's mission of
mercy.
Martin Niepage was a German teacher attached to a school run through mission funds in
Aleppo, capital of the vilayet of the same name in Ottoman Syria. During the early phases of the

241 Ibid. 202.
242 See Chapter 7.
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Armenian genocide, in 1915, he reported on the roundup and partial massacre of the entire
Armenian population of Aleppo, which was considerable before the First World War. Niepage's
account, like many others detailed in this chapter, was published after the war, based on notes
and journals taken at the time of the events but not subsequently available.243 It is less useful for
showing any changes in attitude that characterize the applied Orientalists, but an important
witness to a moment in time, and accords in its snapshot fashion with the other applied
Orientalists under study.
Niepage returned to his mission school in October 1915, at the start of the Armenian
massacres. In his accounts of the horror, he quickly sums up the things he saw: “a new phase of
Armenian massacres had begun which was much worse than the horrors under [Sultan
Abdulhamid II].” Niepage does not give us an account of his previous thoughts, but he does
seem to take, at first, a credulous view of the charges laid against the Armenians he saw marched
through the streets, or lying dead in rows after exhaustion or disease had taken their toll. Niepage
heard that some of the Armenians were involved in espionage on behalf of the British or
Russians. Some, he was told, had been part of the uprising around Lake Van earlier that year, or
had given aid and comfort to those who had risen against Ottoman rule there. Niepage was not
willing to dismiss these charges at first, as they accorded with what he had heard before, and
because he found the idea of the Ottoman authorities embarking on a wholesale campaign of
extermination against the Armenian minority “incredible.”244
Nevertheless, Niepage was to come to believe the evidence after seeing the state of
Armenian women and children in Aleppo. His testimony went beyond simply reporting what he
243 Martin Niepage, The Horrors of Aleppo Seen By a German Eyewitness (New York: New Age Publishers, 1975).
An original copy was unobtainable.
244 Ibid., 7 and 9.
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saw, to speculate upon the motives behind the massacres. “[the massacres] aimed at
exterminating the intelligent and industrious Armenian people, and at transferring its property to
Turkish hands.” Niepage speculated that the “progressive” nature of the Armenian people was
due to its Christianity, and that this was what had aroused the jealousy and hatred of the Muslim
population of the Ottoman Empire.245 Niepage would go on to attempt to bring this testimony to
the world, but found himself stymied by German authorities, who wished to “cloak” the
massacres of the Armenians behind a veil of military necessity. The Niepage testimony does not
show the change over time of some of the more complete applied Orientalist texts, but it contains
familiar tropes. That Christianity was a reason for jealousy, and that religious motivations, and
not necessarily only political ones, were to blame for communal massacre in Ottoman lands.
None of this is to say that Niepage’s speculation was not correct, only that it accords with
patterns noticeable elsewhere.
Alma Johansson was a Swedish missionary, but attached to the German mission aid
station orphanage located in the city of Mus, in eastern Anatolia. Mus was of mixed population
within the bounds of the urban area, but the surrounding countryside included a large Armenian
population which had, before the First World War, been often at odds with the Turkish and
Kurdish Muslims that also populated the area. Johansson was not German, but because she
worked with the German missions and was in communication with German military and
diplomatic authorities during the Armenian massacres, her narrative has survived in German
records, though her own recollections were only eventually published in Swedish. That book,
based on diaries kept at the time, is not as great a source as her accounts given in German

245 Ibid., 15.
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diplomatic correspondence at the time, which was much more voluminous about the Armenian
genocide, and is both more easily accessed, and more proximate to the events.246
Johansson’s mission, funded by the Deutscher Hilfbund, was mostly concerned with
Armenian orphan children in the area around Mus. Having grown up in poverty in Sweden,
Johansson felt an affinity for the poor of her chosen station, and especially for the poor mothers,
“who reminded me so much of my own.”247 Training as a midwife in order to better assist the
women of the region, Johansson at first wished to transcend boundaries of nationalism and
confession. She wondered why the station did not attempt to reach out to Muslim women in the
same fashion, while acknowledging the always thorny issue of proselytization made such things
difficult. Due to those difficulties, permission from the home office was not forthcoming, and
Johansson moved on to other pursuits. As a Lutheran, she and her colleagues had more contact
with the American and British missionaries of the Armenian-populated regions of Anatolia than
with Catholic or Orthodox missions. Johansson at first disliked especially the American
emphasis on close cooperation with business interests, which she felt jeopardized the neutrality
of the mission work.248
By the end of her time in the Ottoman Empire, Johansson would be understandably less
worried about neutrality. During the clearances of Armenians from the Mus vilayet, in 1915, she
witnessed atrocities so great that even decades later, as she ended her life at a mission in
Thessaloniki in Greece, she hesitated to discuss them.249 She would later testify to the destruction
of the entire Armenian population, even including women and children known to, or under the
246 Maria Smaberg, “On Mission In the Cosmopolitan World” in Sociology (May 2015), 37-42.
247 Alma Johansson, A People in Exile: One Year in the Life of the Armenians (Stockholm: Unknown publisher,
1937), 8.
248 Ibid., 17- 20. Comments on other missionaries on 18.
249 Ibid., 92. Smaberg, “On Mission,” 41.
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care of, the mission station and orphanage. Johansson came to regard the Armenian Christian
children at the orphanage as “her” children, and to the end of her life would regret her inability to
save them. The understandable identification should not obscure a case that fits the pattern of
Biorn and Lepsius. Realities on the ground in the Ottoman realms consistently pushed applied
Orientalists in the direction of less sympathy and connection with Islamicate society, even when
they came from a German intellectual tradition that emphasized both.
The applied Orientalists of the mission field and aid station follow a trajectory we will
see again in the coming chapters. They were the inheritors of an Orientalist tradition in Germany
that emphasized that Islamicate societies were the inheritors, perhaps even sole inheritors, of
classical civilization, not a frightening “other” to be despised. Especially in the cases of Lepsius
and Biorn, we see a pattern that will be developed further in this work, that of closer contact with
the “Orient” changing this initial attitude into one of despair at the possibilities and progress of
Islamicate civilization, and a deep preference for the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire
over their Muslim neighbors. The connection to state power, economic necessity, and German
imperialism is not as direct as in the later chapters, for the mission stations did not seek profit,
and were more aloof from the diplomatic needs of their home state than were the missions of the
Entente powers, Britain, France, and Russia. Nevertheless, the necessities of life in the Ottoman
Empire, and especially the increasing difficulties the skeptical and defensive Ottoman state posed
to both missions and especially their Christian charges, altered permanently their views. Not only
did closer contact not help to build tolerance, but material conditions in the Islamicate East
mitigated any more nuanced views of Islam and Islamicate society these figures had. It is a story
that will be repeated hereafter.
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CHAPTER 4: GERMAN DIPLOMATS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Not all German actors in Islamicate lands during this period were privately-backed
missionaries and adventurers. The transformation of the disparate German lands into a cohesive
state centered on the former Kingdom of Prussia allowed for greater activities in the diplomatic
sphere. Prussia had been a latecomer to the Ottoman diplomatic scene and had therefore been
given least precedence at formal occasions among the powers of Christian Europe. Nevertheless,
that very distance from the interests of the other great powers meant that Prussia could establish
military and diplomatic contracts in the Ottoman Empire starting in the 1850s. The military
applied Orientalists will be examined in Chapter 7. This chapter will be concerned with the
civilian diplomats on service in Islamic-majority lands, and the way their perception of the
society they dwelt in influenced the course of German Orientalism.
In the larger scholarship about Orientalist discourse, diplomacy in general has been
neglected. Edward Said, with his background in literature, conceived of Orientalism as
predominantly a literary and cultural phenomenon.250 Said also neglected, famously, the German
contributions to not only Orientalism, as discussed in Chapter 2, but also the German imperial
project in the Ottoman Empire, as unworthy of notice because Said perceived German influence
as lesser than that of the British and French scholars and literary figures he studied.
This is especially odd, considering the longstanding institution of the dragomanate. In the
Ottoman and other Islamic and Islamicate lands, a dragoman was a combination of interpreter,
linguist, cultural expert, and go-between. More than just a translator, these diplomatic assistants
occupied an intermediary position between Christian European and Islamicate societies. They
250 Edward Said, Orientalism, 11 and Suzanne Marchand, German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion,
Race, and Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), vii.
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grew out of a tradition in the Ottoman Empire of using non-Muslim subjects of the sultans as
interpreters at court. The idea was that only Christians could truly understand other Christians,
and it also was of a piece with Ottoman policies in the early-modern period, which emphasized
outsourcing of trade and diplomacy, both considered low-status occupations, to non-Muslims.
The Capitulations, which allowed extraterritorial status for foreign traders and Ottoman subjects
acting as agents of foreign powers in matters of trade, were the economic equivalent of the
dragomanate.251
These parameters of diplomacy within the Ottoman Empire require introduction at this
point. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the twin institutions of the Capitulations and the
dragomanates defined the contours of European-Ottoman diplomacy in terms of an Orientalist
framework that was decisively tilted in the favor of the Christian European powers. The
dragomanate will be introduced below. The Capitulations require their own introduction.
The Ottoman Empire began its existence as a land-oriented power. In the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, the Ottomans were overwhelmingly concerned with other Turkish rivals in
Anatolia, and with the states of the Bulgars and Serbs in the Balkans, once the Ottoman state had
expanded into that borderland of Europe. The need for naval power to counter the remnant of the
Byzantine Roman state in Constantinople was counterbalanced by continuing land-based threats
from the Mamluk state centered in Egypt, and the empire of Timur to the east.252 After the fall of
Constantinople in 1453, Venice replaced the Byzantines as the primary naval challenge to the
251 This is the conclusion of Stanford J. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I (Ankara: Turkish Historical
Society Press, 2006), vol. 2, 876.
252 The best secondary sources on the early Ottoman Empire are Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kurel Shaw, A History of
the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). A more
modern take is Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: A History of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Basic Books,
2006). The latter is a slightly more literary, but no less serious, general history of the Ottoman state. The Shaws
remain best at placing the Ottoman Empire in its international context, and at looking at the interplay of its
institutions.
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Ottoman state. Venetian naval power, and especially its mercantile power, which remained intact
despite repeated Ottoman victories in warfare, helped confirm the Ottoman state in its overall
course. “Outsourcing” mercantile affairs to those with the navies and merchant marines to
support seaborne commerce seemed a good idea.
The Ottomans, with their millet system of indirect rule in areas of civil law for religious
minorities, were used to delegating functions of the state to others.253 The Capitulations began in
the sixteenth century as a way to absolve the Ottoman state of an area of jurisdiction it had little
expertise in, while still guaranteeing the revenues of the Sublime Porte, the Ottoman central
government. The Capitulations took the form of treaties in which the Ottomans allowed access to
their vast markets to foreign, mostly European, powers, at low or no tariff duties. This allowed
much of the seaborne and foreign commerce of the Ottoman Empire to be “outsourced” to
foreigners. Let the Venetians, or the French, or later the British, undertake the expense of
maintaining a merchant marine, navigating the maze of Mediterranean ports and their differing
tax and regulatory procedures, their differing rules on quarantine of produce and livestock. Let
others navigate the seas, as well as the difficulties of supplying demands in foreign ports. The
Ottoman state would guarantee its revenues by taxation of certain minerals for export, head taxes
on livestock and the like, and through simple payment of lump sums at the renewal of the
Capitulation treaties.254

253 Shaw and Shaw, A History of the Ottoman Empire, vol. 1, 136. Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 102, makes a similar
point.
254 The indispensable source for the history of the Capitulations remains the chapter of Stanford J. Shaw, The
Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 1, 106-127. No other source puts the Capitulation agreements in context,
or shows as well how they declined in usefulness to the Ottoman Porte over time.
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The treaties of Capitulation, known in the Ottoman language as ahidname, or “sworn
charters”, were more than mere commercial treaties.255 They relinquished Ottoman jurisdiction
over foreign subjects and traders nearly entirely. In most such treaties, the terms included
exemption from Ottoman taxation, exemption from prosecution in Ottoman courts for most
infractions, and even on occasion clauses guaranteeing the immunity of the subjects of foreign
powers from search of their person or property. It was practically, in certain times and places, an
invitation to smuggling and tax evasion. It also, however, had the effect of simplifying and vastly
increasing the amount of commerce conducted in Ottoman ports, without the Sublime Porte
having to even so much as promulgate maritime laws in the earlier years.256 Taxation of Ottoman
subjects, and the special taxes levied on non-Muslims into the early nineteenth century, helped
make up for what must have been vast potential tariff revenues that were lost under the terms of
these treaties.257
The first treaties of Capitulation were signed with the Renaissance Italian republics, who
dominated the merchant trade in the Mediterranean basin in the early centuries of Ottoman
power. The Republic of Genoa and the Most Serene Republic of Venice were the early
beneficiaries, followed by lesser mercantile powers like Ragusa, Florence, and the Kingdom of
Naples. The signing of an agreement of this kind with France in 1540 was a landmark in
Ottoman diplomacy with Christian Europe.258

255 Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002), 27.
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258 Hans Theunissen, The Ahd-names: Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics: The Historical Background and
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It is important to note that the term “Capitulations” is used here because it has an
explanatory function regarding these agreements. The Ottomans used different words for
Capitulation agreements and regular “treaties,” and the difference in language denoted their view
of these deals with foreign powers.259 The Capitulations were just that, regarded as a concession
to foreign interests. As noted above, this was not entirely a one-sided exchange, since the
Sublime Porte believed that it was freeing itself from mercantile entanglements and encouraging
commerce and trade through concessions that were believed to be relatively unimportant.
However, this linguistic difference is the reason I have decided to keep the term “Capitulation,”
to denote that these were not treaties between equals, or agreements that were reached by
partners. Only Ottoman disdain for mercantile affairs and the belief that greater commerce made
for a more prosperous empire provided for these agreements’ justification in the centuries of
Ottoman power. In a way, the agreements reflected a view of the overall Ottoman economy that
was ahead of its time.260 It was not until the eighteenth century that economic theorists like Adam
Smith would posit that increased commerce could bring wealth to all nations by increasing the
overall wealth of the world. The prevailing mercantilist economic theories of the Ottoman
heyday in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries held that wealth was finite. By allowing
foreign powers to take control of at least the part of the Ottoman economy involved in foreign
trade, the Sublime Porte helped create the conditions for more commerce and an overall more
prosperous state, with higher tax receipts. The Capitulations system worked well for centuries,
until the terms of trade shifted against the Ottoman Empire.

259 Ahidname, the Ottoman term for a “Capitulation” agreement, originally meant “oath.” It came to have a similar
resonance to the term “unequal treaties” in China, at least during late-Ottoman period political debates.
260 Finkel Osman’s Dream, 70.
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In the early centuries of the Ottoman Empire, these treaties were not regarded as much of
a burden. It was only later that they became a distinct hindrance to Ottoman development and
economic independence. There was a lag between the development of the unequal treaties that
gave foreign powers the right to claim effective protectorates over Ottoman religious minorities,
starting in the late eighteenth century, and discussed in Chapter 3 as regards missionary workers
in Ottoman lands, and the establishment of a new, and harsher Capitulation regime. The latter
took place in the early nineteenth century. After the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, the British
Empire became more involved in the economic life of the Mediterranean Ottoman lands. The
French invasion of Egypt in 1798 had revealed to the Ottoman state the catastrophic shift in the
military and fiscal balance between themselves and powers like France. The post-revolutionary
French state could simply mobilize more men and more money than the Ottomans and organize
both more effectively. Debts incurred to British traders, some assumed by the British
government, led to a debt crisis in the early 1830s, coincident with a series of political crises
between the British and the Ottoman government over Ottoman policies and control in the
Eastern Mediterranean region. The culmination of all this was a new commercial treaty that
would exemplify the British relationship with the Ottomans until the empire’s end, as well as
create an example all the other European powers would follow in their relations with the
Ottoman state henceforward.
The 1837 Treaty of Commerce between the British and the Ottomans was a landmark in
several ways.261 For the first time, the foreign power dictated the terms of the concessions in a
Capitulation agreement. The treaty contained large concessions regarding the sovereignty of
Britain over not just British subjects engaged in trade in Ottoman lands, but also of “designated
261 Sukru M. Hanioglu, A History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 75.
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persons.”262 Essentially, in the late Ottoman period, the European powers arrogated to themselves
the right to designate any persons engaged in trade or other intercourse with the outside power as
quasi-subjects of that power, entitled to all the privileges and exemptions that foreign traders and
agents had long held under the Capitulation agreements. The agreement also dictated Ottoman
tariffs, setting them extremely low, or even at zero, on a range of products. These terms were to
apply whether the goods in question were traded in British ships, by British merchants, or neither
of those. For the first time, an outside power had essentially seized control of a core function of
the Ottoman state. This was quantitatively different, diplomatically and economically, from
previous agreements. This involved control by a foreign power far beyond the cultivation of
commerce and beyond the protection of non-Ottoman subjects. It also reflected the shifting
balance of trade, which was not in the Ottomans’ favor.263
When the Ottoman Empire was young, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it
continued to be a major conduit for luxury goods from India and China to Europe, a terminus of
the Silk Road trade that had never completely faded in importance despite the newer and cheaper
sea routes discovered by the Western European states in the same centuries. The Ottoman Empire
remained “the primary entrepot for goods the East had, and Europe wanted.”264 After the
Industrial Revolution began in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, the Ottomans found themselves
trading minerals, artisanal goods, and agricultural produce for finished tools produced in
factories. It simply took far more wheat, or dates, or nickel, to pay for a single finished industrial
product than it did for goods traded in earlier times. The terms of trade moved inexorably against
262 Ibid. and also Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I vol. 1, 129.
263 Geoffrey Miller, Straits: British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Dardanelles
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the Ottoman Empire, and it found itself in ever-deeper debt to European powers, debt contracted
to buy on credit goods the Ottomans could not produce for themselves. The result was a series of
debt crises, and with each crisis, the Ottomans found the terms of their Capitulation agreements
with the European powers growing more onerous.265
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman government had surrendered
sovereignty over much of its economy to its European creditors. A French concession held a
monopoly on the Ottoman tobacco crop, which could only be marketed by French
concessionaires, at prices set by French interests, with none of it subject to Ottoman taxation or
tariff at any stage of its journey from Anatolian field to final consumer in Europe. Likewise,
Ottoman tariffs were controlled by foreign interests.266 The Ottoman Public Debt Commission
controlled large aspects of Ottoman financial policy, ensuring that taxation remained low, tariffs
near to nonexistent, and that any revenues that could be raised were earmarked first of all for
servicing the interest on the enormous debt owed to British, French, Russian, German, and other
European governments and private banks. In this context, the Capitulations were clearly now a
drain on the Ottoman economy, and the terms of the economic treaties with the European powers
prevented the Ottomans from accumulating the capital necessary to industrialize their economy,
or even to care for their people on a basic level.267 Considering the numerous crises and the vast
inflow of refugees from the Balkans and the Caucasus that concerned the late Ottoman Empire,
these economic strictures threatened the future of the Ottoman state. Unsurprisingly, therefore,
abolition of the Capitulations was one of the core demands of the revolutionaries that seized
control of the Ottoman Empire in 1908-1909.
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The Ottoman revolutionaries of 1908-1909 were not shy about their economic demands
with regard to outside powers. “We Demand the Abolition of the Capitulations” read one placard
in Ottoman during the tumult of the post-revolutionary period.268 In the restored Ottoman
parliament, operating for the time being under the Constitution of 1876, abrogated by Sultan
Abdulhamid II long before, speaker after speaker denounced the regime of the Capitulations. The
Capitulations “keep our people in a condition of slavery to foreigners,” said one. “The
Capitulations are the reason for our weakness, and without them we will have great strength.”
The ruling coalition, the Ittihad ve Teraki (Committee of Union and Progress), held internal votes
to canvass the membership regarding a demand for the abolition of the Capitulations, followed
by an industrial policy including robust import substitution and tariffs to protect Ottoman
industry.269 All foreign-controlled monopolies were to be broken up, and all contracts in the
extractive industries were to be reconsidered for fairness and to make sure the terms of the
agreements aligned with the new Ottoman policies. These new restrictions on foreigners were, of
course, considered with great hostility in all European capitals.270
The Ottoman attempt at diplomacy to solve the issue of the Capitulations is one of the
great failure stories of the last years of the ancient sultanate. The Ottoman government brought
the issue up diplomatically repeatedly in all the capitals of Europe. No European power was
interested in even renegotiating the terms. The “refusal was universal,” and most powers
emulated the French government in advising the Ottomans to “put their own house in order”
before seeking a renegotiation of the Capitulations.271 This is a striking show of the new order in
268 Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (London:
Hurst, 2010), 36. Image facing 58.
269 Ibid., 177.
270 Constantinople to Berlin, August 7, 1914, BA R AA 54:7. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I , vol. 2, 18
reprints this.
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Ottoman relations with the European powers. The Capitulations, which had begun as a means of
facilitating commercial relations, had become instead a punishment for Ottoman inability to pay
debts. By 1914, there was no hiding the punitive nature of this regime, and often it was couched
in completely Orientalist terms by the diplomats who enforced it. Hans von Wangenheim, the
German ambassador to Istanbul at the time of the outbreak of war, for instance, believed that the
Ottomans “were not capable of being responsible for their financial situation.”272 This he
attributed to the nature of the Ottoman state, based as it was on a dynasty that began as border
warriors, ghazis on the frontiers of Islamic civilization. Such a mentality did not lend itself, von
Wangenheim believed, to seriousness in financial affairs. Similar sentiments could be found in
the writings of most of the other diplomats in the Ottoman capital. If the Capitulations were to be
abolished, then it would only be by unilateral Ottoman actions.273
Such actions were forthcoming once the long-awaited alliance with a European great
power was secured. On August 2, 1914, the Ottomans signed the alliance with Germany.274 This
alliance came at a time when Germany was already at war with Russia in alliance with its ally
Austria-Hungary. Thus, the Ottoman state was aware that by entering into this alliance, they were
taking sides in a major world war. Therefore the recompense had to be great.275 While much of
the literature, and even the memoirs of diplomats present in the Ottoman capital at the time,
placed great weight on factors such as the presence of German warships fleeing British pursuit,
or large-scale German financial and materiel transfers to the Ottoman Army, or the desire of the
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Ittihad ve Teraki to bolster its “Ottomanist” bona fides by recovering areas lost to Russia on the
Caucasus frontier in 1878, the Capitulations loomed larger in Ottoman telling and action.
The Ottoman Empire abrogated the Capitulations in stages, beginning in the period in
September and October of 1914, when the alliance with Germany was signed, but still largely
secret, and in which the Ottomans were slowly preparing for armed action against Britishoccupied Egypt, and against Russia in eastern Anatolia. The Sublime Porte, in a series of notes to
each of the Capitulatory powers, laid out the reasons for the unilateral abrogation. The Ottoman
Empire required the expansion of its economy, and especially of its industry, to survive. This
could not occur with foreign concessionaires in charge of key export sectors, or with the tariffs
set as low as possible, or with so many exporters not subject to Ottoman tax or regulation. The
Capitulations were a “burden” that could not be borne by the Ottoman people any longer. That
the action was unilateral in nature came only because the Ottoman government had found itself
rebuffed in all attempts to negotiate compensation, or a gradual raising of tariffs and ending of
unequal privileges.276
One of the most vociferous anti-abrogation governments was, surprisingly, the Ottomans’
German allies. Von Wangenheim not only demanded compensation for the obliteration of the
Capitulation privileges for German subjects, but encouraged the Foreign Ministry in Berlin to go
further.277 Von Wangenheim claimed that strong action might scare the Sublime Porte into
retracting, or at any rate mitigating the abrogation of the Capitulations, at least as far as Germany
was concerned. In view of the alliance and the heavy German expenditures in gold and weaponry
that were flowing into the Ottoman Empire to enable it to rebuild its army after the shattering
276 Constantinople to Berlin, October 1, 1914, BA R AA 55:2, enclosure. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War
I, vol. 1, 490 helpfully includes this as well.
277 Berlin to Constantinople, October 2, 1914, BA R AA 55: 6.
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defeats against Italy and the Balkan League in 1911-1913, von Wangenheim believed that the
Germans were owed at least a transitional period.278 When the German government decided to
confine its response to a formal protest and not take any action that might materially effect the
Ottomans, who were needed for the larger war effort, von Wangenheim was unhappy with the
policy and tried once more to get his superiors to agree to some measure of sanction.279 Von
Wangenheim was overruled and it appears that the Ottomans, and the ruling party, had chosen
their moment well.280 With the Great War raging, and the outcome hanging in the balance during
the autumn of 1914, the German government was not willing to test Ottoman patience. After all,
the Ottomans had not yet entered the war when the Capitulations were abrogated and would not
do so until the end of October and the beginning of November, with actions first against the
Russian Empire, and then the British and French. Had the Ottoman Empire survived the war,
these steps would have meant a new economic and diplomatic reality for the major Islamicate
state of the Middle East, but defeat in war, and then by the Turkish Nationalist movement
afterward, meant that abrogation of the Capitulations came too late to save the Ottoman state.
The Capitulations, therefore, had become, and remained almost until the end of the
Ottoman state, an Orientalist institution that was part of the diplomatic reality of life and service
in the Ottoman Empire for German, and other European, diplomats. Like the missionaries
discussed in the last chapter, whose interactions with the Ottoman population were shaped by
sharing a religion with some, and being forbidden to proselytize to others, the reality of the
Capitulations shaped the lives and views of diplomats stationed in the Ottoman lands. They
meant that much of the time of a diplomat was taken up with adjudicating and liaising with
278 Constantinople to Berlin, October 2, 1914, BA R AA 55: 6.
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Ottoman authorities about claims and counterclaims of those who were “protected subjects” of a
foreign power, under the Capitulation agreements’ terms. Especially after the Revolution of
1908-1909 in the Ottoman Empire, when abrogation of the Capitulations became a major state
project, and consequently there seems to have been more resistance to European claims under
their terms, this led to friction that caused or increased jaundiced views of Ottoman state and
society among German diplomats.
The Capitulations were not the only such institution, however. The dragomanate, a
specifically diplomatic function unique to Islamic and Islamicate embassies from European
powers, was another. A dragoman was to be the equivalent in the Ottoman Empire of the
“Chinese secretaries” or “Oriental secretaries” maintained in especially British diplomatic
outposts in China and India, respectively.281 Like the Capitulations, the dragomanate was
originally an Ottoman institution. The court dragoman of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
was often either a foreigner or a person from a religious minority in the Ottoman lands. They
were used as interpreters and for their expertise on everything from Christian religion to
mercantile pursuits that were alien to many in the Ottoman court.282 As with the Capitulations,
this institution became changed over time into a foreign imposition on the Ottomans. An
embassy dragoman remained an interpreter, but also a sort of specialist in applied Orientalism.
The dragoman under European employ in the late Ottoman period was usually from the
embassy’s country of origin and educated in Oriental studies and languages, with all of the
intellectual baggage that was explored in Chapter 2. Due to the dragoman’s role as interpreter of
the Orient for a home government and for an ambassador usually not as well-experienced in the
281 See Introduction by G. R. Berridge in Berridge and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Tilkidom and the Ottoman Empire:
The Letters of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice to George Lloyd (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2008), xi.
282 Ibid., xiii.
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Ottoman Empire, there was also a less seemly side to the institution of the dragomanate.
Dragomen were often utilized as spies, or spymasters, since they were able to speak local
languages and more easily develop contacts within the Ottoman lands. Accusations of spying
often lingered around dragomen in the late Ottoman period, but the nature of these allegations
and activities makes confirmation more difficult than with more open diplomacy. For the bestknown example, we have to look to the British briefly.
One of our best sources about the institution of the dragomanate comes from the diaries
of an Anglo-Irish dragoman at the turn of the twentieth century.283 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice left
behind not only the usual diplomatic dispatches and other documents of his work, but copious
letters to friends and family. In these latter, Fitzmaurice gives us a picture of the nature of applied
Orientalism. His letters are filled with wordplay in the half-dozen languages he was fluent in,
including Ottoman and Farsi.284 Fitzmaurice regarded his time in Istanbul and elsewhere in the
“Orient” with the sort of playful talk that might have been reserved for an exotic vacation. For
example in a letter to a correspondent, Fitzmaurice referred to himself as “fox” and gave playful
animal names to various figures in power at the time in Istanbul. Letters like these were filled
with gossip, political information, and informal views of high-ranking ambassadorial
discussions. Fitzmaurice was often detached from the British embassy in Istanbul for various
other diplomatic duties. He was the key British diplomatic representative in south Arabia in
1902, when a new convention between the British government of India and the Ottomans
redefined, radically in Britain's favor, the border between Ottoman Yemen and the British
protectorate sultanates like Lahej that surrounded the inland frontier of the Aden colony.285
283 Fitzmaurice, Letters of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, no. 7.
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Another key point to note about Fitzmaurice is that he was, apparently, a spy.286 Many of
his activities during his time in the Ottoman Empire are either poorly documented or else
chronicled in files still under seal and unknown to scholars.287 What is known is that his
diplomatic service also included work for the foreign espionage agencies of the British
government. With the rupture of relations between Britain and the Ottomans in the fall of 1914
after the outbreak of the Great War, Fitzmaurice desired to return to some posting that could
make use of his talents. He was instead sent to Bulgaria to recruit and run a spy ring targeting
both that Balkan kingdom and its Ottoman neighbors. His facility with languages and foreign
locales should have served him well in such a capacity, yet he seems to have accomplished little,
or at least little that has left an accessible documentary record. With Bulgaria's entry into the war
on the German side in October, 1915, his services came to an end, and he went into retirement
from the foreign services.288
It is difficult to determine if the experiences of Fitzmaurice were typical of dragomen in
the Ottoman Empire during the period under study. Knowledge of local languages is always
necessary for espionage work, and with diplomatic cover, there were doubtless many
opportunities for recruiting local agents. During the research leading to this dissertation, no
further information was located indicating that the diplomats discussed here were spies.289
Rather, the impression given by the frequency of accusations is that espionage and diplomacy for
dragomen and other applied Orientalists went hand in hand. Knowledge of the “East” was seen
as a commodity useful to both functions, and the roles of diplomats and spies tended over time to
merge into one. This indicates an extremely instrumentalist approach to Orientalist scholarship,
286
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one entirely in keeping with the paradigm, descended from the work of Edward Said, that sees
such scholarship as a part of imperialist dominance over Islamicate societies. What has been
missing up to now is an appreciation of the ways in which this dominance could be exercised in
material terms. That is to say, a study that takes into account the ways in which Orientalist
scholarship was converted, by the applied Orientalists studied here, into a working dominance on
the ground in Islamicate lands.
The earliest German-speaking diplomat to engage with the Orientalist view of the
Ottoman Empire was Joseph von Hammer. Von Hammer was an Austrian, assigned to the
embassy of his sovereign in Istanbul in 1799. Upon his return in 1807, he followed a typical path
of European Orientalists, becoming the foremost historian of the Ottoman Empire in his age. His
Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches was the standard European text on that state for
generations after its completion in 1835.290 As late as the mid-1950s, standard English-language
histories were still being based upon its original research.291
Von Hammer is interesting to this study mostly for being a pioneer in the field of applied
Orientalism in the German language and because his career illustrates the opposition of academic
Orientalism to the applied Orientalism now under study. Von Hammer was criticized by
academic Orientalists, especially by Heinrich von Diez, an academic who wrote at length on
what he considered the fraudulent nature of von Hammer’s expertise. Von Diez’s criticisms
mostly relate to the general nature of von Hammer’s studies, and von Diez was quick to say that
von Hammer’s experiences had been inflated into an expertise that should have come from
narrow, academic study. This clash between two different kinds of Orientalism, however, may be
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more than it appears.292 Von Hammer was a prolific author and late in life became the exact sort
of academic that von Diez criticized him for not being earlier in von Hammer’s career. Von
Hammer believed that poetry and all sorts of literature, were the key to understanding a culture,
and therefore continued his translation of Ottoman and Iranian literature after his return to
Europe in 1807.293 Unlike many of the later German-language applied Orientalists, von Hammer
still believed, no matter the criticisms of von Diez, that Orientalist study and experience in the
field were complementary.
Prussian-German diplomatic contacts with the Ottomans date to the time of Frederick the
Great in the middle-eighteenth century. An embassy existed in Istanbul from that time, and
Prussian relations with the Ottoman Empire assumed a form familiar to most of the European
powers. A Capitulation agreement was signed in 1761, while Prussia was fighting in the Seven
Years’ War. While some records are contradictory, it appears that the first dragomen were
employed by Prussia about this time, mostly Greek Christians at first due to the relative lack of
experienced diplomats and translators in Ottoman languages to be found in Prussia then.
Frederick the Great attempted to remedy some of this lack by sponsoring Oriental studies and
commissioning prizes for expertise in “Oriental” languages, though the effect does not seem to
have been great as far as the Prussian ministers in Istanbul were concerned. They continued to
employ local translators and dragomen for some time after that.294
A key turning point in German relations with the Ottoman realms came in 1835 with the
advent in Istanbul of the Moltke mission.295 This was the seconding of the future German general
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Helmuth von Moltke to the Ottoman military, as part of the process of reforming that body, and
infusing it with European ideas on organization and strategy. Von Moltke was made the
equivalent of a general in Ottoman service, though still just a captain in his native land and was
given duties as inspector-general of troops in the capital.296 In this capacity, he oversaw the
training and modernization of the Ottoman Army. At this time, the Ottoman forces were still
reeling from the suppression of the ancient Corps of Janissaries in June 1826. This event, the
vaka I hayriye or “auspicious happening” to the Ottoman court, had resulted from the opposition
of the Janissaries to any reform of the Ottoman military.297 The ranks of Janissaries had once
come from Christian children recruited or taken from the peoples of the Balkan peninsula, but by
the nineteenth century service in the Corps had become nearly hereditary. The Janissaries were
accorded enormous privileges by tradition and political necessity, since the Janissaries had
removed Ottoman rulers in the past. In the events of June 1826, nearly the entire Corps of
Janissaries was killed or imprisoned, and the Corps disbanded. The Moltke mission’s job was to
supervise an army that had lost its supposedly elite force, however much that elite had lost its
edge by the time of its suppression.298
The Moltke mission also was to supervise the Prussian artillerists that came along with
his mission. These were hired by the Ottoman sultan to build a body of modern gunners in the
Ottoman ranks. Ironically, the Janissaries had, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, been
pioneers in the use of gunpowder weapons, including large siege guns. The Ottomans of the
1830s had fallen far behind the times, however.
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Moltke arrived accompanied by Lieutenant von Berg as an assistant, and soon the
Ottoman government ordered a follow-on group of eleven officers and four non-commissioned
officers.299 These were only the officers and men approved for detached service in the Ottoman
Empire by the Prussian government. An unknown number of artillerists were also present, most
of whom seem to have been former Prussian soldiers as well, though at least one was from
Bavaria.300 The Moltke mission was later documented in an unpublished collection of letters
Moltke sent back to Prussia during his time in Ottoman service, most covering the initial period
of his service there.301 Moltke initially found the human material in the Ottoman Army quite
promising but the major influence of his mission was a growing diplomatic closeness between
the Ottomans and Prussians. Moltke will be covered in more depth in Chapter 7.
Another key moment in German relations with the Ottomans came at the conclusion of
the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878. This conflict had brought Russian armies to the final
defense lines outside of Istanbul and a British fleet into the Sea of Marmara, to warn St.
Petersburg authorities against any further advances. It was German Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck who solved the impasse and the threat of European war it brought, through a
conference held at Berlin in 1878. This conference, and the war, put an end to the period of
Ottoman reform and parliamentary experimentation known as the Tanzimat and cemented the
rule of the authoritarian Abdulhamid II, without permanently damaging German-Ottoman
relations.302
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German-Ottoman diplomacy thus had begun before the unification of Germany. Most
contacts were military, and most were run through the Prussian Ministry of War, as with the
Moltke mission, whose salaries were paid by Prussia throughout their service in the Ottoman
realm.303 The need for reform of the Ottoman army had been made apparent during the
Napoleonic wars, but aside from the suppression of the Janissaries, the slave-soldiers taken from
Christian parents and raised as Muslims since the earliest days of the Ottoman dynasty, little was
done. Contacts with Prussia and other German states like Bavaria in the 1850s were an attempt to
remedy the decades of indecision in the Ottoman government. When Prussia unified the German
Empire in the 1860s-1871, these contacts were continued with the new German state.
Germany was allowed to continue the Capitulation privileges of the former Kingdom of
Prussia, as well.304 Trade contacts flourished, with German imports and exports with the Ottoman
Empire more than doubling and tripling, respectively, by the end of the nineteenth century.305
From military contacts and trade, diplomatic links followed. By the 1880s, Germany established
consulates in most major Ottoman cities with any link to German citizens, Lutheran
missionaries, or those with strategic importance like the Aegean port of Izmir. These consulates
would provide ample space for the expansion of German applied Orientalism, bringing hundreds
of Germans, from clerks to consuls, into contact with Islamicate civilization in the Ottoman
realms. The papers and dispatches of these personnel are a potential treasure trove of information
about the changing views of German professionals abroad.
Martin Hartmann was the dragoman of the German consulate in Beirut. As an emissary to
one of the most Christian parts of the Ottoman realms, he had a special role. As he saw it, he was
303 Moltke to Adolf von Moltke, undated but from 1830s, Moltke Papers, Bundesarchiv, Moltke S. 26, misc.
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“the ambassador of one civilization to another.”306 He was trained at the University of Leipzig as
a scholar of the “Orient,” and was later accepted into foreign service. From 1876-1887, he was
the dragoman of the German consulate-general in Beirut.307 During this time, he had to deal with
several crises between the Ottoman authorities and the Christian inhabitants of Beirut, and also
to assist the consul with German efforts to stymie French ambitions. The Maronite Christians of
the Mount Lebanon region, Arab in language and culture, were a target of French efforts.308 As
the premier Catholic imperial state in Europe, France styled itself as the protector of the
Maronites against the Ottoman government and the Muslim and Druze inhabitants that
surrounded their territory. This was not merely an academic concern as Hartmann took up his
post. A crackdown on Christian rebels in the Mount Lebanon area in 1860 had led to a full-blown
international crisis, and a reassertion of French interests in the region.309
Hartmann came to Beirut with views that accorded with the typical German views on
Islam, as explored in Chapter 2. He believed that the Ottomans were the premier dynasty of their
civilization, and as such the rightful protectors of the holy places of Mecca, Medinah, and
Jerusalem. Hartmann regarded the Ottomans as the “heirs of antiquity” and believed they had
preserved some of the essence of a Greco-Roman culture he much admired. At the same time, the
origins of the Ottoman dynasty in the ghazi border lords of Anatolia made them heirs of a
conquering and culture-building tradition. Hartmann looked forward to learning from his
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experiences, and thought that “there was much to offer in these ancient places, more than those at
home would think.”310
Hartmann occupies an important role in the history of Arab nationalism in the late
Ottoman Empire. His work on early Islam and Arab language reflected an abiding passion for the
people he lived among in Beirut. Hartmann's work performed several functions for later Arab
nationalists.311
Firstly, Hartmann was one of a number of Orientalist European scholars who traced the ancient
origins of modern Middle Eastern languages. One of the prerequisites for the formation of a
national consciousness is an intelligentsia that understands itself as being heir to a long, shared
history of language and scholarship. Hartmann's work tended to deemphasize the Ottoman roots
of Islamic jurisprudence in the early modern period. Instead, Hartmann emphasized the Arab
roots of Islamic law and the continuing importance of medieval Arab scholars into the Ottoman
period, a view directly at odds with those promulgated by Ottoman higher education at the
time.312
Secondly, Hartmann was interested, as were many Orientalist scholars, in early Islamic
history and theology. His studies, however, tended to emphasize the peculiarly Arab roots of
early Islam and to promote the idea that early Islamic law and culture were more “pure,” less
corrupted by worldly concerns, than the original ideas of the religion.313 This was not only at
odds with scholarly views in the Ottoman Empire, but also with the Orientalist scholarship in
Europe at the time. Critics wrote that his work was “unscholarly” and overly influenced by his
linguistic preferences, Arabic over classical Ottoman. He was even at times accused of having
310
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gone native in some way, that his long sojourn among the Arabic-speaking Ottoman subjects had
given him some sort of anti-Ottoman bias, when the opposite was the case in this period.
Hartmann instead seems to have believed that by emphasizing the Arabic and early-Islamic roots
of certain aspects of Ottoman governance, he was forwarding his view that the Ottomans were
culture-bearers, a bridge with late-Classical antiquity, and its heirs in the early Caliphate.
Hartmann's views changed over time. Hartmann's training in Oriental studies in Germany
had given him “very high respect” for the cosmopolitan nature of the Ottoman Empire.314 The
idea of Christians, Muslims, and Jews all living in a state that honored their religions in personal
status issues like divorce and inheritance was very appealing. There may here have been a degree
of wishful thinking, imagining the Ottoman state to be in accord with the ideals inherent to many
educated Europeans. There is no hint in Hartmann's writings before his years as dragoman in
Beirut of any sort of prejudice against one group or another in Ottoman society, with the
exception of an affection for the courtly ritual of the Porte, the sultan's court in Istanbul.315 Once
on the ground in Beirut, however, Hartmann's correspondence records a growing feeling of
contempt for the Muslim Arabs, a conviction that it was Christian Arabs who were the
repositories of the best of that “race”, and the hope for an Arab civilization separate from the
“Stamboul effendis,” the Ottoman-speaking court officials, which he now saw as decadent
oppressors of the Arab people.316
Hartmann became such a detractor of the possibilities of “development” among Muslim
Arabs that by 1899, he wrote, as part of a review of Arabic-language writing in Egypt, that the
literary development of Egyptian Arabic was so rapid that it was “surprising for an Oriental
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country.”317 When speaking of the Sunni Arabs of Egypt in general, Hartmann, though knowing
considerably less about that land than the communally mixed Syria-Lebanon region, believed
that “the Egyptian […] is in a high degree indolent, aimless, changeable, servile.”318 The advent
in Egypt in the late 1890s of businessmen and investors belonging to the Syrian Christian
community was “of the utmost importance to the country,” because Christian Arabs were, in
contrast, “industrious, consistent, eager for knowledge.”319 It was equally important that these
Christians from the “Libanon region of that land” be given leave to oversee the book and
periodical printing businesses of Egypt, since “Syria cannot possibly utilize all this [human]
capital. Every kind of public instruction is systematically opposed by the Turkish
Government.”320 The latter discounts his previous intimate familiarity with the schooling system
in Lebanon-Syria, about which his consular-era writings make clear that he toured many local
institutions of learning. The majority of the pupils, however, would not have been Christian
Arabs, and in any case by this late period of his activity Hartmann was wholly soured on the
Ottoman Empire as a system of government. Hartmann's writings from the period after his
consular service ended contain none of his former praise of the empire's governing system, or the
millet concept that allowed personal autonomy to the disparate religious groups within the
sultan's lands.321
It is true that Hartmann later returned to a Pan-Islamic view. Starting in late 1914, he
wrote of the need for Islamic civilization, led by the Ottoman sultan-caliph, to unite in the face of
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hostile Christian empires.322 He did this, however, in the context of the First World War, and the
German-Ottoman alliance signed on August 2, 1914. A major component of that alliance, though
one controversial among modern scholars of the period, was the German hope that the Ottoman
sultan could, in his capacity as Caliph of the Muslims, declare a jihad against the British, French,
and Russian empires. This meant reviving the Pan-Islamic tendencies of the former Sultan
Abdulhamid II, which had been useful in the period of his authoritarian rule following the
suppression of the Constitution of 1876, only a year after that document was promulgated. These
ideas had fallen out of favor in the interim, something that Hartmann had been glad about at the
time. His changeover therefore, like that of the government of the Ittihad ve Teraki, can be seen
as driven by the exigencies of the war, and the desire for an Ottoman jihad with real teeth,
something that could raise Muslim revolts in British India or French Algeria.323
How do Hartmann's writings and dispatches fit into the general picture of applied
Orientalism? Firstly, we have here a definite case of the applied Orientalist. Hartmann is, indeed,
an exemplar of the type, being both a scholar and diplomat in one. His work in the Ottoman
Empire was mostly routine consular work. His writings indicate that most of the consulate
dragoman's job was processing applications for extraterritorial rights under the infamous
Capitulation treaties, which granted European states the right to judicial control over designated
protected persons who otherwise were Ottoman subjects. In 1880, Hartmann wrote that “the only
ones worthy of this status were the local Christians, who are the better traders.”324 This was not
an issue confined to German consulates. The naming of Christian Arabs as protected persons
322 Ursula Wokoeck, German Orientalism: The Study of the Middle East and Islam from 1800-1945 (London:
Routledge, 2009), 285. This references a Hartmann letter in the periodical Der Welt des Islams that was not
contained in his correspondence.
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no. 2 (April 2011), 185.
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under the Capitulations was an issue raised constantly by the Ottoman government with all the
European states that operated under those treaties. It favored the Christian Arab minority in ways
that undermined communal peace in the Ottoman Empire, and allowed the capture of much of
the local business infrastructure by these agents and their foreign protectors.
Martin Hartmann was therefore a perfect example of the overlooked destructive impact of
applied Orientalism on its host society. It would be wrong to attribute to Hartmann a leading role
in the formation of Arab nationalism in the Ottoman lands. More accurately, he provided “grist”
for the mill that ground out the last strains of multiethnic identity in the Ottoman lands. Much of
the legitimacy of the government of Abdulhamid II rested on the sultan's role as caliph, which
had not been emphasized in centuries. Abdulhamid II revived this role, and his government was
active in matters of Islamic law and downplayed the roles of traditional judges in these matters in
order to emphasize the sultan's unique inheritance as the successor to the Prophet Muhammad.325
Likewise, projects like the German-financed Hijaz Railroad were undertaken by the Ottomans
and their German partners at great expense in order to improve the land communications to the
holy cities of Mecca and Medinah. As custodian of the holy cities, the sultan's government was
responsible for the yearly hajj, the pilgrimage which all believers are enjoined to undertake in
their lifetimes, if they are able. Then as now, this was a massive and expensive logistical feat.
Prior to Abdulhamid II's reign, pilgrims received considerably less state support, and the
numbers able to attend the rituals yearly at Mecca were accordingly much smaller.326 This and
support for politically Islamic movements in British India and elsewhere, complicated the
Ottoman Empire's budgetary and foreign policy dilemmas but were part of a concerted “Pan325 Shaw and Shaw, A History of the Ottoman Empire, vol. 2, 280. A very good discussion of this in Feroz Ahmad,
The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (London: Hurst, 2009),
11.
326 Joshua Teitelbaum, The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom of Arabia (London: Hurst, 2001), 20.
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Islamic” strategy to defuse the nationalist tensions that might otherwise rip the Ottoman state
apart.327 The activities of applied Orientalists like Hartmann, even if all he managed was to
provide the raw material of Arab nationalism, helped to foreclose Pan-Islamic loyalty as an
alternate identity that might shore up, rather than undermine, the Ottoman Empire. Just as
applied Orientalists in missions and orphanages helped to promote Christian separatism and
communal conflict in the Ottoman lands, so the dragoman Hartmann undermined even the
cohesion of the Islamic elements of the Ottoman population.
The assassination of the Habsburg heir in Sarajevo, on June 28, 1914, produced the same
flurry of diplomacy in Istanbul as in the other capitals of Europe. By July 14, the Ottomans had
made overtures to both alliance blocs, offering neutrality to the highest bidder. As we have seen,
these proposals were not new, nor were the Ottoman conditions. With the exception of the return
of some islands in the Aegean seized by the Greeks less than two years previously, the Ottomans
desired only protection from other predatory powers.328 Contrary to his later reputation as a
German agent of influence, it was Enver Pasha who argued most strenuously against any
Ottoman military action, in conversations reported to Berlin by German Ambassador Hans von
Wangenheim. The Entente powers did not respond to Ottoman overtures, but the German
negotiations quickly settled into a pattern that became familiar. Faced with a German demand
that the alliance be limited to the period of the crisis, the Ottomans vaguely threatened to joint he
Entente instead. Berlin gave in, and the Foreign Office ordered Ambassador von Wangenheim to
sign an alliance with the Ottomans on August 2, 1914.329 By its terms, the Germans guaranteed
327 Ahmad, The Young Turks, 23. Shaw and Shaw, A History of the Ottoman Empire, vol. 2, 272.
328 British Foreign Office precis, Confidential Print: Middle East FO 406/9. Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World
War I, vol. 2, 589ff.
329 Karl Kautsky, ed. German Documents on the Outbreak of the World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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118

Ottoman territory, promised not to make a separate peace until territory lost in the war was
recovered, and agreed to a large loan to the Ottoman treasury. In return, the Ottomans agreed to
go to war against the Entente powers, though the document was vague on the timing and form of
any hostile action. The Ottomans were aware that the articles committing them to war with
Germany's enemies were not hypothetical: Germany had declared war on Russia the day before.
With the protection of one of the Powers, the Ottomans quickly moved to secure their longstanding goals.
By this time, Wangenheim had come to believe differently. The Capitulations, he claimed
in dispatches to Berlin, were “necessary for an Oriental state that knows nothing of
commerce.”330 The Ottoman Empire was not capable of extracting its own resources, or of
satisfying the demands of its people for goods and services. Only commerce with more advanced
nations could do this, and this was why German capital was active in the Ottoman lands, why the
Baghdad Railway concession had included the economic development clauses that would allow
Germans to exploit the natural wealth of Anatolia. Though those concessions had been justified
very differently by Wangenheim himself in previous writings, now they were openly to be the
vanguard of German empire that their Ottoman critics had long held them to be, though this was
all, to Wangenheim, justified by the need to economically develop the Porte's realms.331
Even Wangenheim's superiors noted the nearly complete turnaround in his attitude
toward Ottoman economic freedom. There was a flurry of diplomatic traffic between the Istanbul
legation and Berlin, with Foreign Office officials afraid that Wangenheim's fury over the
Capitulations might sour an alliance the German government, now felt essential to the war effort.
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As noted earlier in this chapter, Wangenheim was overruled, and the German government
decided to limit itself to formal protests that did not have any material effect on the Ottomans.332
Wangenheim continued to believe, up until his death in 1915, that more should have been
done.333 In fact, his sudden death was attributed by some to assassination by poison, and the
reasons given for this amounted to little more than a suspicion that Ottoman authorities had the
motive to do so, considering some of Wangenheim’s views about the legal changes just after the
signing of the German alliance.
The end of the Capitulations came with the publication of the formal order that the
Ottomans would no longer accept limits to their courts' competence over Ottoman nationals and
matters taking place in Ottoman territory, on September 9, 1914.334 The spontaneous celebrations
that greeted the
announcement were attended by Ottoman citizens regardless of creed, “because of their feeling
that the foreign influences which had prevented the Empire from prospering and restoring its old
power and glory had been wiped away.” Demonstrations in favor of the measure even occurred
in British-occupied Egypt, despite attempts by the authorities in Cairo to prevent them. The
British response, delivered by their ambassador, Louis Mallet, was typical in its insistence that
the Ottomans had acted “precipitately,” that it must be a pro-German intrigue to harm the
economies of the Entente, and that this measure would increase, not diminish, foreign
interference in the affairs of the Sultan's realm.335 The Germans, however, shared the dismay of
the Entente powers. Despite their alliance with the Porte, German Ambassador Wangenheim was
332 Bethmann-Hollweg to Wangenheim, August 1, 1914, in Kautsky, German Documents.
333 Wangenheim to FO, April 7, 1915, in Kautsky, German Documents.
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“in a state of confrontation and passion” over the decision, and immediately made his anger
known to the Grand Vizier, Said Halim Pasha. In paranoid mirror image of his British, French,
and Russian counterparts, Wangenheim reported to Berlin that the Ottoman abolition of the
Capitulations was actually part of an Entente scheme to break up the new alliance between
Berlin and Istanbul.336 From this it seems that Berlin was not even warned of the Ottoman action,
let alone consulted with beforehand. Istanbul's actions were taken in the advancement of a longheld goal and indicated the Porte's lack of subservience to Berlin, though none of the Entente
ambassadors could be convinced of this.
Wangenheim continued his conspiratorial thinking throughout the rest of 1914. “The
Capitulations were the only thing keeping the lid on the fanaticism of the ulama,” he wrote in
November. Now that the Istanbul bazaaris had had their victory, all Europeans in Ottoman lands,
even allied German soldiers, were at risk. There was now, to Wangenheim, nothing to stand
between Muslim “fanaticism” and the hated ferang (Christian foreigners). Wangenheim was
especially concerned with those who had previously operated their businesses in Ottoman lands
as subjects of the Sultan under European protection and extraterritorial legal authority.337
The only decision remaining to the Ottomans was to enter the war.338 Having fulfilled
their chief goal of abolishing the hated Capitulations, there now seems to have been some debate
as to the timing of Ottoman entry into the conflict. The traditional narratives have long split the
ruling figures into pro-Entente and pro-Central Powers camps. Enver Pasha, Minister of War,
desired war at all costs, and the sooner the better. Cemal Pasha, Minister of Marine, is supposed
to have favored the Entente, and
336 Wangenheim to Foreign Office, October 25, 1914, in Kautsky, German Documents.
337 Ibid.
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specifically France, and to have desired the Porte to await the outcome of the opening
campaigns in Europe. Talat Pasha, Minister of Interior, represented a persuadable middle
position. Said Halim Pasha and Cavid Pasha, the Grand Vizier and Minister of Finance,
respectively, are usually treated as pro-Entente, but increasingly marginalized. There are two
reasons to reject this categorization of the cabinet, one internal, and one external to the Porte.339
Internally, the Ottoman government was less divided than outsiders assume, even in
modern scholarship written decades after the events in question.340 The Ottoman ruling party, the
Ittihad ve Teraki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress) continued to consult widely
within its organization after gaining power, a habit from its years in exile and opposition, when
factionalism had been the bane of Ottoman reformers. The central committee of the party was
consulted about the alliance with Germany, and the prospect of hostile action against Russia and
Britain. The response was “overwhelming,” with the central committee apparently voting its
approval, though actual vote counts have never emerged from the Ottoman archives.341 A
separate vote occurred on the eve of naval action against Russia in the Black Sea. Only the
Minister of Finance, Mehmet Cavid Bey, seriously dissented, and he was persuaded to keep his
dissent to himself and to delay his resignation to present a united front to the world. Indeed, there
is some evidence that Cavid Bey was planning to resign before this and did so for mostly
economic reasons related to his dissension from the new Ottoman industrial policy, which he
considered fiscally ruinous. Even so, Cavid was derided as a “treacherous Jew” because his
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family were Dönme, related to a seventeenth-century Jewish offshoot religion.342 Cavid later
returned to government, but was so little trusted by the rest of the cabinet for his resignation
shortly after the outbreak of war that he claimed later not to have known about the Armenian
deportations and massacres for months after they had begun. Thus the Ottoman cabinet, if Cavid
Bey’s resignation was indeed due to other factors, lost fewer of its members on the eve of war
than the British cabinet, which saw several members of Prime Minister Herbert Asquith’s cabinet
resign rather than countenance the ultimatum to Germany that led to Britain’s August 4, 1914,
declaration of war.
The external reason to doubt this narrative is that the Entente Powers, Britain, France, and
Russia, never doubted Ottoman hostility after the German connection with Istanbul was
established in early August. Russian sources recently viewed by Western scholars have now
shown that plans for an amphibious descent on Istanbul and the annexation of the capital to
Russia after a conflict were part of Russian war plans long before 1914, and indeed formed a
core Russian war aim, whether or not the Ottomans were involved in initial hostilities.343 British
plans were also conceived before the war, with correspondence ongoing between London and
Cairo about plans for an Arab caliphate, partition of the Ottoman Empire, and much else.344
Preparations for a landing from British India directed at Basra were well-planned before the war
and implemented in the first days of November, almost on the heels of the declaration of war
between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. In other words, there was no apparent dissension or
undue delay on the Ottoman part seen by the embassies and diplomats of other powers.
Germany’s ambassador, with his applied Orientalist lens, thought otherwise.
342 Shaw, op cit.
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Wangenheim gave credence to what became the traditional narrative of European
historians. He believed that the German government had to at all costs strengthen the “faction” of
“our friend,” War Minister Enver Pasha.345 As we have seen, this belied the true unity of the
Ottoman ruling classes at the outbreak of war. The hesitation that Wangenheim complained of in
his dispatches to Berlin were borne of caution and the overwhelming needs of the Ottoman
military, which had had barely a year of peace since the 1911-1913 rounds of fighting against
Italy and the Balkan League of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro. Wangenheim waxed
apoplectic at the constant Ottoman demands for more heavy artillery guns, more naval mines,
more German engineers and sappers, more officers and translated training manuals, and,
especially, more gold. Wangenheim even complained that the Ottomans were making Germany
“pay twice” by demanding more gold from the state treasury, while also altering the terms of
trade in the Ottoman favor by unilaterally abrogating the Capitulations even with its ally,
Germany. Wangenheim continued, even after the outbreak of hostilities, to believe that there was
a separate-peace faction within the Sublime Porte, and he remained on guard against the
“treacherous nature” of “Oriental” government until his untimely death in 1915.
The final case study of diplomats as Orientalists touches, as with the missionaries of
Chapter 3, on the genocide of the Armenians during the First World War. Wilhelm Litten was a
German diplomat, dragoman, and interpreter, as well as eyewitness to the Armenian
deportations. Litten had spent much of his service in Tehran, in Qajar dynasty-ruled Iran. He had
there developed along the usual paths of the applied Orientalist. He had embarked upon his
service in the Islamic East with a sense of adventure, and a “desire to see the modern heirs of the
great civilizations of Islam.” Litten was made dragoman of the German embassy in Tehran in
345 Wangenheim to Foreign Office, November 12, 1914, in German Documents.
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early 1907 and was present for much of the revolution in Iranian politics that took place between
that time and 1911.346
From the beginning, Litten was an applied Orientalist, contributing to the “Knowledge of
the Orient,” as the yearbook of the Munich Oriental Society put it.347 Litten contributed to that
organization’s 1908 edition, writing a brief on the new Iranian constitution that praised its
innovations as heralding a new chapter in the “grand history” of Iran and of the “Orient,” more
generally. In the constitution were to be found “both the ideas of this ancient civilization and
those of the reformers of Europe.” This fusion seemed to please Litten greatly, and letters from
his time in Tehran are uniformly of this type, excited at the new possibilities inherent in the
revolution.348
In 1914, Litten was detailed to become consul of a new German consulate he was to
establish in Tabriz. His brief was specifically to use the area, and his dragoman skills, to recruit
spies and informers in Tabriz and the surrounding provinces of northwest Iran.349 At the time, this
was one of the most prosperous areas of Iran, and it had been assigned as sphere of influence to
the Russian Empire by the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. While the specific terms of that
agreement remained secret until the Bolsheviks published them after the October Revolution, it
was an open secret that Russian diplomatic and economic penetration in that region was agreed
to by the British, and even periodic Russian military expeditions reinforced the Russian claim to
Tabriz and its environs. Litten was by all accounts a model consul who oversaw a large increase
in German trade in Tabriz, remarkable considering the distances involved and the advantages
given by treaty to Russian traders. Litten remained in this post until Russian advances into
346 Wilhelm Litten, Persische Flitterwochen (Berlin: Georg Stillke, 1925), 34.
347 Yearbook of the Munich Oriental Society, 1908, in BA KG 28.
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neutral Iran in 1915 in pursuit of Ottoman forces also in the country, forced his consulate to
withdraw from Tabriz.350
Litten fled into Ottoman territory along with Kurdish tribesmen escaping the area of
Tabriz in fear of Russian retaliation. As in Ottoman Anatolia, the Muslim Kurds were regarded as
a pro-Ottoman fifth column, especially by the Russians and Iranian Armenians. Litten’s
dispatches and letters show at this time the first signs of a change in attitude. He denigrated the
Kurds as lawless and uncultured. He believed that sectarian “fanaticism and Oriental barbarity”
made them habitual plunderers of the “industrious” Christians of Anatolia, both Armenian,
Greek, and Chaldean. His retreat with the Kurds was not a happy one, and upon his reintegration
into the diplomatic chain of command he learned that he had been conscripted by the German
Army.
After a brief return to Tehran, and hoping he might be made military attache in that city,
he instead was forced to leave Iran with the rest of the German embassy after British and Russian
pressure forced Iran to break relations with Germany in November 1915. In view of his military
commission, Litten was then assigned to Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz’s command in Baghdad,
facing the British and Indian force advancing up the Tigris and Euphrates valleys.351 Service on
the Mesopotamian Front did not appeal to Litten, as he regarded the Arabs of the Mesopotamian
vilayets as being backward “lacking in all the forms of civilization,” and a “shame to Islam,” for
the marauding and thieving ways of the tribes there, of which he seems only to have heard
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secondhand. This was very different from the tone of his earlier dispatches and letters, especially
in its willingness to draw conclusions from possibly biased secondhand information, and gossip
among German officers.352
His journey to Baghdad, roundabout due to logistical shortcomings in those regions of the
Ottoman Empire coincided with the Armenian deportations. Starting in February 1916, Litten
wrote a series of reports for the German consulate in Aleppo, where he knew the consul
personally. Many of these are merely descriptive, and Litten was careful to record every instance
of brutality by Arab Ottomans to the Armenians and every dead body by the roadside lost in the
death marches through the Syrian Desert.
These reports from Litten confirm the well-attested horror of the Armenian genocide and
the complicity in that massacre of many Ottoman authorities, especially military and
gendarmerie. Again and again, Litten reports that he confronted Ottoman police and soldiers
about the fate of deported Armenians, or the reason for the brutality he witnessed, such as
beatings and shootings of those who could not go on, and deliberate deprivation of the
condemned to ensure they died of thirst in the desert wastes. The answer was reported at each
inquiry: “Effendim, basch ustune!” “Acting on orders, sir!”353
Litten inserted himself into his litany of atrocity to note, at several points, that he believed
the Ottoman authorities who said they acted in this “uncivilized” fashion only due to orders from
on high. “No capacity for initiative in the Muslims here,” Litten wrote.354 Despite his disgust at
the methods used, Litten expressed some sympathy for the deportation, and even execution, of
Armenians who had worked against the Ottoman government during the war. He repeatedly
352 Ibid.
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asked the gendarmes at one stop “why should they be tortured to death slowly.”355 If the
Armenians were guilty of treason and rebellion, as Litten had been told, then fine, “sentence
them and shoot them quickly.” Litten began to see the brutality as part of, not the specific
circumstances of the war or the Ottoman situation, but of an essential “Oriental” quality.356 To
Litten, this had to be caused by a clash of religions.
Litten, in these dispatches, was at pains to say that Germany had to take a stand with the
Armenians as “fellow Christians.” He believed that if Muslim Ottomans were allowed to proceed
with this genocide, “no Christian’s life here is worth more than the Armenians’ was.” He
believed even German missionaries might became endangered, either then or in the future, if
German authorities turned a blind eye to the Armenians’ plight. He also invoked issues of
Realpolitik. Every Armenian school, he said, taught “good French” to their students, “and none
study the German language here.” How would that situation, so detrimental to German influence
in Ottoman Anatolia, ever be remedied if the Armenains came to “blame equally their Muslim
neighbors and the German Reich” for what had happened to them. If this seems to presuppose a
future where the Ottoman Armenians continued to exist, that is because Litten believed that the
Ottoman authorities were capable of brutality, but not competent brutality. The Armenians would
continue to exist, and as industrious people, to thrive in the future. As “fellow Christians” the
Armenians would be natural allies to Germany in the future, especially if the Berlin-Baghdad
Railway project [discussed in Chapter 5] were to be completed after the war. Allowing the
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massacres and death marches to continue was to forfeit goodwill that would have to be earned
back. By this point, Litten was operating as a true applied Orientalist, an agent of empire as
surely as any British or French colonial administrator or dragoman.357
Litten’s attitude hardened in other ways on his journey. One of his diary-like entries sent
to the German consulate in Aleppo details how Litten, in frustration, beat his “Arab servant boy”
for an infraction he does not bother to record. He then relates how, ever since, “boy has called
me not ‘friend’ but ‘lord’” in an indication of his growing distance, not just from his servant, but
from Islamicate culture of a kind he had once admired. Litten then goes back to observations on
how German engineers could straighten the local road with little difficulty and how the
Armenians should be saved in order to provide “12,000 spirited workers” for the Berlin-Baghdad
Railway after the war.358
The cases detailed in this chapter show the same sort of transformation of opinion among
applied Orientalists as in the previous chapter on German missions and is wholly in keeping with
the thesis of this work. In short, while there might have been a “special” sort of German
Orientalism that left a lingering respect for Islamic and Islamicate culture, religion, and society
in diplomats like Hartmann, close contact with actually existing Islamicate society in the
Ottoman Empire tended to create instead a contempt and dismissive attitude reminiscent of the
Orientalists of Britain and France. As actors in an imperial drama, these German diplomats were
agents of their nation’s power projection into the Ottoman realms, whether as consuls, dragomen,
or ambassadors. Whether because of witnessed horrors, like the massacres of the Armenians in
1915, or because of suspicions bred of frustration in the pursuit of national interest, as with
357 Report by Wilhelm Litten to the consul in Aleppo (Rossler), dated Aleppo, 6 February 1916, in Wolfgang Gust,
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Wangenheim in 1914 and 1915, these applied Orientalists were forced into a similar mindset, a
similar mold, to the experts that administered British and French colonies with large Muslim
populations. The factor that mattered most was representing their nations’ interests, or perceived
interests. Just as the missionaries often came to see themselves as the emissaries of Christendom
in an alien land, diplomats like Martin Hartmann came to see themselves as a vanguard of
culture in a backwards “Orient.”
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CHAPTER 5: GERMAN BUSINESSMEN
Businessmen were a major part of the German presence in Islamic and Islamicate lands in
the early national period.359 Starting as early as the unification of the German Empire in 1871,
German banks and construction companies, especially, began to view the Ottoman Empire as an
outlet for investment that could not find a productive return in Europe. Even after the German
colonial empire took shape in the latter half of the 1880s, investment in the Ottoman lands
continued to be an attractive alternative.360 The implications of this informal economic empire
have already been covered. This chapter discusses the opportunities that led German
businessmen into the Ottoman lands and what they thought and wrote about their experiences in
the Islamicate east.
The experience of German businessmen in the Ottoman Empire is a key part of the story
of the applied Orientalists here under study. These were not scholars and did not partake in the
academic debates among German Orientalists in the world of the universities. They were
influenced by material considerations: career advancement, profit, the exercise of their skills for
the benefit of themselves and their employers. With missionaries and army officers they shared a
common set of experiences. Many were either indifferent to or supportive of the Ottoman state
and its Islamicate society when they arrived, and they grew less so with experience.
The business interests of Germany were also key to the actual political and economic
influence in the Ottoman Empire. Having greater contact with actual conditions in the “Orient”,
these businessmen were in positions to advance the relations between German and Ottoman
cultures and did so. They also saw a different side of the Ottoman Empire, and Islamicate
civilization in general, than the academic Orientalists who did not experience these societies.
While the academic side of German Orientalism emphasized the accomplishments of Islamic and
Islamicate culture, the businessmen of the Kaiserreich were concerned with the state of Ottoman
359 Donald Quataert, “The Age of Reforms” in Halal Inalcik and Donald Quataert, eds. An Economy and History of
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infrastructure and commerce. These they often found lacking and increasingly they were drawn,
in the fashion of academic Orientalism, to cultural and religious explanations for material
realities.
At the start of the period under study, much of the economy of the Ottoman Empire was
in the hands of foreigners. The 1838 Treaty of Commerce and Amity between the British
government and the Ottoman court delineated the basic terms of trade the Sultan's lands operated
under until 1914.361 By this treaty, tariffs were nearly non-existent in the Ottoman Empire, as
were controls on foreign capital, leaving the major power of the Middle East completely open to
foreign goods and investments. The treaty was the subject of the ire of Ottoman reformists from
its inception until the end of the Ottoman state, as its terms effectively blocked Ottoman
industrialization from occurring. With no protection for nascent domestic industries after 1837,
the Ottomans were forced to concentrate on export industries, especially raw materials and other
unfinished goods.362
Cash crops such as tobacco and cotton were some of the better options for Ottoman
governments seeking exports that might bring in cash to the perpetually bankrupt government's
coffers.363 As European penetration of the Ottoman economy increased throughout the ninteenth
century, both of these commodities came under the control of foreign businesses or foreign
governments. In the case of tobacco, restrictions on the sale of land to non-Ottoman subjects kept
the crops both natively-owned and taxable for some time. Ottoman tobacco was widely held to
be of very high quality, effectively competing in European and Asian markets with Americangrown tobacco from Virginia and North Carolina. However, after another bout of indebtedness
and a near-default on foreign-owned bonds in 1889, the Ottoman government was forced to sign
a concession demanded by the French government that turned over all export of Ottoman
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tobacco to the Régie de Tabac, a French monopoly formed for that purpose.364 All taxes and
duties on tobacco from that point onward were controlled by the monopoly's mostly-French
board of directors and were designated first to pay off the bondholders, with any surplus going to
Ottoman government coffers, with restrictions even then on how it could be spent. In the twentyfive year history of the tobacco monopoly, no significant revenues were ever sent to the
government in Istanbul. After the First World War, the monopoly was disbanded by the Turkish
nationalist government that succeeded the Sultans.
Cotton, mostly from Ottoman Egypt, was the other main source of cash crop revenue.365
The growth of Egyptian cotton received an enormous boost in profitability in the early 1860s,
when the Confederate rebellion against the United States led to a cotton embargo from the
secessionist states American South that acted to protect alternate, and usually pricier, sources.
The Ottoman Empire was not allowed to benefit from this boom in its Egyptian dependency for
long. Under the terms of British and French capitalists, the revenues from the cotton exports
were mostly earmarked to pay Egyptian debt and under pressure the fixed amounts paid to the
Ottoman government each year from Egypt were reduced to help service that same debt, even as
revenues skyrocketed. In 1882, the British invaded Egypt to put down the army revolt led by
Ahmed Urabi, which the government in Cairo had failed to defeat and which threatened British
interests in the debt payments, as well as European control of the Suez Canal. After the British
occupation, though no formal protectorate was proclaimed until 1914, the Egyptian payments to
the Ottoman government were slashed again and again. With British force behind these demands,
there was little Istanbul could do but acquiesce. Another major source of revenue from cash
crops was therefore denied the Ottomans.
Eventually, even the basic governmental functions of taxation and budgeting were
usurped by Europeans. The Ottoman state declared bankruptcy in 1875 and the war with Russia
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in 1877-1878 exacerbated the already dire financial situation.366 In 1879, as the bankruptcy
proceedings were renewed, the British and French governments submitted an ultimatum to the
Sultan that resulted in the formation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA). The
OPDA would be tasked with reorganizing the Ottoman finances to ensure that the old debts were
paid. There were minimal amounts of debt forgiveness, but the vast majority of loans were still
declared valid. Since most of these debts were owed to state or private banks in Britain and
France, the OPDA had a 3 to 1 European majority, with token Ottoman commissioners who were
de facto chosen by the European powers to sit on its board.367 The OPDA was given veto power
over changes to Ottoman tax law and tariffs, even with powers that, unlike Britain, did not have
trade treaties with the Ottoman state. All revenues of the central government in Istanbul were
administered first by the OPDA and used to pay interest on the debt. Only after the debts were
serviced was the revenue allocated back to the government for use in normal budgeting. In
reality, even budget priorities after this point were often dictated by the OPDA, which heavily
favored investment in schemes that would benefit exports in sectors of the economy controlled
by Europeans. With this, the Ottomans lost much of the semblance of real sovereignty.368
The German break into the Ottoman economy came in the form of transport infrastructure
building. Even before the Ottoman revolutions of 1908-1909 brought modernizing reformers into
power in Istanbul, the Sultan's governments had been concerned about the increasing
encroachment of predatory European powers on the realm's transportation systems. The lack of
adequate railroad connections to the most-Arab provinces meant that those vilaya were largely
economically isolated from the main territories of the empire in Anatolia. Mesopotamia was
especially concerning. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers were the main mode of transport in the
366 Jonathan S. McMurry, “Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad
Railway, 1903-1908” (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Claremont University, 1999), 75. See also Sean
McMeekin, Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for World Power (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2010), 7.
367 Halil Inalcik, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), vol. 2, 889.
368 Ibid. Also Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Press, 2005), vol. 1,
189.
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region and the advent of shallow-draft steamships that could move upriver instead of being at the
mercy of the currents revolutionized the local economy. However, from the 1860s, the
steamships in the vilaya of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul were under British control. The Tigris
and Euphrates Steamship Company, controlled by British capital, and with an entirely British
board of directors, was given a monopoly on the river routes of Mesopotamia by agreement with
the British government.369 The company had a habit of raising cargo rates on its routes without
warning the local authorities and otherwise seemed never to keep Ottoman interests in mind
when deciding schedules and rates. This was the point at which German capital would intervene,
creating opportunities for would-be applied Orientalists.
The first German investment in Ottoman railways was indirect, however. The Hijaz
Railway project was a pet scheme of the arch-reactionary Sultan Abdulhamid II. In an auto-coup
of 1876, Abdulhamid had both come to power after the discrediting of his predecessor and then,
after a period of reform and the promulgation of the first Ottoman constitution, crushed his
liberal rivals and assumed near-absolute rule that lasted until 1908. Abdulhamid was acutely
aware that the ethnically and religiously heterogenous Ottoman Empire was an outlier in an age
of nation-state consolidation. One of the major goals of his decades of rule was to find a unifying
ideology for the Ottoman state. If loyalty to the dynasty would not work, and the repeated crises
of secession and sectarian violence in the nineteenth century seemed to indicate that it would not,
then a pan-Islamic identity might do. This would play on the Sultan's long-neglected role as
khalif, successor to the Prophet Muhammad. Ottoman rulers had claimed this since the sixteenth
century, having superseded the last caliphal claimants in the Sunni Muslim world at that time.
Now it would be revived and a new shaikh-ul-islam, the highest cleric in the realm, who
promulgated religious decrees in the Sultan's name, was chosen accordingly. As protector of the
holy shrines in Mecca and Medina, the Sultan had for centuries been responsible for
safeguarding the hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca to be undertaken by faithful Muslims at
369 Penelope Tuson, ed. Records of Saudi Arabia: Primary Documents 1902-1960, vol. 6, no. 178.
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least once in their lifetimes if they are able. Abdulhamid decided that furthering his role as
successor to the Prophet required that the Ottoman state undertake a high-visibility project to
increase the number of pilgrims that could be accommodated in the holy city each year. Thus, the
Hijaz Railway project was conceived. It would have the additional benefit of undercutting the
near-independent sharif of Mecca, the only potential rival claimant to the caliphate, by cutting
the transit time from Istanbul to Mecca by more than half.370
Such a holy project could not utilize non-Muslim capital.371 Therefore, besides loans from
state-run banks within the Ottoman Empire, the necessary capital would be raised by
subscription from the faithful. Not only Ottoman subjects, but Muslims from all over the world
contributed to the project, which was fully funded in 1900. Although the chief engineer and
many of the supervisory staff for the railway's construction were to be Ottoman Muslims, much
of the actual design and on-the-ground supervision were carried out by German engineers.372 At
least three hundred German workers were laboring to complete the railway at any given time
over the next decade. The importance of the railway would be borne out in the course of the
Great War.
Throughout the First World War, the Ottomans used the Hijaz Railway as a major
communications artery. The two attacks on the Suez Canal in 1915 and 1916 were supplied by
the Hijaz Railway and once the Arab Revolt began in 1916, the railway was the only lifeline
connecting the core Ottoman territories with the Hijaz and the holy cities themselves. Thanks to
the Hijaz Railway, the Ottomans were able to keep Medina supplied throughout the conflict,
denying their enemies control over the entire Hijaz, with its great religious significance. Once the
British Empire invaded Palestine, the Hijaz Railway was key to advance and defense for both
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sides, and even the spur line to Amman became the subject of several major campaigns in 1917
and 1918.373
The need for better transport to Mesopotamia to undercut the British influence on the
Tigris and Euphrates, as well as the in the Persian Gulf and to bind those remote lands more
closely to the central government, led the Ottomans to seek outside assistance to fund a railway
from Istanbul to Baghdad. The quality of the work of German engineers on the Hijaz railway
project would have made a recommendation for German workers natural, but as it happened
German capital had taken an interest in Mesopotamia long before the Ottomans seriously began
to contemplate the project. Wilhelm von Pressel had been given the brief to reorganize the
railroads of Anatolia as early as 1871 and under his leadership a consortium of Deutsche Bank
and the German construction company Philipp Holzmann AG provided the capital and
engineering expertise to complete several extended lines and spurs in Anatolia in the 1870s and
1880s.374
Wilhelm von Pressel had originally traveled to Istanbul with ambassadorial powers to
seek an outlet there for Prussian and German railway investment. His initial impressions were
extremely favorable. Fascinated by this “Oriental capital of the first rank,”375 he spent his first
months in Istanbul attempting to learn the Ottoman language and culture. His writings make it
clear that this was not merely a study he undertook so that he could better perform his duties. He
was genuinely smitten with the Ottoman people, and spoke of the exoticism of the Istanbul
bazaar as a wonder. His efforts paid off with increasing rank and power within the Ottoman
transport ministry, to which he was attached.376 Nevertheless, it was only after the RussoOttoman War of 1877-1878 that his railway projects were supported fully at the top of the
Ottoman hierarchy. After that conflict, he made contact with the Prussian officer Colmar Freiherr
373 Shaw, Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 2, 1001. See also Edward Ericson, Ordered to Die: A History of the
Ottoman Army in the First World War (Stamford: Greenwood Press, 2000), 190.
374 General appraisal of invetment, Bundesarchiv Deutsche Bank collection, Amt R, 8119F, 7096 S. 5.
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von der Goltz, who had been sent to Istanbul to reform the Ottoman armies in the wake of their
defeat by the Russians. Von der Goltz would play a major role in military-to-military contact
between the Ottomans and Germans, but he also was convinced by von Pressel to advertise for
railway projects to his connections back in Germany.377
Von Pressel's initial impressions of Ottoman government were good. He spoke highly of
the administrative capacities of the people he worked with. “The Sublime Porte works in the
interests of its people,” and he specifically in his writings refuted the idea that the Ottoman
government was corrupt. The use of bribery was a common trope in European writings about life
in the Ottoman Empire. More than one embassy official arriving in Istanbul would end up in
trouble because they expected that the local police could be bought, or that government permits
and licenses were for purchase. Von Pressel found this not to be so, and expressed pride that
there was no waste or fraud involved in the railway ministry's business.378
Another commonly leveled argument was that the Ottoman government was a relic of the
barbarous past, long since left behind in Christian Europe. Torture and extrajudicial killings were
said to be common and the justice system a travesty. Von Pressel specifically investigated this on
his own, asking questions of colleagues about the workings of the Ottoman courts, and showing
a fascination with the operation of the millet court system, under which the various recognized
religions of the Ottoman lands adjudicated marriages, divorces, and inheritences, among other
things, according to the judgements of their religious leadership. Von Pressel wondered how the
Christians of the Ottoman lands could be oppressed, as he had been told to expect, if they were
accorded “their own laws and courts to oversee them composed of their own people.”379
Von Pressel was especially interested in the Christians of Anatolia. During the period he
worked on the financing for the Baghdad Railway project, there were three serious uprisings
among the Christian Armenians, in 1896, 1906, and 1909. These were being referred to in the
377 Pressel correspondence, BA DB R 8104.
378 Ibid. and generally confirmed by Johann Manzenreiter, Die Baghdadbahn als Beispiel fur die Entstehung des
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German press as the “Armenian horrors”, to echo the famous “Bulgarian horrors” of the 1870s,
which William Gladstone had campaigned against during his return to national British politics.
Von Pressel had paid much attention in his time in Istanbul to the talk of the “plight” of the
Anatolian Armenians. His friends at embassy parties had on more than one occasion waylaid him
to discuss his feelings on the subject, which was also discussed in other embassy circles
according to surviving accounts.380
Von Pressel gradually came to adopt this language. By the time of his death, in 1902, von
Pressel had accumulated a great many enemies in German government and financial circles.
Many of them believed that he had “gone native,” and adopted far too soft an attitude regarding
the Ottomans. They need not have worried. Von Pressel was, by the time of the 1896 Armenian
uprising, convinced that “hypocritical” Ottoman valis, or governors, had stirred up religious
dissensions between the Armenian Christians and their Muslim neighbors, then complained
about Armenian attacks. “Naturally, the Armenians look to Christians in Europe,” said von
Pressel, to save them from “corrupt and primitive” government by Muslims. He no longer saw
Ottoman society as Islamicate-that is, as a government of a diverse realm in which Islam was the
dominant, but hardly the only, influence. Instead “fanatical Muslim policy” prevailed in Ottoman
circles. These policies were inevitable, products of the “bazaar opinion”. By this, von Pressel
meant that the nature of Islam in the Ottoman Empire precluded a more tolerant policy toward
other religious groups within the Sultan’s lands, because Muslim popular and clerical opinion
would not countenance toleration.
That von Pressel, an astute observer of the Ottoman scene in so many of his writings,
should think this precisely during the time when legal equality of all religions was being enacted
in one area of administration after the next, is odd. While it is possible that von Pressel was
380 Pressel Correspondence, BA DB R 8104.
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reacting to the Pan-Islamic policies of the court of Abdulhamid II, previously mentioned, these
policies had more to do with foreign affairs. When speaking of the essentially intolerant nature of
Islamicate society in the Ottoman Empire, von Pressel refers only to domestic affairs there,
especially about the Anatolian Armenians.381
Von Pressel is unusual among the applied Orientalists in another way. He remained proOttoman where the projects he had worked upon were concerned. By this time, von Pressel was
retired, but he had remained in the Ottoman Empire as a common citizen. Until his death, he
continued to advocate for German-Ottoman friendship and for German investment in the
Ottoman Empire. This would, he thought, benefit both countries. Von Pressel also continued to
believe that he had been unfairly sidelined and that he was a “father of German-Ottoman
relations.”382 This sat uneasily alongside his increasingly jaundiced opinion about what he
thought as misgovernment that could not be remedied without religious and social changes in the
Ottoman Empire. There is no doubt, however, that von Pressel’s writings constitute applied
Orientalism. He displayed all the “symptoms” of the genre: essentialism, blaming deep-seated
religious and social issues for modern ills and an increasing regard for Islam and its adherents as
alien and hostile.383
Von Pressel would die in Istanbul, to the end convinced of what he had accomplished. His
detractors, on the occasion of his death, would speak ill of him once again in the diplomatic
dispatch on the occasion of his death. Von Pressel believed he had “the right to call the Anatolian
381 Ibid. This was a longstanding opinion, and the evolution can be easily tracked by comparing later
correspondence with Wilhelm von Pressel, “Das Anatolische Eisenbahnnetz” in Zeitschrift fur Eisenbahnen und
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2000), 35. This work quotes from proprietary archives of the Istanbul branch of DB’s operations, as well as the
archives of the Turkish Central Bank, which the author has not seen utilized otherwise.
383 Pressel Correspondence, BA DB R 8104.

140

Railway my child,” and there is much truth in that.384 Modern historians are now revisiting his
role in this project, and the role played by his financial schemes in putting Ottoman credit to
rights after the defaults of 1875-1876. That von Pressel was loyal to something beyond the
interests of his German homeland in this is shown by the fact that he apparently pressured Sultan
Abdulhamid II to nationalize the railway if his German rivals succeeded in compromising or
altering von Pressel’s rather rigid conception of what the project had to be.385 His legacy was that
the project would become much larger after his death. Von Pressel has, however, not been
evaluated previously for his Orientalist writings, and though there are contradictions in his
contribution to this tale, he remains an important figure in it.
The most consequential project in these years, as noted above, and the one that attracted
the greatest number of German businessmen to the Ottoman lands, was the aforementioned
Baghdad Railway project, often called the “Berlin-Baghdad Railroad.” To introduce this project,
it is necessary first to explore what it was and how that reality differed from the reality of the
enterprise, before we can detail how it relates to the field of applied Orientalism.
The Baghdad Railway is one of the few examples in the English-language literature about
the Ottoman Empire that recognizes investment and business activity as a field of imperial
endeavor. The literature on the Baghdad Railway focuses mostly on the “threat,” even the
“mortal danger” the enterprise posed to the “lifeline” of the British Empire, its sea lines of
communication between Britain and British India.386
The Baghdad Railway project was an outgrowth of the Anatolian Railway, which by the
beginning of the twentieth century was beginning to function as Wilhelm von Pressel had
384 Pressel to Berlin, 1910, Pressel Correspondence, BA DB R 8104.
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intended and would become a lifeline for the Ottoman Empire during the First World War,
especially after the conquest of the Kingdom of Serbia by the Central Powers in 1915 freed the
European portion of the railway from blockages due to hostile forces.387 The legacy of von
Pressel can be seen in the outgrowth into the Baghdad Railway in that that never-fully-completed
transportation artery became much more than a simple investment or infrastructure improvement,
but the core of the economic and strategic relationship between the German and Ottoman
Empires, as well as a spur to more German applied Orientalists following their careers into the
Anatolian mountains.
The origins of the German railway projects that became combined into the Baghdad
Railway scheme by the beginning of the twentieth century lay, as with the Hijaz Railway, in
opportunities caused by British and French exploitation of the Ottomans. The French government
had originally overseen the formation of an “Ottoman Railway Society” in the early 1880s and
French capitalists had subscribed the Society, under government auspices and guarantees for
their investments.388 However, the French government was never completely supportive of the
project, because of geopolitical interests. The Ottoman Railway Society was to build railroads in
Anatolia, the Asian region of modern Turkey.389 Both the British and French governments had
concerns that any such project, were it to be completed, would pass too close to the
Mediterranean shore of Anatolia. For the British Empire and its foreign and colonial service
officers in London and, after 1882, Cairo, this meant the potential for land transport that
competed with the Mediterranean shipping the British dominated both commercially and,
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through their Mediterranean Fleet, militarily.390 For the French, Foreign Ministry records indicate
that successive governments were concerned about the railway’s ability to bring new Muslim
settlers into areas where Armenian Christians and Chaldean Catholics lived. Since the French
government had, as detailed in Chapter 3, long considered these peoples to be under French
protection even when nominally Ottoman subjects, this meant that any railway projects in
Anatolia might conflict with French interests both present and future, especially French claims to
the Lebanon region and to Armenian Cilicia.391 Both were areas that had a large number of
Christian Ottoman subjects and both would be claimed by France during and after the Great War.
After French capital subscriptions failed due to government opposition and the high risk
of investments in Ottoman lands, German capitalists took over. At the request of the Ottoman
Empire, made through the German embassy in Istanbul, feelers were placed to Deutsche Bank, to
see if the bank was willing to provide financing at terms the Ottomans could accept.392 The
records are unclear whether Deutsche Bank was given any guarantees regarding their potential
investment, though at least one author is able to assert that such guarantees were requested.
Deutsche Bank’s “Oriental Files” still exist in some form, but many documents were, by the
admission of the bank, destroyed between the 1920s and the 1950s, having been declared
irrelevant. Therefore, discussion of these matters rests largely with government diplomatic
records that record the interactions German diplomats and other officials had with Deutsche
Bank officers and executives, both in Germany and on the ground in the Ottoman Empire. These
records contain no such information, but it suffices for the purposes of this study to note that the
initial contact with Deutsche Bank was through the government. Nor would the bank officers
390 Shaw, Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 1, 287.
391 Krieger, op cit.
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143

have been unaware of German government wishes in directing this investment, or that the
investment opportunity had only arisen because of French neglect of the matter. Deutsche Bank
was so enamored of the opportunity that it spun off an entire dedicated entity to supervise its
investments in the Ottoman Empire, the Deutsche Orientbank. This was appropriate given the
enormous scale of the eventual project.
The Baghdad Railway project was not meant to be merely a railroad. The investment
treaty signed with the Ottoman government made clear that, in exchange for favorable rates and
the use of German capital and engineering to build the railway, Germany would finance the
development of a wide swath of Anatolia and Mesopotamia on either side of the railroad's right
of way. The use of spur lines was mandated by the treaty, to connect cities like Diyarbakir, Van,
Sivas, Antep, Arbil, and Tikrit to the rail network. There would be further spurs to existing or
projected mines for nickel, copper, tin, and cobalt. German companies would exploit these ores
and German interests were to have the right to buy a certain amount of the output. The result
would be to free German industry, upon completion of the projects, from many of the resource
restraints it faced in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.393
This was important to both the Germans and the Ottomans. Firstly, it allowed the
Ottoman government, both that of Abdulhamid II, and after 1908 the Ittihad ve Teraki, to exploit
mineral deposits in Anatolia, especially the high-value nickel, that was simply not possible
without infusions of European capital and engineering know-how.394 The Ottoman Empire
needed the foreign currency reserves to service debt. It will be remembered that the Ottoman
393 Shaw, Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 1, 281. McMurry, “Distant Ties” 106. BA DB 7946, von Siemens
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Public Debt Corporation, and the terms of many of the Capitulation agreements with European
powers, specifically prioritized debt service before any sort of other spending, military or social
in nature, that the Ottoman state might wish to undertake. It would also serve as a military and
commercial way to more closely bind the Mesopotamian, and largely Arab, vilayets to the rest of
the Ottoman Empire. Tribal unrest was endemic in those lands and the Ottoman state also had
questions of legitimacy bound up in securing Mesopotamian Arab allegiance395. As noted above
when discussing the Hijaz Railway scheme, the government of Abdulhamid II (1876-1908)
relied much more heavily upon the claim of the Sultans to be Caliphs of the Muslims. This
religious legitimacy was especially important in Mesopotamia, with its non-Turkish but
overwhelmingly Muslim population. Second to the abrogation of the Capitulations themselves, a
trans-Anatolian railway was one of the higher priorities of the Ottoman government in its later
decades.396
To the German Empire and Deutsche Bank, this was a prime opportunity for expansion in
a world that seemed all to often to deny German capital its “place in the sun.” Whereas the
French had dithered for decades before pulling the plug on their investment, Germany was
determined to “move quickly and with as much as possible,” throwing geopolitical weight as
well as financial capital into the mix. A memorandum on loans was drawn up quickly, and terms
agreed. The Anatolian Railway Company was “for many years, the only representative of
Deutsche Bank interests in Turkey,” but by 1909 space from a former branch of the French
Credit Lyonnaise was rented in Istanbul to house Deutsche Bank’s new premises.397 It was fitting
that the new premises involved the replacement of a French bank with a German one, as it
395 Briton Cooper Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914 (Berkeley: UC Press, 1967), 54ff.
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paralleled the larger financial developments taking place. Two floors were used for the new
offices, the lower one a public-facing part of the Deutsche Orientbank, while the second floor of
the building housed the offices of Deutsche Bank’s senior management in the Ottoman lands,
both those stationed there permanently and an increasing number of transients between Istanbul
and the bank’s main offices in Frankfurt as the years went on.
Nor did Deutsche Bank’s activities stop there. The bank actively sought to interest
smaller German financial firms in the opportunities on offer in the Ottoman Empire. According
to a 1910 Frankfurter Zeitung article, while “Deutsche Bank was the main representative of the
substantial German financial interests in the Orient […] Dresdner Bank and Nationalbank
Deutschland were given specific representation in the Deutsche Orientbank beginning in 1906.”
The new premises in the Galata district of Istanbul were specifically cited in the same article as
being necessary for the rapidly expanding horizons of the bank’s railway projects. “Until now,
the bank’s business has been handled largely through the Anatolian Railway Company. That no
longer seems enough for the bank.”398
The expansion of the project from railway finance into a massive scheme to knit together
the Ottoman Empire and enable it to exploit its own natural resources, alarmed the Germans’
British and French geopolitical rivals. From the beginning, the project was an international
concern. Longstanding French interests were acknowledged in 1909, when the German and
Ottoman governments, along with the directors of the railway and banking consortium, agreed to
steer the railway farther from Cilicia, on the southern Mediterranean coast of the Anatolian
peninsula. This also accorded with British interests in the region of the Gulf of Alexandretta, a
large natural harbor that various British planners and civil servants would consider annexing to
398 Frankfurter Zeitung, June 2, 1910, included in “Operations” folder in BA DB R 7946.
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the British Empire both before and during the First World War. British diplomats had also
intervened extensively in the area of Cilicia during a 1906 uprising among the Armenian
Christian communities there.399 The uprising was caused by abuse by Ottoman tax farmers and
the perceived favoritism shown to Muslim Kurds and Turks in the region by Ottoman
gendarmes. Acting under the terms of their Capitulation agreements, the British authorities in
Cairo had encouraged British consuls on the spot to hand out British certificates of protection to
Armenians in the region, which the Ottoman authorities claimed only exacerbated the
intercommunal problems by giving Armenian villages a sense of impunity, that they were
protected by a strong foreign power. No matter the truth of the accusations and counteraccusations, the German-run railway consortium wanted to stay well clear of these problems and
so by a series of memoranda exchanged between the British, French, German, and Ottoman
governments, Cilicia was declared to be off-limits to the railway and its associated developments
for a specified distance from the Mediterranean coast and especially the Gulf of Alexandretta.400
Further negotiations with Britain were necessary regarding the projected terminus of the
railway. The scheme was originally the “Berlin-Basra” Railroad. Basra, the chief Ottoman port
on the Persian Gulf, was an area of British interest. As will be seen later in this chapter, British
interests in the Persian Gulf were already undermining Ottoman political and economic strength
there. Anything that allowed quick and cheap land travel to Basra from the Anatolian core of the
Ottoman state was therefore opposed by the British. This was couched at the time in the nature of
“keeping Ottoman sovereignty safe from German expansion,” but historical opinion has long
since shifted toward a more self-interested set of British motives.401 The more paranoid British
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Turkey for the Year 1906,” received February 11, 1907, in BDOW vol. V 189-195.
400 Ibid.
401 McMeekin, Berlin-Baghdad Express, 97. Shaw, Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 1, 356.

147

agents in Cairo and the Persian Gulf even believed the ultimate goal of the railway was Kuwait,
since 1899 under a British protectorate and expanding its ill-defined territory into the hinterlands
of Basra.402 British steamships also plied the Mesopotamian rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates. A
railway moving south of Baghdad to where the rivers were still navigable by larger flat-bottomed
steamships would undercut British business interests as well. Diplomacy around the Baghdad
Railway led to 1903, 1911, and 1913 exchanges of notes between the governments of Britain and
Germany. By the terms of these, the railroad was not, for the time being, to be extended south of
Baghdad. It was not to ever end at the even better port facilities in British client Kuwait. For the
rest, the German government again and again repeated that the consortium of German banks, led
by Deutsche Bank, were operating independently of government interests in regard to the
railway.
The Baghdad Railroad was the largest single foreign venture in the Ottoman economy
when
the Great War began. The initial groundbreaking occurred under the consortium of German
banks, led by Deutsche Bank, as seen above. However, by the time the rails had reached the
Taurus Mountains, slowing construction and badly damaging profitability until the German
railroad engineers could blast costly tunnels through the rock, the scheme had been effectively
nationalized. Day to day control of the project remained with German engineers and bankers, but
German government funding was now matched by Ottoman government funding, making
finance of the unexpectedly difficult project largely public by 1914. The Ottoman funding was
indirect, taking the form not of cash outlays but of “kilometric guarantees,” by which the
Ottoman government pledged that the line would have a minimum profitability per unit
402 Anscombe, Ottoman Gulf, 135. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 198-199.
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constructed. The Germans agreed to much more than merely constructing the rails in return for
these kilometric guarantees.403 The Ottomans wanted the Baghdad Railroad to enhance the
governability of difficult-to-control parts of Anatolia as well. The railroad’s right-of-way was
extended to include space for more spurs, stations to be built by German engineers in German
styles in towns nearby, and a parallel telegraph line. Further plans were drawn up for electricity
transmission lines, electrical substations, factories to take advantage of the provided electricity,
even German-built post offices to handle the telegrams sent along the wires, and the parcels sent
along the rails. Gendarmarie posts would be placed alongside these stations to protect them from
thieves and bandits. This, in addition to the mineshafts to be sunk in the Anatolian interior, mines
that would not be profitable without nearby railroad spurs to carry their output to cities and ports,
amounted to a massive development project in the Ottoman Empire, financed by German capital,
and transforming some of the most impoverished vilayets of the Ottoman realms. By the time the
First World War disrupted employment figures all over the Ottoman Empire, due to all ablebodied men being conscripted into the armed forces, the Baghdad Railroad project employed
over sixteen thousand Ottoman subjects, making it the largest employer in any of the places the
project’s many branches operated.404
Deutsche Bank was an obvious vehicle a German investment of this magnitude in the
Ottoman Empire. With its large capital reserves and international presence, as well as a great
many ties to government, Deutsche Bank was accustomed, among both bank management and
government ministers, to close cooperation with the Foreign Office’s aims. That cooperation
brought thousands of Germans into the Ottoman Empire just for this project.
403 Copies of British notes, and kilometric guarantee agreement dated June 1907, in BA DB R 7946
404 See “Summary of a pamphlet by Dr. Paul Rohrbach respecting the Baghdad Railway, dated January 18, 1902” in
Sir N. O’Connor to Marquess of Lansdowne, no. 28, PRO406/19, July 27, 1903.
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One of them was Otto Kaufmann, who became chief manager of the Istanbul branch of
Deutsche Bank’s operations in 1908 and would continue the role until the Deutsche Orientbank
was dissolved by decree of the Allied Control Council that took over governance of Ottoman
finances after the Armistice of Mudros ended the First World War in the Middle East, in 1918.
Kaufmann’s background with Deutsche Bank stretched back to the early 1880s and he was
chosen for his role in part because, as a young trainee manager, he had overseen the liquidation
in 1881 of some of the French infrastructure of the failed previous Anatolian railway schemes.
Also important was his knowledge of the French language, learned on that early assignment.
Even as French finance pulled back from certain investments in the Ottoman Empire, French
remained the language of much of the business community, especially among the other European
nations, most of whose employees could not speak the Ottoman language.405
Kaufmann took up his post with some trepidation, natural considering the scale of the
task he was managing. Many of the records, as indicated above, have been lost. It seems that
Kaufmann’s Istanbul branch was involved in bond flotations for the Ottoman government, but
there remains no trace of these transactions in the archives and the only mentions of these in
diplomatic records that were copied to the German Finance Ministry.406 Kaufmann only refers to
“the need for bond sales and the difficulty of this” when speaking of his early years in Istanbul.407
As for the people he worked with in Istanbul, Kaufmann was more concerned about the German
staff he brought with him, than about the local translators, typists, and clerks he hired. The
German staff was “a bunch from many places, with much to learn” about both the business they
were in, as well as the specific ways of Deutsche Bank. For example, Kaufmann found that he
405 A Century of Deutsche Bank in Turkey, 19-20.
406 Copy of DB circular to Staatssekreatiat Berlin, in BA R AA 207:3.
407 Ibid. and A Century of Deutsche Bank in Turkey, 22.
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was constantly reprimanding the German staff for failing to adhere to an idiosyncratic filing
system for documents that Deutsche Bank used. The Ottoman staff, however, “never gave such
troubles” and learned the ways of the company quickly.
Similarly, Kaufmann had nothing but admiration for what we can term an Islamicate city
and which he simply saw as “cosmopolitan” beyond his expectations. At the time of Kaufmann’s
arrival in Istanbul, the city population was perhaps half Muslim, with the other half either
Christians (most of the Orthodox churches), or the large Jewish minority. The ease with which
“these people of different religions mingled in public” was astonishing to Kaufmann and he
credited the “moderation of rule” of the Sublime Porte for these conditions. It seems Kaufmann
even took it upon himself to correct certain of the misconceptions of German managers coming
to the Istanbul bank headquarters, writing on two occasions that he informed them not to expect
a society any less “cultured” than that in Germany and warning them that neither he nor the local
population would take kindly were the new staff to assume airs of superiority around Stamboulis
in the markets and squares.408
Kaufmann began to be disillusioned only relatively late in his time in the Ottoman
Empire. From 1911 there are indications of his disquiet with conditions in Istanbul. Kaufmann
came to believe, in his writings to his superiors and reports given by diplomats who worked with
him, that the Ottoman authorities were systematically lying about their financial situation.
Kaufmann believed that the “treacherous Oriental need for bribery” was siphoning off increasing
amounts of money from the projects Deutsche Bank was financing.409 This is especially strange
considering that some of his earlier writings are fairly frank about the costs of doing business in

408 Annual report for year 1909, Kaufmann to DB Berlin, in BA DB R 8111.
409 Kaufmann to DB Berlin, August 3, 1911, in BA DB R 8111.
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the Ottoman lands, which included steering money into accounts that likely were personally
controlled by various Ottoman cabinet ministers or courtiers. Kaufmann came to speak less and
less of the importance of his work. The Baghdad Railway project, once deemed “highly
important to Germany,” in his dispatches and memos, was now “unlikely to succeed soon
enough” for any use to be gotten out of it. Nor was this mere pessimism at the international
situation. Kaufmann’s writings are strangely optimistic about the chances of Germany avoiding a
major war. He repeatedly filed annual reports that downplayed the risk of conflict. That he did
this even after the Italian attack on Ottoman Libya in October 1911 is quite astonishing.410
The next year, 1912, Kaufmann could not deny reality any longer. The rapid advance of
the Balkan League powers, especially the now-fully-independent Kingdom of Bulgaria, overran
large amounts of the original railway projects that metastasized into the Anatolian and Baghdad
Railway schemes. For a short time in 1912-1913, the Ottoman frontier ran along the Chatalja
Lines, the final trench defenses of the peninsula on which Istanbul sits. While the Ottomans
would recover a fifty-mile stretch of the railway in a surprise advance in mid-1913, Kaufmann
was not rendered more optimistic by this.411 In early 1913 occurred the final pre-war political
upheaval in the Ottoman Empire.
The “Raid on the Sublime Porte” in January 1913 was in reality a near-bloodless coup
d’etat. The reverses in the Italian and Balkan Wars had caused a drop in the popularity of the
Ittihad ve Teraki government and the 1911 and 1912 elections did not go well for the party. In
1911 an Ottoman Liberal party had been formed in opposition to the government, and the
January 1913 coup was primarily directed against the Liberals’ growing power in the cabinet and

410 Ibid. and Annual report for year 1911, Kaufmann to DB Berlin in BA DB R 8111.
411 Kaufmann, Monatschrifte, December 1, 1912, to DB Berlin, in BA DB R 8111.
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parliament. After the coup, the government was largely in the hands of Cemal, Talaat, and Enver
pashas, three ministers who formed a sort of triumvirate that dominated the cabinet.412
Otto Kaufmann was not at all in favor of this. In fact, Kaufmann had disliked the Ittihad
ve Teraki from the start. In 1909, when a grassroots reactionary movement in Istanbul had
attempted to restore Abdulhamid II in the name of the caliphate, Kaufmann had oddly attributed
this anti-revolutionary movement with the “Young Turks” of the Ittihad. The “fanatics in the
streets are there because of the new government,” he proclaimed. The “robed mullahs” were in
charge of Istanbul now, and could call upon the mob at their wish. Even though the revolutionary
government had put down the reactionaries, who were indeed in some cases led by Muslim
religious figures, Kaufmann continued to darkly brood on the consequences for “civilization and
Christianity in this city” should another such uprising occur.413
These fears seemed realized in January 1913. Kaufmann at first seems to have panicked
and believed that those “robed mullahs” had returned. “People in excitement here and I fear the
worst for the Christian population,” was his first reaction.414 Even after it became clear that the
coup d’etat was a purely internal affair of the government, Kaufmann feared the crowds who
appeared to cheer the new ministers on the streets of Galata. His expectations of profits for that
year were correspondingly weak.415
Kauffman had little to fear from “angry Muslim crowds” that he reported. The final
victory of the Ittihad ve Teraki was accomplished with no further rioting. Only Kaufmann’s
growing fear that this Islamicate society could not remain diverse without upsetting some
412 Eric Jan Zuercher, The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 19051926 (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 214. Sukru Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008), 126.
413 Kaufmann correspondence, undated but filed with 1908, in BA DB R 8105.
414 Kaufmann to Embassy Constantinople, January 20, 1913, in BA DB R 8105.
415 Annual report for year 1913, Kaufmann to DB Berlin, in BA DB R 8111.
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inherent Muslim sensibility to coexistence caused him to grow so acerbic in his commentary. The
final straw came with the affair of the Ottoman Naval League.
The general arms race before the First World War ensnared the Ottoman people as much
as any in Christian Europe. It will be examined in Chapter 7 how Ottoman military reforms
would bring German soldiers into the Sultan’s realms. For the building of naval power, however,
the Ottomans looked to the British. Subscriptions were to be undertaken for the building of two
large battleships, of the most modern types, in British shipyards, starting in 1910. These ships,
the Reshadiye and Fatih Sultan Mehmed, became later famous when the British Royal Navy
seized them nearly complete from the yards on the outbreak of the First World War, thereby
supplementing British naval superiority by two extra, very modern, ships that would later see
service against the Germans. Various authors have even blamed popular feeling at the ships’
seizures for helping cause the Ottoman slide into the war and the alliance with Germany.416
Relatively new evidence, suggests, however, that the story of the popular subscriptions to the
Ottoman Navy League, that Ottoman pensioners paid for the battleships with their life savings
and that many families were inflamed against Britain and its allies by the later seizure, is deeply
erroneous. Otto Kaufmann already knew that it was, in 1911.417
Kaufmann was extremely suspicious of the Ottoman Navy League from the beginning.
As a financier operating in the Ottoman capital, he was aware of loans being made to the Navy
League, and to the Naval Ministry, by foreign banks. The figures his unknown sources cited to
him matched closely the figures being given for the Ottoman Navy League’s subscriptions.
416 Ulrich Trumpener in “Turkey’s Entry into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities,” Journal of Modern
History 32: 4 (1962), 369-80. Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. III 166ff. And 605ff. This is
the traditional account, and can be compared with the next reference.
417 Charles D. Haley, “The Desperate Ottoman: Enver Pasha and the German Empire,” in Middle Eastern Studies
vol. 30 no.2 (July 1994), 224-251. Aksakal, Ottoman Road to War, 86.
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When Kaufmann inquired at the Ottoman Finance Ministry, he felt that they were evasive
regarding the ways in which the subscriptions were being solicited. Kaufmann believed that the
Ottoman government was “not competent” to undertake such a nationwide popular campaign, at
any rate. Kaufmann was especially angry when the story of Deutsche Bank involvement in other
ship purchases, through financing arrangements Kaufmann had supervised himself, was leaked
to the newspapers in Istanbul. Again he feared “demonstrations against Christians, local and
foreign” would be the result. Kaufmann also felt it was an “insult” that the narrative in the papers
had contended that the Ottoman people were paying for their own ships, rather than paying
“extortionate” interest on further Deutsche Bank loans. “This government should now have no
trust,” he declared after yet another story in the papers earned his ire.418
Historians since have largely followed the original narrative of those newspapers. In
reality, Kaufmann knew that earlier Deutsche Bank loans to the Ottoman Navy League were in
arrears.419 Rather than penalizing the League, Kaufmann had persuaded the directors of the bank
to extend the repayment of interest again and again. By late 1911, he no longer believed that the
Ottoman Navy League had anything like the required funds.420 Historians have now proven him
right. The receipts of the Ottoman Navy League were nothing like what was necessary to pay for
the Resadiye and Fatih Sultan Mehmed. According to the Ottoman Navy Minister, in fact, most
of the receipts were instead used to pay for steam ferries the Navy League owned and operated
through a government concession. In fact, Kaufmann would partner with French banks to finance

418 Kaufmann to DB Berlin, Monatschrifte December 1910, and undated correspondence with Embassy
Constantinople enclosed, in BA DB R 8111.
419 Ibid.
420 Haley, “The Desperate Ottoman,” 235.
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the famous battleships, though he continued to believe that the business sense of his Ottoman
counterparts was lacking and that they were getting little value for German money.421
Kaufmann thereafter filled his dispatches home with further tales of Muslim fanaticism,
laziness, and lack of business acumen.422 Kaufmann would occasionally make philosophical
commentaries on the nature of Islam as a religion and why both the religion, and the nature of
the Ottoman state, precluded a favorable climate for investment.423 Kaufmann would remain in
Istanbul throughout the war, but increasingly was sidelined as military priorities overtook
civilian investment in the war years. Kaufmann only left in November 1918, shortly before the
Allied Control Commission for the Turkish Straights seized his office and all of Deutsche Bank’s
investments in the Ottoman East. Kaufmann would end his career in Berlin, vainly trying to
settle his branch’s outstanding claims.424
It is clear that Otto Kaufmann fits perfectly the role of the applied Orientalist. Kaufmann
was, like many of the subjects of this work, not unfamiliar with the “Orient” due to his early
business assignments. He was determined to make things work and impressed with the human
qualities of his local employees. It was only with long experience on the ground in an Islamicate
society that he became disillusioned and increasingly began to comment on events and people
that he encountered in the course of his work in an Orientalist fashion. Nor was his familiarity to
breed in him any sort of greater sympathy and understanding. On the contrary, he became, in his
own words, “angered” by the policies of the Ittihad ve Teraki, though he had been early on
sympathetic to its aims. He came to believe that Germany was throwing away good money in
Istanbul and elsewhere. Where he once had referred to his Ottoman counterparts as “surprisingly
421 Annual report for year 1913, Kaufmann to DB Berlin, in BA DB R 8111.
422 Ibid.
423 Kaufmann to DB Berlin, Monatschrifte April 1, 1914, in BA DB R 8111.
424 A Century of Deutsche Bank in Turkey, 87.
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incorruptible,” something which astonished his diplomatic contacts, he by 1915 contemptuously
referred to the ubiquity of “baksheesh,” or bribery, of officials as part of the common experience
of doing business with Ottomans. Not just any Ottomans, however. This was seen through an
essentializing lens of Orientalism that blamed such societal shortcomings on the nature of Islam
and its permeation of Ottoman society.
All of Deutsche Bank’s projects required massive amounts of engineering knowhow. The
primary contractor for engineering services in the Ottoman Empire’s late years was the Philip
Holzmann corporation.425 One of the premier German engineering and construction firms even in
the twenty-first century, Philip Holzmann was chosen because it had experience, along among
German engineering firms, in international projects. Holzmann had also been responsible for
building many of the bridges, tunnels, and railways that tied together the German nation in the
years before Otto von Bismarck brought political unity through war.426 The Baghdad Railway
project was going to need tunnels through two major mountain ranges, as well as operating in
diverse climates ranging from humid to arid, making both drainage and well-drilling essential
skills to bring along. Much of the route had not ever been surveyed in the modern era, so
surveyors were needed in large numbers as well. All of this and more Holzmann could provide.427
Heinrich August Meissner was the engineer in charge of many of the most challenging
sections of the route. Meissner was no stranger to the problems of working in Ottoman climates
and with politically sensitive projects. Meissner had largely overseen the building of the Hijaz
Railway, already mentioned. That project was key to Ottoman religious legitimacy and involved
building rails across waterless and rocky terrain, subject to the whims of local tribes and, in its
425 DB Berlin to Philipp Holzmann AG board, January 16, 1903, in BA DB R 7940.
426 McMeekin, Berlin-Baghdad Express, 103. McMurry, “Distant Ties,” 36.
427 A Century of Deutsche Bank in Turkey, 12.
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northern reaches, local politics, as every Levantine town wished a connection to the rails.
Meissner had commanded enough respect on this project that he was ennobled by the Ottoman
state, becoming “Meissner Pasha” in 1903. Meissner would use that respect to take on the new
challenges of the Baghdad Railway.428
Meissner began work in 1910, on the controversial section of the railway that extended
too close for British and French comfort to the coast in Cilicia. Meissner had no trouble with the
politics of the project, but soon faced a major controversy regarding the need for more engineers
than he had been assigned. Meissner believed that the number of employed engineers was a
quarter of what it needed to be in order to complete the stretch of track between Aleppo and
Mosul by 1913, as he had been assigned. The Ittihad ve Teraki government was keen that new
hires at that point in the project should be Ottomans. “They are proud of their education
programs,” Meissner stated, pointing out that the revolutionary government hoped to take credit
for unleashing Ottoman higher education. For decades under Abdulhamid II, much of the higher
education system in the Ottoman lands had been shackled by political considerations. The Sultan
had believed that universities invited rebellion and that educating too many of his subjects would
awaken desires the Ottoman state could not fulfill.429
Meissner should have been in favor of this. During the Hijaz Railway project, he had
willingly accepted a Muslim Ottoman second in command and had viewed the performance of
his Ottoman engineering personnel as first rate. One of Meissner’s subordinates on that project
would say that Meissner himself viewed the project as an “opportunity to train Muslim

428 Haim Goren, “Meissner Pasha: German Railway Construction in the Ottoman Empire,” in Germany and the
Middle East (Tel Aviv, 2003), 225-242.
429 Ibid., 230.
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engineers.” This would have put Meissner in accordance with the Ottoman government’s
wishes.430
However, instead there was constant friction. Meissner reported to his superiors, one
German diplomat said, “that the Muslim engineers leave things to god and do not work” to make
things operate properly. “He requests German engineers, but the Porte is uninterested.”431
Meissner continued until at least 1912 to request more German engineers who could do the work
better.432 When the Ottoman government proposed to exempt Ottoman engineers from the
military call up, even in time of war, Meissner was against it, because, according to those
familiar with his conversations, he viewed such an eventuality as an excuse to get more German
engineers to replace Ottoman Muslims.433
We have fewer of Meissner’s words and it is much harder in this case to draw conclusions
about what the engineer was thinking that changed his mind about the human material he had to
work with on the Baghdad Railway project. Put in the context of applied Orientalism, however, it
goes with a pattern. Again and again, patterns of thought assert themselves in the cases of
Germans on the ground in the Islamicate East. Everyday frustrations, or difficulties on the job
become not the fault of individuals, but the failing of a society. Previously rosy opinions become
less so. Meissner’s reported invoking of Ottoman sloppiness as being driven by Islamic faith,
that his local engineers “leave things to god” is a common trope of Orientalist discourse in
English as well, both in the twentieth century and still in the twenty-first century. Altogether, it
seems strong evidence that, once again, applied Orientalism has changed patterns of thought.

430 Ibid. 238.
431 Consulate Adana to Foreign Office, May 5, 1911, BA R AA 34: 2
432 Goren, “Meissner Pasha,” 240.
433 Consulate Adana, November 28, 1912, report of Meissner correspondence, in BA R AA 34:2
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The final major business venture of the Germans in Ottoman lands before the war
concerned steamships. The Persian Gulf carrying trade became a major point of contention, both
economically and diplomatically, between Britain and Germany in the years before the First
World War. For a long period before the war, almost all shipping in the Persian Gulf was under
British guarantee, insured by British insurers like Lloyds of London and in three out of every
four cases, carried in British-owned steamships.434 Even the traditional wooden dhows that
carried the local trade between Iran and the Ottoman shore of the Persian Gulf were subject to
British interference. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, British naval power guaranteed
the Persian Gulf naval truce.435 This agreement, signed between the British Indian authorities, the
Sultan of Oman and the sheikhs of the seven “trucial” states (Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai,
Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaiwan) along the mid-southern Gulf coast,
traded British regulation and protection of the maritime trade for a cessation of the traditional
piracy that had been the major economic activity of many of the sheikhs of the Gulf. Later
adherence of the island sheikhdom of Bahrain and the peninsular sheikhdom of Qatar signaled an
expanding British presence in the Persian Gulf. Licensed Arab traders were to bear a piece of
paper issued in British India, so that if they were stopped by the British Royal Navy, their
compliance with the truce could be assured. Over time, this led to the introduction of British
ships in tandem with a convenient reduction in the number of licenses issued by the authorities in
India. British diplomats and naval officers worked in tandem with insurers and shipowners to
434 For this section generally, see Frederick Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
and Qatar (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), and the older but more useful Briton Cooper Busch,
Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). These studies, like
most other secondary works on the subject, utilize the British Foreign Office Confidential Print: Middle East
files. These are numbered by subject and file, and will hereafter be cited by those numbers only. The standard
treaty, or “truce,” often referred to in British documents was an agreement for protection and exclusion of
foreign influence. The original, from 1853, can be found in FO 406/9.
435 Anscombe, Ottoman Gulf, 29.
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keep other nations out of the Persian Gulf trade, with the excuse that only Britain was guarantor
of the perpetual maritime truce and that any other presence would undermine the peace. This led
inevitably to monopoly, and increasing British diplomatic presence in the Persian Gulf as well.436
The importance of this to the Ottomans and the Germans was in the way the British
monopoly of the steamship trade in the Persian Gulf undermined Ottoman rule in the region. Not
only was this, similar to the Capitulation arrangements, taking revenue and opportunities from
Ottoman traders and tax agencies, it was also holding back the development of Ottoman
shipbuilding capacity in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the British monopoly tended to spread. In
1890, Britain used a loan negotiation to extort from the Sublime Porte a monopoly granted to a
British company for the entirety of the steamship trade on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, thus
challenging Ottoman control in Mesopotamia itself. The sheikhdoms covered by the “truce” and
under British protection had tended to expand with time and in any event all those semiindependent lands along the Persian Gulf owed a fairly nominal allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan
in Istanbul. That these ties could be made more concrete as part of the late-Ottoman statebuilding projects was shown in the 1870s, when the Ottoman governors of Basra made a
concerted attempt to reconquer and reorganize the region of al-Hasa, essentially the entire
Ottoman coast of the Persian Gulf not already under British protection.437 This involved military
forces, but also Ottoman engineers and technicians to install telegraphs and repair roads in the
region between the oasis towns of the arid coast, and census-takers to register and count the
population so that the government could more effectively administer the area. This precipitated
436 See the many examples in Penelope Tuson, ed. Records of Saudi Arabia: Primary Documents, 1902-1960
(Slough: Archive Editions, 1992), vol. I-II, which despite the title contains a great many documents from before
1902, comprising, indeed, nearly the entire first volume.
437 See India Office to Foreign Office, November 23, 1898; Foreign Office to India Office, December 7, 1898; Sir
N. O’Connor to Salisbury, December 22, 1898; and India Office to Foreign Office, December 27, 1898, in FO
406/14 nos. 35-38.

161

the final expansion of British influence in the region before the First World War, the 1899
protectorate declared unilaterally by Britain over the sheikhdom of Kuwait.438 By 1914, the
British Indian government had a Permanent Resident at Bushire in Iran, a diplomat authorized to
make agreements such as the Kuwait protectorate without reference to home governments and
further authorized to call upon military forces to back up his claims. British agents were known
to be in the deep Arabian desert, holding discussions with the Saudis of the Nejd region, and the
Muntafiq tribes south of the Euphrates. It appeared very much as though the Ottomans were
going to lose control of eastern Arabia if something did not change.
Enter German steamships. Hamburg-based shipping companies had been eyeing the
Persian Gulf market for some time. The Johan Roth Corporation was one of the first entries into
this new field of German endeavors in the Ottoman East, followed by the much larger firm
Norddeutscher Lloyd.439 The first German consul appointed to Baghdad, in 1894, had as one of
his charges to “facilitate German shipping firms in Mesopotamia and the seas beyond.”440 By
1900, German firms were deliberately undercutting British prices, even if it meant taking
temporary losses on trips that by then were traversing the Persian Gulf regularly, taking Bahraini
pearls to Bushire and Bandar Abbas and finished goods, textiles, machinery, and food south to
Fujairah, Manamah, and Kuwait.441 In dispatches from the businesses involved and from the
German diplomats on the scene, these business ventures were classified in specifically
geopolitical terms, as a tool for undercutting a growing British dominance on behalf of
438 The British relations with Mubarak as-Sabah are covered in Anscombe, Ottoman Gulf, 101ff. From Tuson, see
“Lorimer’s Account of the Struggle for the Possession of the Southern Najd,” from “Gazetteer of the Persian
Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia, vol. I,” Calcutta, 1915, reproduced in Records of Saudi Arabia, 553.
439 Anscombe, Ottoman Gulf, 135. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 198-9. Penix, A Rational Disaster
discusses all the above in Chapter 3.
440 Consulate Baghdad to Foreign Office, July 15, 1894, BA R AA 7:17
441 Caesar Farah, “Anglo-Ottoman Confrontation in the Persian Gulf in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries,” in
Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, vol. 33 (2003), 117-132.
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Germany’s friends in the Ottoman Empire. Consul Richarz in Baghdad, for example, was to
write in 1895 that if things kept on as they were at his appointment to that new post, “first
Kuwait and then possibly Basra” would fall into British hands within twenty years.442 The first
would occur only four years later and the latter a year earlier than Richarz’s prophetic statement
would have had it.
In this growing competition between empires for Ottoman spoils came Joseph Svoboda.
An Austro-Hungarian subject, Svoboda had been born in Ottoman Mesopotamia and spoke the
Ottoman language as well as German and English. Svoboda’s later life is almost entirely
unknown, but in the years around 1895-1900 he was a purser on a British-owned steamship that
plied the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad, besides other trips into the Persian Gult to various
ports. Svoboda’s diaries, some of which have survived, give us an interesting picture of another
applied Orientalist, this one actually born in the Islamicate East.443
Why count Svoboda among the applied Orientalists? Because his internal thoughts,
preserved in a diary, give a baseline to compare. Svoboda was of a mercantile family and
remained a Christian throughout what we know of his life.444 He therefore may have lived in two
worlds, but his mindset remained that of a European Christian and he refers in his diaries
throughout to the peoples of Iran and the Ottoman Empire as something other than himself, of a
different sort of people. However, his native knowledge of the Ottoman language,445 his lifelong
residence in an Islamicate society, and his extensive travels make his retention of an outsider’s
viewpoint indicative of the phenomenon under study.
442 Consulate Baghdad to Foreign Office, May 2, 1895, BA R AA 7:27.
443 Diaries of Joseph Svoboda, Svoboda Diaries Project, at www.svobodadiariesproject.org, all accessed January 7,
2019.
444 Introduction, Svoboda Diaries Project.
445 Ibid.
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Due to the nature of Svoboda’s lifelong residence in the Ottoman Empire, the before and
after comparison is not possible here. There is no indication in the diaries that Svoboda changed
his viewpoint significantly. Rather what is at issue here is, did Joseph Svoboda exhibit similar
sorts of Orientalist thinking during his life in the Ottoman East to our other case studies? The
diaries indicate that he did.
Svoboda did not segregate himself from the Muslim passengers and crew of his ship. His
language skills meant that, when a European passenger, often a missionary or trader, was present,
Svoboda would be called upon to translate for them, besides his usual duties as purser. His
diaries record many instances where other Europeans invited him to share their food and their
company, imagining that he “missed civilized sorts” and the comforts of “real food or so they
said.” Svoboda refused these entreaties, once sending his wife to tea in his place so as not to
cause offense either to the Ottoman Arab crew or to the European passengers. Svoboda often
evinced a love of the natural beauty of Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, referring again and
again to the blue of the water and the enormous skies over the open plain between the rivers.
Svoboda seemed content in a life that included constant travel, occasional worries about friends
during outbreaks of disease and an increasing background of European competition, as the
German railway and steamship concerns began to partially replace the previously predominant
British interests.
Nevertheless, Svoboda’s discourse shows the marks of the same Orientalist thinking we
have seen before and will see again. “Koords” [Kurds] were known to plunder, and Svoboda
would not think of having them as crew alongside him. He attributed to the ghazi mentality of
the Islamic warriors of the border with the ancient Byzantines for the local Arabs’ love of
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plunder.446 Svoboda again and again would note that it was the nature of the people, not need or
local conflicts, that caused incidents such as when, in 1898, the “tribes of the Beni Sudd”
“commit[ted] plunder and cut the telegraph lines.”447 For this, Svoboda was glad to see them
“punish[ed] by Hamdi Pasha” with a detachment of “Turkish” troops.448 Svoboda seemed
satisfied when local officials, who were invariably corrupt if they were Muslims, were dismissed,
as when the vali of Basra dismissed a certain “Enis Pasha” which he “attributed to some English
policy.”449 “Muslim walis all corrupt” he said, despite their being no other kind in his region.450
Svoboda also believed the people of the Gulf to be pirates despite the British-enforced truce and
dirty to boot. He attributed the quarantine of several vessels to inadequate hygiene among local
passengers, not disease environment or simple ill chance. Svoboda seems relatively happy in his
life despite these somewhat prejudiced observations and he continued his service on the
steamship until at least 1905.451
Joseph Svoboda shows us a baseline for applied Orientalist thought. If this man, who
dined with, spoke as a native with, and lived alongside Ottoman Muslims, but still referred
constantly to their dishonesty, thieving natures, and unclean habits, then these are deeply
ingrained habits of mind. As a Christian and a European by descent, Svoboda apparently was in
some ways still an outsider in his own mind and close contact with actual Ottoman society did
not completely insulate him from the habits of thought seen in those who were mere sojourners
in the “Orient.” It is unknowable, but interesting, to speculate upon the role played by the
446 Svoboda Diary 49, 3, August 1898.
447 Svoboda Diary 48, “Mrch” (March?) 1898.
448 Ibid.
449 Svoboda Diary 49, February 28, 1899. See also Diary 49 “Ascension of Enis Pasha” entry, May 2, 1899.
450 Ibid.
451 This is where the surviving diaries end. Originally there were 61 volumes, extending to Svoboda’s death in
Baghdad in 1908. “History of the Svoboda Family” at svobodadiariesproject.org, accessed January 7, 2019.
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aforementioned British-German rivalry. Svoboda was well aware of it and his diaries are replete
with references to the rivalry’s symptoms. In other contexts, the role of German-speaking people
in Ottoman lands has been shaped by their position as a spearhead of imperial interests. It may
have also been thus with Joseph Svoboda. In the next chapter, we will explore a redefinition of
imperialism in a German-Ottoman context, one that draws on the lessons of applied Orientalism
to discuss state-to-state relations in situations of a great power imbalance.
German business interests in the Ottoman Empire increased dramatically between 1880
and 1914 and brought many new applied Orientalists into the field. By and large, they followed
the pattern seen in previous chapters. They came to the Ottoman East either with no expectations,
or with a pre-existing idea of Islamicate society as a neighboring and sophisticated civilization, a
sense that came from cultural assimilation of the ideas of German academic Orientalists shown
in Chapter 2.
Arriving with notions that they were saving the Ottomans from a British and French trap
of debt and dependency may have had a special influence on these agents of German capital that
is less present than, say, in the missionaries and orphanage staff of Chapter 3. Saving souls was
not a factor, since proselytization was so limited in the Ottoman Empire, by both law and
custom, for the missionaries. This may, ironically, have limited their missionary impulses. The
agents of German capital had no such compunctions. They believed they were wielding the
power of upstart German capitalism in service of a noble notion of ending a more exploitative
system in which the Ottoman Empire was trapped. This made their subsequent disillusionments
surprising, because in many ways they did achieve those goals, until the First World War first
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interrupted, then ended, any further progress for the Ottoman system. The abrogation of the
Capitulations, the attempt at a Baghdad Railway, the brief challenge to British dominance in the
Persian Gulf-these were all real foundations to build upon for a future Ottoman state, had that
state existed.
Instead, close contact with Islamicate society only brought disillusionment and
abandonment of many of these ideals. This appears in both applied Orientalists who were aware
of, and horrified by, the Armenian massacres and those that were more distant from these events.
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CHAPTER 6: GERMAN IMPERIALISM
The question of applied Orientalism cannot be disentangled from the larger issues of
German diplomatic and political activity in the age of imperialism. This chapter will discuss the
historiographic problems of the study of German imperialism, and tie the issues raised in the rest
of this dissertation to the study of German foreign policy and imperialism.
Studies of German imperialism have been afflicted by two major historiographic issues.
Firstly, the desire to compare the German imperial project to the larger empires of Britain and
France has been extremely detrimental to the field. Germany's empire was acquired both later
and far more quickly. Methods of conquest varied, but were largely comparable to those of the
British, French, and other powers in Africa, China, and the Pacific.452 The comparison breaks
down, however, when we turn to actual German investment in foreign policy schemes. In both
number of people sent abroad, both publicly and privately supported, and in terms of marks
invested, the Ottoman Empire began in the late-1880s to overtake the formal German overseas
empire, and by the time of the Ottoman-German alliance completely overshadowed it in
importance.453
The second issue is that German imperialism during the Kaiserreich is often seen as a
precursor to Nazi lebensraum ideology.454 Middle class support for German imperial projects can
452 Nina Berman, ed. German Colonialism Revisited (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014) is an
attempt to move beyond this. For the debate, Paul Kennedy, “German Colonial Expansion: Has the
‘Manipulated Social Imperialism’ Been Antedated?” in Past and Present no. 54 (Feb. 1972), 134-141.
453 W. O. Henderson, “Germany’s Trade with Her Colonies,” in Economic History Review vol. 9 no. 1 (1938), 1-16
gives a baseline of the former German colonies. Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf: Droste,
1961)132-138 and War of Illusions: German Policy from 1911- 1914 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975)234-235.
Ulrich Trumpener, in “Turkey's Entry Into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities,” Journal of Modern
History vol. 32 no. 4. Comparison in Stanford Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I (Ankara: Turkish
Historical Society Press, 2005), vol. 1, 17-20.
454 The best example of a fruitful use of this exploration is Volker Langbehn, ed. German Colonialism: Race, the
Holocaust, and Postwar Germany (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
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be seen as prefiguring the failure of bourgeois democracy in the Weimar Republic. Nowhere is
this more true than in the attempted genocide of the Herero in German Southwest Africa.
German Southwest Africa, modern Namibia, was acquired in 1884 by land purchase,
followed by a proclamation of German protection of a small German settlement and station at
Lüderitz Bay. Besides mining operations and cash-crop farming, the economy was quickly
rearranged around the German settler minority. Unlike the stereotype of the “new imperialism”
of the pre-World War I period, German Southwest Africa was a settler colony. Forced or
fraudulent purchase, and outright cattle rustling, was state policy in order to provide a living for
the small influx of Germans who followed the confirmation of the German protectorate at the
1885 Congress of Berlin. In 1904, the Herero of German Southwest Africa rebelled against the
colonial authorities in protest over the confiscation of their land and cattle. German General
Lothar von Trotha then put the rebellion to an end by force-marching as many Herero as could be
captured into the Namib desert, where many of them died of thirst or starvation. When the Nama
people likewise protested against land confiscations, they too were marched into the Namib. Tens
of thousands, at a minimum, died, among these pastoral peoples whose populations were not
large to begin with. General von Trotha justified this “race war” as a war of necessary
extermination, a way of making way for the superior German colonists to follow, clearing an
inferior “race” from their lands. Von Trotha's letters proclaimed that he wished to have the
Herero “annihilated as a nation”, and that he explicitly disavowed any protection or rights they
might have assumed from being German subjects: “the Herero are not German subjects any
longer.”455
455 Jeremy Sarkin , Germany’s Genocide of the Herero: Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers
(Cape Town, University of Cape Town Press, 2010. Juergen Zimmerer, Genocide in South-West Africa: The
Colonial War of 1904-1908 and Its Aftermath (Monmouth: Merlin Press, 2003). Quotation of von Trotha and
his “extermination letter” in Casper Erichsen and David Olusoga, The Kaiser’s Holocaust (London: Faber and
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The equally bloody Mayi Mayi rebellion in German East Africa is often grouped with this
to show a propensity in German colonial policy toward race-based confiscation and genocidal
repression. The NSDAP Nuremberg racial laws, and the gradual stripping of German citizenship
and rights from the Jewish minority in the 1930s, are taken to be the culmination of a German
policy predating the rise of Adolf Hitler and the NSDAP. These were, in this telling, simply
relocating the site of colonial oppression to Europe.
Picking apart these events in order to understand the later policies of Adolf Hitler and the
NSDAP is fallacious and teleological. Moreover, it omits a great deal of the true story of German
imperialism, one which we are only now starting to uncover. For instance, to the extent that
Germany's colonies were created as model overseas provinces, to utilize new methods of
exploitation, they drew on models other than the British and French, ones which were not usually
included in histories of colonial exploitation. Andrew Zimmerman has now carried out a case
study in the German West African colony of Togoland. Here, the Germans had the opposite
problem of Southwest Africa, having a ready supply of exploitable labor that was used to
agricultural life and living in sedentary villages. The problem was how to gear a subsistence
agriculture toward the mother country's economy. Unlike in German Southwest Africa, this was
also not a settler colony, due to issues of disease environment and tropical climate. The answer
was to exploit systems of cash-crop agriculture taken from the southern United States. Cotton
sharecropping, using agricultural methods and techniques of labor force control developed in
Alabama, was seen as the answer. This would allow Germany to organize, control, and exploit

Faber, 2010), 38.
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the local population of Togoland, while raising a cotton crop that would support German textile
industries that had otherwise to source their raw materials outside the Kaiser's realms.456
All of these previous attempts to find the larger relevance of Germany's short-lived
empire have focused on traditional power-political concerns. In diplomatic and military terms,
Germany's empire amounted to little. Formal control over Togoland, German East Africa,
Kamerun, and German Southwest Africa paled in comparison to the international, economic, and
military significance of British control of Egypt and the Cape Colony. The few German islands
in the Pacific, and the German control of parts of Shandong Pronvince in China, or the northeast
quarter of New Guinea were of nearly zero importance when compared to colonies like
Singapore, Australia, or French Indochina. Britain ruled over tens of millions of Muslims, most
in British India. Germany's Muslim colonial subjects, concentrated in German East Africa's
Swahili-speaking coastal regions, were insignificant enough for Edward Said, originator of
Orientalist study, to discount Germany as a source of Orientalist thought.
The cultural turn in history should have brought an end to such thinking. Starting in the
1960s, intellectuals like Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida began to expand the meaning of
domination and control in Western societies. Previously unquestioned interactions could now be
seen as part of larger systems of control, a legacy of the expansion of government power and
reach dating back to the Enlightenment. Using concepts like “body power” and
“microaggression” to explore the imperial sphere is relatively new as a concept. This allows the
expansion of imperial histories to wherever those with power interacted with those without. In
this, Germany excelled no less than its imperial rivals.

456 Andrew Zimmerman, Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of
the New South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
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Germans in the Islamic and Islamicate lands of the Ottoman and Persian empires had no
formal political control to fall back upon. They were unable to legally confiscate land or
resources. German generals had no authority to put down rebellions against any German
measures. Yet by 1918 the amount of German military and economic control of the Ottoman
Empire was probably greater than that Germany exercised in its far-flung Pacific colonies.
Moreover, German concerns, economic, military, and missionary, in the Ottoman lands were far
more central to German foreign policy than any of the other possessions acquired in the colonial
scramble of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Few German colonists ever went to
Africa, even the relatively temperate climate of the coastal regions of German Southwest Africa,
or the tropical disease-free highlands near Mount Kilimanjaro in German East Africa. In the First
World War, the German war effort suffered not at all from the rapid loss of nearly all these
colonies. With the exception of a guerrilla struggle carried out by native askaris under General
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck in German East Africa until the end of the conflict, all the German
colonial possessions had been conquered by the Entente by mid-1915. Conversely, German
investment in Ottoman lands continued to grow throughout the conflict, despite the desperate
situation on the Western front and in Germany itself. The collapse of the German position in the
Ottoman Empire did not come long before the end of the Kaiserreich itself.
The reason that these enterprises are overlooked, and are not referred to as colonial, has
to do with their nature. While remaining sovereign, and even carrying out policies that the
German government and its agents did not wish to support, the Ottoman Empire came
increasingly to rely upon German experts, soldiers, and most of all capitalists. The Ottoman need
for a European ally disguised the degree to which the economic and diplomatic agreements
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between the two powers were to Germany's benefit. Finally, there has been a reaction against
World War I-era British and Russian propaganda, which portrayed the Ottoman Empire as a
German puppet.457 Early histories of the Ottoman Empire in its last decade were written by the
victors of World War I, chief among them Winston Churchill, whose memoir-history of the war
portrayed the Ottoman leadership as being bribed or entranced by German wealth and power.
Churchill played on classically Orientalist tropes of Eastern inscrutability and biddability to
explain the Ottoman diplomatic turn from Britain to Germany. Later German authors were
concerned with placing or avoiding German blame for the spread of the world conflict to the
Middle East, and did not concern themselves much with pre-war German activity in Ottoman
lands.458 One of the chief historians of German-Ottoman connections before and during the war
dismissed the activities of German missionaries as unimportant, despite their large role in the
Armenian conflicts that roiled the Ottoman state in its final years.459 German economic projects
to develop Anatolian mines and railways, or to connect Mesopotamia with the Ottoman capital,
were taken to be either understandable reactions to British counterparts, or beneficial to the
Ottomans because they aided the state's economic development goals. In all these cases, the key
missing element is the role of German actors on the ground. Benign intentions attributed to
German political or military leaders who remained in Europe and never saw the “East” could be,
457 Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), based
upon “Defending the Nation: The German-Ottoman Alliance of 1914 and the Ottoman Decision for War,”
unpublished PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2003. For similar conclusions, see also F.A.K. Yasamee,
“Ottoman Empire,” in Keith Wilson, ed., Decisions for War, 1914 (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1995). Hasan
Kayal, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
458 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: 1911-1914 (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1923), vol. I, 539-40.
459 Ulrich Trumpener, “Turkey’s Entry Into World War I: An Assessment of Responsibilities,” Journal of Modern
History 32:4 (1962), 369-80 and “Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire” in Marion Kent, ed. The Great
Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire (Hoboken, NJ: Frank Cass, 1996), 107ff. A virtually identical view
is in Frank G. Weber, Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance,
1914-1918 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970).
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and were, eroded by applied Orientalists on the spot, who increasingly came to act against
Ottoman interests out of a sense of Islamicate Ottoman civilization as an alien and undesirable
Other. Future scholarship must be less concerned with whether Kaiser Wilhelm II was sincere in
his overtures of friendship to the Muslims of the world, than with whether German missionaries
and diplomats, who actually implemented those policies, failed to share the warm feelings
coming from Berlin.
The largest German enterprises in the Ottoman Empire all revolved around railroads, as
seen in Chapter 5. The Hejaz Railway, and the Berlin-Baghdad Railway were both funded with
German capital, and both of prime importance to the Ottoman government.
The Hejaz Railway, which connected Damascus, and ultimately Istanbul, with the
Haramayn, the holy shrine cities of Mecca and Medina, was of prime importance to the Ottoman
government's legitimacy.460 The Sultan was also the khalif, the successor, to the prophet
Muhammad, and in theory the leader of all the ummah, the community of the faithful. The
Ottoman rulers had co-opted this title from its Fatimid and Abbasid predecessors, in Cairo and
Baghdad, respectively, in the sixteenth century. In practice, the Ottoman caliphate extended only
to the Sunni branch of Islam, as the various types of Shi'a mostly ignored its existence.461
Therefore, despite the lack of German control over the Hejaz region, this one major
investment of German capital was responsible for inaugurating German influence over Ottoman
religious matters, and therefore over the ummah as a whole, through the Ottoman caliphate.
Documents from the period of German-Ottoman alliance after August 2, 1914 indicate this was a
460 Joshua Teitelbaum, The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom of Arabia (London: Hurst and Co., 2001), 19
and note 22. See 12 for the importance of the Haramayn or Holy Places, at Mecca and Medinah to Ottoman
legitimacy. The British wish to use the Haramayn for their own ends lead to discussion of a Meccan caliphate,
as early as the 1860s. Hussein, the last Sharif of Mecca, was appointed by the Ottomans in part because of
British pressure, according to Teitelbaum, 40-1.
461 Ibid. 62.
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live issue. “The legitimacy in religious matters of the Sultanate is a matter of German concern,”
was the belief of German diplomats in Istanbul in 1914.462 In the context of the World War, there
was a very specific concern for German military and political planners, that of the ability of the
Sultan to declare a jihad, a holy struggle for the freeing of Muslims everywhere from nonIslamic colonial rule. In the context of 1914, this meant struggle above all against the Russian,
British, and French enemies of Germany and the Ottoman government. The attempt to procure a
“jihad Made in Germany” sets Edward Said's formulation regarding German Orientalism on its
head.463 It was precisely because more Muslims were seen to be oppressed by the British Empire
and its allies that Germany was able to contemplate turning the war into a religious struggle. The
German colonial possessions had little to fear if the Sultan declared the current war a struggle for
virtue and a freeing from non-Muslim control. Max von Oppenheim, the German agent of
influence who has been the subject of several recent works, was especially eager for this. “The
enemy of Islam is also our enemy, and this fact allows us to stir up great trouble,” he wrote to his
superiors.464 Many of von Oppenheim's actions in support of Ottoman, or generally Islamic, goals
can be seen as attempts to make the jihad declaration, duly promulgated by the Sultan in
November, 1914, a joint struggle of Germans and Muslims, a leading by example.
It is also in this context that earlier German actions, which are sometimes considered
“baffling” and “mysterious” by historians, can be seen.465 The Kaiser's attempts to declare
Germany on the side of, not the Ottoman Sultan, but the caliphate itself, in Jerusalem in his 1898
462 Kautsky, German Documents Wangenheim to Foreign Office, no. 147, July 24, 1914.
463 Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War, 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 11.
464 Von Oppenheim to Foreign Office, October 1914, Denkschrift Betreffend die Revolutionierung der islamischen
Gebiete Unserer Feinde in BA R AA 57:12. For the resurrection of this obscure figure’s historical reputation,
see Lionel Grossman, The Passion of Max von Oppenheim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
465 Y.T. Kurat, “How Turkey Drifted into World War I,” Studies in International History: Essays Presented to W.
Norton Medlicott, 291-315 (London: Longmans, 1967). Quotations on 292.
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speech during the Holy Land tour he undertook that year, and in 1905 during the crisis with
France over the fate of the independent Muslim monarchy in Morocco, prefigured the German
demand for jihad in 1914.466 German applied Orientalists had by this point long been warning of
the dangers of “Muslim zealots” and “the view of any struggle with non-Muslims as a part of
jihad” in the context of German mission stations and economic enclaves in Anatolia. Here the
applied Orientalists mistook their own growing fear and disdain for Islam as a problem affecting
the German Empire as a whole.467 The apparatus of foreign policy in Berlin consistently
denigrated the possibility that siding with pan-Islamic feeling in the Ottoman Empire, or in
British India, endangered German interests.
Recent authors have put a spotlight on the importance to German imperial aims of the
turn to Islam in foreign policy after the Holy Land tour of 1898. A recent monograph468 on the
jihad declaration of 1914 thoroughly knocks the idea that jihad made any difference in the
German-Ottoman war effort, while simultaneously reinforcing its centrality to the government in
Berlin. In the aftermath of the German-Ottoman treaty of alliance of August 2, 1914, demands
for a fatwa, an official religious declaration in the Sultan's capacity as caliph of Islam, were as
common in German communiques to Istanbul as the demand for an attack on the Suez canal to
disrupt British shipping.469 The latter was a material concern, but the ideological project of
turning the entire ummah of the world against the Triple Entente consumed much German
attention.

466 Gregor Schoellgen, “Dann Mussen wir un saber Mesopotamia sichern! Motive Deutschland Tuerkenpolitik zur
Zeit Wilhelms II in Zeitgenoessischen Darstellungen,” Saeculum 32:2 (1981), 130-45.
467 See Chapter 3, above.
468 Mustafa Aksakal, “Holy War Made in Germany? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad,” in War in History vol. 18
no. 2 (April 2011), 185.
469 Ibid. Also Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 2, 1098.
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Germans within the lands of the Ottoman Empire were overwhelmingly distressed by the
idea of a jihad against Christian powers, and petitioned their government to avoid the
consequences of its own policy. “The idea of a jihad makes the local population tremble for the
future,” said one of the leaders of the German missions in Ottoman Armenia.470 “We cannot think
of this without fear for the future,” was the view from the German mission stations in Ottoman
Syria.471 Nevertheless, the German government persisted in its view that a jihad was the only
way to make the alliance with the Ottomans pay dividends. Ottoman weakness in material and
training compared to the British and Russian empires forced the German government to look to
irregular fighters for Islam as a redress for their cause. Theoretical Orientalism clashed with
applied Orientalism, to the detriment of the latter.
German imperialism in Islamic and Islamicate societies was mostly concentrated in the
Ottoman Empire. The British chronicled the rise of German influence in Ottoman lands better
than the Germans themselves did. The Kaiser's 1898 visit to Jerusalem and the “Holy Lands” of
Christianity sounded the alarm for its rivals. Thereafter, British influence seemed to wane in
exact proportion to German gains in Ottoman lands. Informal influence was concentrated along
the lines of the railroads, the most visible signs of foreign capital in the Ottoman realms.
The Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway has been the subject of a great deal of English-language
scholarship, most of it relating to the railway's role in the rivalry between the British and German
empires. This project was much more than that. Ottoman scholars during the Tanzimat (Reform)
period of the 1870s had looked forward to the establishment of a modern form of Ottoman
sovereignty over Mesopotamia.472 Railroads and telegraphs were key to this plan. Grand Vizier
470 Schmidt briefe, BA KG 4:20, September 1, 1909.
471 Consulate Beirut to Berlin, November 5, 1914 in BA R AA 55:3.
472 Schoellgen, “Dann Mussen wir un saber Mesopotamia sichern!,” 36.
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Midhat Pasha had inaugurated the first telegraphic connections to Baghdad, paid for with
German investment.473 At this time, in 1872, when the German engineer named Wilhelm von
Pressel entered the Ottoman Empire to begin surveying the Anatolian highlands for possible
railway routes.474 Von Pressel reported that the Ottomans were extremely interested in German
investment, and were willing to offer part-ownership of the railway, and to guarantee the profits
from railroad operations for as long as needed to secure the necessary loans. Even this early
project had an element of imperial ambition. Von Pressel's reports contain no hint of political
motivations, and the German government seems to have been barely aware of his employment in
the Ottoman Empire at all, though his missives were duly forwarded by consulates in Anatolian
cities back to Berlin.
On the Ottoman side, however, there is plenty of evidence of the political rationale for the
flurry of interest in rails and wires in Mesopotamia. Midhat Pasha, who had become the
reformist Grand Vizier, had been governor of the vilayet (governorate) of Baghdad, previously.
During his time there, he had been extremely active in opposing British schemes for investment
and economic penetration of the Mesopotamian lands, and endorsing rival German capitalists.475
Before the national unification of Germany in 1871, Prussian diplomats had been present in
Baghdad to assist Prussian businessmen seeking outlets for their surplus capital or factoryproduced goods in what was then an impoverished backwater of the Ottoman realms. Prussian
industry had little success, and by the time of German unification, nearly 90% of the foreign
trade of the three Mesopotamian vilaya of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul was in British hands.
473 Anscombe, Ottoman Gulf, 23ff.
474 See Chapter 5, above.
475 Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 340-1. The British relations with Mubarak as-Sabah are covered in
Anscombe, Ottoman Gulf, 101ff. See also Lorimer’s Account for the Possession of the Southern Najd,” from
“Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia, vol. I,” Calcutta, 1915, reprinted in Tuson, Records
of Saudi Arabia, 553ff.
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Midhat Pasha had been acutely aware of the potential for British political control to follow
economic might, and let his Prussian representative know that he preferred non-British
investment, which did not come with the same strings attached.476
Midhat Pasha was successful enough at modernizing the administration in Baghdad, and
increasing the tax revenues from his lands while decreasing the number of rebellions against the
central authorities, that he was brought to Istanbul during the first Ottoman constitutional period
in the mid-1870s. Midhat's plans for Baghdad ran into the same problems that his reformist
administration in Istanbul would. Britain and France, as the chief donors to the Ottoman
government, were opposed to measures such as raising tariffs to fund Ottoman industrialization.
In 1885, these two creditor powers would impose upon the Ottomans the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration (OPDA), which essentially internationalized the Ottoman fiscal apparatus. The
OPDA had a board with one representative from each power involved in financing the Ottoman
public debt, meaning that the Ottoman representatives could always be outvoted. The OPDA
board not only oversaw the repayment of Ottoman loans, but oversaw tariffs and taxes, keeping
both low, and ensuring that taxation never fell upon the citizens of the creditor nations. All
revenue that was raised by the Ottoman government had to be used first as service on the foreign
loans. In this way, almost all of the capital that could have been used for Ottoman economic
advancement was siphoned away to pay European bankers and governments. This ensured that
the Tanzimat period ended without substantial change, but it would in the future also make the
German connection even more of a tempting alternative for Ottoman statesmen than it had been
in Midhat Pasha's time.477
476 Busch, op cit. The diplomatic archives in Berlin-Lichterfelde do not extend to this period.
477 Zafer Toprak, “Modernization and Commercialization in the Tanzimat Period, 1838-1875,” New Perspectives
on Turkey 7 (1992), 57-70.
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No German banks were heavily implicated in the OPDA or other foreign schemes to
control Ottoman finances. Here, as in the Scramble for Africa, the Germans had arrived late,
something their agents were prone to mentioning with disgust.478 All the major Ottoman
infrasturcture projects had been spoken for. A British consortium monopolized the steamer trade
in the Persian Gulf, and on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.479 Thanks to OPDA intervention to
exempt the British steamships from tariffs, even local traditional river pilots could not compete
with steamers shipped to Basra in pieces from Liverpool, and there reassembled. The Suez Canal
was owned by an Anglo-French consortium with heavy government involvement. The Anatolian
railroads were being built up with French capital, and directed from interior coal mines to ports
like Zonguldak, the better to assist French corporations with exporting Ottoman mineral wealth,
tax-free.480
The first consortium for the construction of a German-financed railway to Baghdad was
formed in 1888. Deutsche Bank took the lead in providing the capital, later bringing in other,
smaller banks. The German Foreign Ministry was consulted at the outset of the project, and
regularly checked in on its progress. The first tracks were laid in 1888, and by the spring of 1893
trains were rolling along German-made track as far as Ankara.481 This would appear at first
glance to be no more than the exact sort of foreign direct investment that other powers were
undertaking. Indeed, the opinion of historians up to this point has been that the project both was
and was not like that of the French Zonguldak scheme, or the British Alexandretta railway
project, both of which were designed by their respective empires as facilitating the exploitation
of Ottoman mineral wealth. Historians certainly believe that German motives were somehow
478 Schollgen, “Dann Mussen Wir Saber un Mesopotamia Sichern!”, 40.
479 See Chapter 5, above.
480 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, 726-7.
481 McMeekin, Berlin-Baghdad Express, 45ff. McMurray, “Distant Ties”, 113ff.
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nefarious, but almost all of the attention has been on whether the Baghdad Railway, never
completed by its German builders, was part of a larger plan to pre-empt the British in
Mesopotamia.482 As noted,483 British sea power dominated the Ottoman Persian Gulf coasts, and
British commercial interests controlled the carrying trade in the Gulf, as well as the steamship
lines on the Mesopotamian river systems. Certainly, British governmental sources indicate this is
how the German scheme was seen in official British circles. The response makes it clear how
serious it was taken by British imperial planners.
In 1899, the British consul-general in the Persian Gulf, Sir Percy Cox, precipitated the
secession of the as-Sabah family from the Ottoman Empire.484 The as-Sabah, emirs of the fishing
harbor of Kuwait, had a dispute with a cousin branch of the family over land and resources,
including a riverside date palm orchard in the vilayet of Basra. The British consul-generals had
long operated in the Gulf as sort of imperial proconsuls, with authority over a number of small
client states in Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Chief among these were the seven “trucial”
emirates, minor, quasi-independent rulers that had previously given fealty to the Ottoman
sultans, and had agreed to join a British-sponsored truce-cum-protectorate ostensibly designed to
suppress local piracy in Gulf waters. The consuls-general operated on a long leash, since their
telegraphic and administrative connections were to the more belligerent and annexationist
authorities in British India, not directly to London.485 In 1899, Cox intervened in the Kuwait
dispute in favor of the main branch of the as-Sabah, and immediately after got the ruling emir to
482 Busch, op cit.
483 See Chapter 5, above.
484 Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 158.
485 See India Office to FO, November 23, 1898; FO to India Office, December 5, 1898; Sir N. O’Connor to
Salisbury, December 22, 1898; and India Office to FO, December 27, 1898, in FO 406/14 nos. 35-38; and
O’Connor to Salisbury, July 5, 1899; India Office to FO, July 6, 1899; FO to India Office with enclosures, same
date; and Salisbury to M. Durand, July 8, 1899, in FO 416/1, nos. 5-8.
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sign a treaty of protection with Britain.486 The Kuwait dispute would go on for some time in
diplomatic circles, but as far as the local rulers were concerned, Ottoman sovereignty was from
this point on non-existent. A few years thereafter, the British authorities would do the same on
behalf of the local noble family in charge of the barren peninsula of Qatar. In 1913, British
agents of influence would play a role in the campaign of the as-Saud family of the Nejd, in
central Arabia and centered on Riyadh, which successfully ousted the Ottoman garrisons of alHasa, the remaining stretch of Persian Gulf coastline in Ottoman hands between Kuwait and
Qatar.487 Later historians would ascribe these aggressive British moves to the need to counter
German influence via the Baghdad Railway, which had not even been built yet, and in 1899 had
not even penetrated within hundreds of miles of the vilayet of Baghdad.488
The way in which the German railway to Baghdad was not seen by English- or Germanlanguage historians as being similar to the plans of other powers is in the lack of German
economic interest in the region. This narrative supposes that German financial interest in the
Mesopotamian lands was non-existent, and that German motives therefore must have merely
been to stymie rivals, or to help the Ottomans in a way that might turn their government into a
pro-German force in the Muslim world. This is to fail to see history as happening any other way
than that it did. The German reasons for the Baghdad Railway lay not in what it ever
accomplished, which was next to nothing, but in what it would have accomplished. The Baghdad
Railway was driven by, not existing German interests, but the desire to create future ones. Much
486 Frederick Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1997), 99.
487 According to Anscombe, Ottoman Gulf, 93, the British slowly moved the limit of what they recognized as
Ottoman northward along the Gulf coast, from Udayd before 1870, to Doha, and by the time of the protectorate
over Kuwait to Uqayr, depending upon what British wished to claim. A slightly different account, with maps,
can be found in Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 94ff.
488 Both Busch, and Anscombe, op cit do this.
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of the impetus for its initiation, retention despite British objections, and ever-larger scope came
from applied Orientalists on the ground in Ottoman lands. Their motives were to remove fertile
and wealthy lands from an alien civilization, and to replace it with German enterprise, and
German clients.
Chapter 5 has already detailed the journey into applied Orientalist thought and action on
the part of German businessmen located in the Ottoman Empire. What remains to be seen is the
extent to which the Baghdad Railway scheme was dictated from below, not above. It cannot be
said that there were no champions in Berlin of the Baghdad Railway scheme, but again and again
the records show that German authorities were extremely wary of the international repercussions
of this investment. Between 1888 and 1892 alone, there were five specific instances when
Foreign Office records show that the ambassadors and consuls in the Ottoman Empire were
asked their opinion on international complications, particularly with the British government,
arising from then-hypothetical extensions of the railway east of Ankara.489
What was never controversial was the use of German capital to open up Ottoman markets
and resources for German exploitation. The final memorandum on the Baghdad Railway was an
unheralded triumph of German foreign policy and imperial ambition. It did not just provide the
right-of-way for a railroad built with German capital, and define the repayment of loans and the
taking of profit from this venture. It was a wholesale colonization of the Ottoman extractive
economy, and ensured a future German control over the heart of the Islamic Middle East. The
agreement was important not for what it meant about German ambitions in Mesopotamia, but in
Anatolia, at the center of the Ottoman Empire's power.

489 Berlin to Constantinople, February 17, 1888, March 2, 1892, and September 7, 1892 BA R AA 18:2, 21:5, 21:6.
Berlin to Beirut, May 20, 1899 BA R AA 18:7.. Berlin to Aleppo, August 10, 1899 BA R AA 18:7.
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The first provision in this project was the stipulation that the railway be accompanied by
feeder spurs, parallel roads of packed gravel or other improved surfaces, and telegraph lines. All
were to be German, and annexes of the agreement detailed the terms. In future years an
enormous influx of German engineers, technicians, and workers would be required to build and
service the railway and its associated roads and telegraph lines.
Protection of all this new German-built infrastructure was also to be outsourced to
German interests. No fewer than one guardhouse every ten kilometers was to be built to protect
the rails and wires from sabotage by the Kurds and other peoples on the fringes of the Anatolian
mountains. Since these provisions were only partially implemented, the agreement itself is not
clear on whether the guards in their blockhouses were to be German soldiers or private security
of some sort paid for by the railway consortium. What is clear is that they were to be at the least
German-officered, and paid for by the German owners of the railway. This would have meant a
foreign-controlled armed force in the center of the Ottoman Empire, and would have put the
richest and most strategically vital region remaining to Ottoman control under the guns of a
foreign government.
The final clause of the agreement that indicated wider German ambitions concerned
minerals. Nickel, copper, tin, and tungsten were just a few of the long list of metals that came
from Anatolian mines. The entire region suffered from geologic under-exploration, and
according to German surveys might contain significantly more natural treasures than just the
ones known in 1900. The OPDA, with its stranglehold on the Ottoman budget, had never
allowed for a full exploration of the mineral wealth within the empire. Most mines that were
worked, were financed by foreign capital, and often owned by foreigners under the terms of the
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Capitulations. What the Germans were promised by the railway agreement was the right to
explore, exploit, and export, on extremely favorable terms, anything they could uncover within
one hundred kilometers of any of the railway lines and roads that would be built. This
remarkable promise covered a large part of Anatolia, and northern Mesopotamia. Had it been
fully implemented, it would have been German corporations that exploited the oil of Mosul and
Kirkuk, much of which was known about or suspected based on initial surveys at the time. The
revenues of these mines and potential oil fields was to be used to help repay the German
consortium for the cost of building the Baghdad Railway. While at first glance this was a
favorable compromise for the Ottomans, it only seemed so because the railway was never fully
completed, and because of the wartime German compromises that helped to keep the Ottomans
on the side of the Central Powers. Fully implemented, this would have made Anatolia and
northern Mesopotamia into German economic colonies. Without full political control, the
Germans would have become the leading power in the Muslim Middle East. This was an interest
in Islamicate lands, in the “Orient” that should have fit the definition of empire enough to
include German views in Edward Said's Orientalist framework. Only the narrow definition of
empire, always construed to mean only formal, political control, has allowed this to remain the
case since.
The importance of Anatolia cannot be overstated for the late Ottoman Empire.490 This was
not only the most populous single part that remained under Muslim control in the Middle East,
but also the Turkish-speaking region that many CUP statesmen hoped would become the center
of a new, Turk-centered nationalism that might resurrect the Ottoman state.491 Under Abdulhamid
490 See Hasan Kayal, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 19081918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 20.
491 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, 197-8.
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II, pan-Islamism had proven one method for renewing loyalty to the ancient House of Osman. In
the aftermath of the revolution of 1908-9, the so-called “Young Turks” of the CUP and allied
liberal movements debated other ways forward in an age of nationalism.492 The question was one
of “big or little Turkey”. Nearly forty percent of the remaining Ottoman population lived in
Anatolia, where the predominant spoken language was Turkish. Despite the influx of millions of
Muslim refugees from the Balkan states and from the Russian Transcaucasus in the period 18751914, amounting to nearly twenty-five percent of the Ottoman population by 1914, the Turkish
identity of the Anatolian peasantry proved resilient.493 The newcomers, whether Bulgar converts
to Islam, or Circassians persecuted by the Orthodox Christian Russian Empire, gradually adopted
Turkish language and Ottoman identity. To weld the two together might create a powerful force
that could revitalize the politics of the Ottoman realms. So, at least, was the dream of Turkish
proto-nationalists like Ziya Golkap, and others who spent the last decades of the Ottoman
Empire turning Turkish from a despised spoken language for peasants into a literary counterpart
to the official Ottoman language of the court.494
The “big” counterpart to this little-Turkish future vision was pan-Turanism, named after
Turan, the mythical Central Asian homeland of all the Turkic peoples.495 This was a vision that
resonated with many at the top of the CUP hierarchy, including influential Minister of War Enver
Pasha. Enver is a figure contested in late-Ottoman historiography.496 A former military attaché to

492 Michael Reynolds, “Buffers, not Brethren: Young Turk Military Policy in World War One and the Myth of
Panturanism,” Past & Present 203 (2009), 137-79.
493 Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922 (Princeton: Darwin
Press, 1995), 148ff.
494 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I, 227.
495 Reynolds, “Buffers Not Brethren,” 140.
496 Eric Jan Zuercher, The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 19051926 (Leiden: Brill, 1984), 210. Sukru Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008), 129.
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Berlin, many historians after the First World War viewed him as a bribed or deluded German
pawn.497 Turkish historians have often had difficulty fitting his disastrous role in the war and the
dissolution of the empire with his earlier opposition to Abdulhamid II, and leading role in the
progressive CUP's reform of the Ottoman state.498 Enver was captivated by pan-Turanist ideas,
not because he was a romantic necessarily, but because this version of a Turkic nationalism
might allow the Ottoman Empire to find new relevance in the world. Most non-Ottoman Turkishspeaking lands were in the Russian Empire, and so pan-Turanism, taken to its logical extreme,
would entail the joining of large areas of Russian territory to the Ottoman realms. It would also
rebalance the empire in favor of Turkic peoples, possibly putting the Ottomans on a more solid
footing in pan-Turanist minds. It was this vision that led Enver to act against the stereotype of
him as German puppet, insisting that the first Ottoman offensive of the First World War be
against Russia on the Caucasian border, not against the Suez Canal as agreed in the GermanOttoman treaty of alliance.499 After the October Revolution in Russia, in late-1917, the panTuranist vision would briefly come to pass, as Ottoman armies penetrated all the way to Baku on
the Caspian Sea, taking that major oil port, and bringing the Turkic Azerbaijani people of the
Russian Empire under the Sultan's control.
No matter which of these nationalist visions had prevailed, Anatolia would remain the
most secure, most important part of a future Ottoman state. During the war, the mass expulsion
and genocide of Armenian Christians was largely driven by a paranoid desire to preserve the
Anatolian “center” of the Ottoman state against preceived foreign agents. The effort largely
succeeded, and after the population exchanges with Greece were completed, Anatolia was
497 Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 269-70.
498 Feroz Ahmad, “Great Britain’s Relations With the Young Turks, 1908-1914,” Middle Eastern Studies 2: 4
(1966), 302-29.
499 Reported in Wangenheim to FO, no. 852, August 4, 1914, in Kautsky, German Documents, 588-9.
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thoroughly Islamic and majority-Turkish, allowing the creation of the nationalist Turkish
Republic on the ruins of the pan-Islamic Ottoman state.
For all of the reasons above, it is impossible to view German activity, economic and
diplomatic, in the Ottoman lands as true state-to-state relations. Though the Sultan still reigned,
and the CUP remained in power in Istanbul, the agreements signed over the Baghdad Railway,
and the Hejaz Railway before it, promised to place much of the economic and religious
legitimacy left to the Ottoman state in German hands. Even though these agreements were only
government-sponsored on the German side, involving the Deutsche Bank-led private consortium
for most actual on-the-ground activity, these agreements would have done more to undermine
economic sovereignty for the Ottomans than the loss of outlying lands like Albania had. The
question that must be answered for historians is why has there been a reluctance to see this as
what it is: German penetration and imperial control of Islamicate lands in the heart of the “East”?
The major objection to seeing the field of applied Orientalists in the Ottoman Empire as a
part of Germany's larger imperial ambitions is that it removes agency from Ottomans themselves.
Elite Ottomans were part of a state that had an existence stretching back to the thirteenth century,
and had for most of that time been counted as the most powerful Islamicate state in the world.
Some of these objections come not from historians, but from political scientists in the field of
“development” studies. As discussed below, this field takes as a given that all economies go
through similar stages of development, and that the choices to move between those “levels of
advancement” are made by the rulers of the states themselves. Another way to phrase this is that
imperialism cannot exist where sovereignty does. In the Ottoman case, there is the example of
the fight against the Capitulations before and after the German alliance.
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The Capitulations were treaties signed from the sixteenth century onward between the
Sultans of Istanbul and outside powers. Their purpose was to free the fiscal-military apparatus of
the Ottoman court from having to worry about matters of trade and commerce. Non-Ottomans
would deal with that, when the goods of the Sultan's realms proved unable to meet all demands,
and in return the foreign powers could be given substantial commercial concessions. By the
nineteenth century, the Capitulations were a legal straightjacket on the Ottoman economy. Nearly
all the major European powers had such treaties with the Ottoman government, and the usual
terms provided for tax exemptions, extraterritorial jurisdiction for civil, and sometimes even
criminal disputes involving foreign nationals, and even in the case of Britain the right to
designate Ottoman subjects as protected persons, entitled to the same rights as British subjects.
The latter, embodied in the British-Ottoman Commercial Treaty of 1837, was a particularly
dangerous provision that allowed a foreign power to build a local Ottoman client base removed
from the authority of the Ottoman government.500 Other Capitulation treaties established
monopolies in trade, like the French Regie de Tabac, which held a monopoly on trade in tobacco
in the Ottoman Empire.501 Since Midhat Pasha, Ottoman reformers and revolutionaries had
identified the Capitulations as the chief obstacle to Ottoman development, and attempts to
abrogate the treaties began at the time of the first Ottoman parliament in 1876. The Ottoman
view accords with that of the development theorists.502 In that theory, the use of tariffs as levers
to achieve “import-substitution industrialization” is a key marker on the trail of development. An

500 The historiography here is largely after Toprak Zafer, "Modernization and Commercialization in the Tanzimat
Period, 1838-1875." New Perspectives on Turkey 7 (1992): 57-70. Roger Owen, "The 1838 Anglo-Turkish
Convention: An Overview." New Perspectives on Turkey 7 (1992): 7-14.
501 Donald Quataert, “The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914,” in Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert, eds., An Economy
and History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 824ff.
502 Ibid.
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Ottoman government operating under the Capitulations was not fully sovereign, and therefore
could not control the macroeconomic levers needed to achieve its economic potential.
The issue of the Capitulations became a serious threat to foreign control of the Ottoman
economy after the revolution of the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihad ve Teraki) in
1908-9. This secret society, with an exiled leadership in Paris and cells in many army units in the
Balkan parts of the Ottoman Empire, was able to overthrow the reactionary government of
Abdulhamid II after an initial attempt at keeping the Sultan foundered on Abdulhamid's contempt
for any sort of constitutional limitations on his powers. The Constitution of 1876 was restored,
and elections called for a new Ottoman parliament. As seen elsewhere, it was this political
development that precipitated the final crisis of the Ottoman state, as well as the final
transformation of German applied Orientalism in Ottoman lands.503
The new Ottoman parliament almost immediately was faced with the twin questions of
the Capitulations and of a foreign alliance.504 Both needed to be solved if the state was to survive,
in the opinion of one of the Committee of Union and Progress' leading members. An earlier
chapter has already dealt with the reaction of German diplomats to these developments, detailing
their hostile reaction to the idea of allying with the Ottomans against the Triple Entente. The
German reaction to the reopening of the Capitulations was much the same. Germany had
negotiated entry into the Capitulation system as an extension of previous rights granted to the
Kingdoms of Prussia and Bavaria before German unification. Economic officials at the German
embassy in Istanbul were extremely hostile to the idea of giving up any of these rights.505

503 M. Naim Turfan, Rise of the Young Turks: Politics, the Military, and the Ottoman Collapse (London: I.B. Tauris,
1999), 74.
504 Ibid.
505 See Chapter 4, above.
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The German economic attache in Istanbul in 1909, Schmidt, went beyond simple
opposition on the grounds of the Capitulations' advantage to German commerce. He used
historical arguments to the effect that Muslims had always disdained commerce, and that
“merchant” was almost an insult to a Muslim man.506 Longstanding Ottoman tradition, he
continued, had placed the commerce of the realm in the hands of either foreigners via the treaties
of Capitulation, or non-Muslim minorities like the Greek and Armenian Christians of Anatolia.
Revisiting the Capitulations as a method of encouraging Muslim Ottoman enterprise “will not be
possible” due to the nature of Muslim Ottoman culture.507 Therefore Germany should oppose all
such moves as bad for the Ottomans themselves, as well as endangering German commerce.
Some Germans involved in commerce in the Ottoman Empire were surprised that the German
government would not, in the end, support the abrogation of the Capitulations. Diplomatic
documents indicate that the mood on the Capitulation question was somewhat more open in
Berlin than in Istanbul, or at the consulates. The embassy to Persia, copied on some of the
conversations of mid-1909, likewise responded with horror, worried about the possibility of
Persia following suit.508 The question of unequal treaties in Persia would have to await the
constitutional revolution of 1911 there, and never bore as much fruit as Ottoman efforts. Since
the British, French, and Russians moved in lockstep regarding the Ottomans' economic demands,
the Committee of Union and Progress made almost no headway. German opposition to the end of
the Capitulation regime effectively doomed the measure.509
The issue of the Capitulations came up again when the Ottomans allied with Germany in
the opening days of the First World War. The alliance, signed August 2, 1914, contained secret
506 Schmidt to Finanzministerium, June 13, 1909, copy to Foreign Office, BR AA 34:3.
507 Ibid.
508 Embassy Tehran to Foreign Office, June 27, 1909, BA R AA 34:3.
509 Yearbook of the Munich Oriental Society, 1908, in BA KG 28.
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codicils that required the Ottoman Empire to move as rapidly as possible to attack the Suez
Canal, to sever the British Empire's lifeline to India.510 The Germans were enjoined to support the
Ottoman war effort by guaranteeing its territory, and the regaining of the governorates of Kars
and Ardahan lost to the Russian Empire in 1878; supplying heavy artillery, German gunners, and
engineering specialists to ensure the defense of Istanbul; and by providing monetary assistance to
defray the cost of the war on the Ottoman treasury.511 There is some evidence in the surviving
correspondence between Ottoman Finance Minister Mehmet Cavit Bey and his German
counterparts that ending the Capitulations was an early Ottoman demand in the alliance talks, but
that Germany balked. The German side of the conversation is slightly more complete than the
fragmentary Ottoman copies that have been seen by scholars so far, but do not illuminate the
basic issue.512
Regardless of whether the Capitulations were the subject of any talks before the alliance,
they were a key Ottoman demand after it. The Ottomans attempted to slow-walk their obligation
to join hostilities against the British.513 Ottoman thinking was that Russia represented a greater
threat, and a greater opportunity due to its weakness compared to the rest of the Entente. German
demands that the terms of the alliance be met were rebuffed by the Ottomans with talk of their
forces' unpreparedness, and the financial turmoil in the empire. Soon hints began to come from
some of the key figures in government, both in the finance ministry and from Minister of War
510 Aksakal, Ottoman Road to War, 80.
511 The Ottoman demands are printed in Shaw, The Ottoman Empire, vol. 2, 713. See the very similar discussions
with the British government detailed in Mallet to Grey, 5 October 1914, Correspondence Relating to Events
Leading to the Rupture of Relations with Turkey (London: HMSO, 1914), 36.
512 Shaw, The Ottoman Empire, vol. 2 715-720 reproduces most of what exists. The Ottoman archives in Ankara
are off-limits to most researchers. Shaw reproduced many of these documents for the first time, and certainly the
first time in English. Considering the historical sensibility of the modern Turkish government, further access
may not be forthcoming. Many of the records would also be in the Ottoman language, now dead, and known by
few scholars.
513 Shaw Ottoman Empire in World War I, 632. Aksakal, Ottoman Road to War, 117-18.
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Enver Pasha's staff, that preparations would be seriously impeded by the loss of revenue
attendant upon the outbreak of the war.514 The withdrawal of British and French merchant
shipping, and the closure of the Straits between the Mediterranean and Black Seas to Russian
shipping, meant a dramatic loss in tolls, and shortages throughout the Ottoman lands, since many
of the imports the empire relied upon in key sectors were carried in foreign bottoms. Finally, on
September 14, Enver Pasha dropped a hint to the German ambassador that eliminating the
Capitulations would do much to stimulate the Ottoman economy, and would encourage its people
to fight. This casual remark was interpreted by the German diplomats immediately as an
Ottoman demand: the Capitulations in return for the attack on Suez.515
The remarks in the diplomatic dispatches were similar to when the topic had last been
broached in 1909. The German Foreign Office repeatedly asked about the feasibility of doing as
the Ottomans requested, while the diplomats with experience in the Ottoman lands replied that it
was impossible. It would solve nothing, for the “Turk is not interested in trade” or in the “affairs
of the bazaar.”516 The disruption would be greater than any increase in native Ottoman
commerce due to the end of European competition. Tellingly, it would make Germany seem
weak, and encourage further demands. It might lead to other states demanding the same, or even
the end of German treaty privileges in China.517 In fitting with the applied Orientalist pattern, the
consul for Van was concerned that any perception that Germany favored Muslim Ottoman
commerce against Christians, even foreigners, might endanger Armenian clients and wards of

514 Ibid.
515 Shaw, Ottoman Empire in World War I, 680.
516 Wangenheim to Foreign Office, October 25, 1914, in Kautsky, German Documents.
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German mission stations. The theoretical and applied Orientalist lines of battle were drawn up
once again.518
The Ottoman ruling party continued to voice its willingness to negotiate the abrogation of
the Capitulations.519 In response a compromise German policy appeared, mixing the two policy
directions of the home government, and its applied Orientalists on the ground.520 Germany
refused the renegotiation or elimination of the Capitulation treaties at this time, and abhorred any
unilateral moves. The subject could be brought up at the hypothetical peace conference after the
war, and at that time the German government might be willing to modify the terms of the
economic arrangements that kept Ottoman commerce uncompetitive with its foreign rivals. In
the meantime, the German government would address any problems relating to financial turmoil
in the empire by providing hard currency direct to the Ottoman government. By the end of
September, as the trench lines hardened on the Western Front, the German Foreign Office was
arranging with its agents in Ottoman territory for the arrival of train car loads of gold bullion
moving in great secrecy across then-neutral Rumania and Bulgaria.521 Then the Ottoman
government unilaterally ended the Capitulations for all foreign powers on October 14.522
There were spontaneous celebrations in Istanbul and Izmir on the day the Capitulations
were ended. German views were less joyous. The responses of the consuls and agents ranged
from dread to outrage. Reports came in from the provinces of outrages against foreign flags.523
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The reports do not state whether there were anti-German demonstrations anywhere, and it seems
unlikely there were. Nevertheless the applied Orientalists were nearly unanimous in their
condemnation.
The entire affair of the Capitulations is easy to see as an assertion of Ottoman
sovereignty, and that is certainly how the Ottomans saw it. Such a demonstration complicates the
view of encroaching German interests that were gradually turning the Ottoman state into a
pseudo-colony. In the sense that the Ottomans won a temporary victory by abrogating the
Capitulations would seem to bear this out. However, there are mitigating factors.
Firstly, the victory only lasted as long as the war. The rump Ottoman Empire that
survived the First World War was forced to reinstate the Capitulations—for every power except
Germany and Austria-Hungary. The newly restored Capitulations lasted only five further years,
before the Turkish Nationalists of Mustafa Kemal, the future Kemal Ataturk, once again
unilaterally withdrew from all the arrangements under the rubric of the Capitulations, and they
have never since been restored. Nevertheless, the Ottoman victory was a short-lived one.
The German discussion about the Capitulations among the diplomatic service, and what
little evidence there is about the opinion of the agents of German companies with interests in
Ottoman lands, indicates something else. As with the mission stations, as with the engineers of
the Berlin-Baghdad railway, there was a clear trend whereby those with actual day-to-day
experience of the Islamicate society of the Ottoman Empire were more likely to take a hard line
against their Ottoman hosts and neighbors. This alone is not sufficient evidence that the pattern
of applied Orientalism holds in this case. More convincing is the fact that diplomatic and
economic objections to the abrogation of the Capitulations was couched in Orientalist terms. The
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end of the economic restrictions on the Ottoman state would be bad because Muslims could not
be expected to become entrepreneurs or merchants. Overall more was served by having foreign,
Christian powers in control of the Ottoman economy than native Ottoman Muslims.
In terms of looking at German imperial aims in the Ottoman Empire, there is also reason
to read the question of the Capitulations as evidence for a new understanding of aims and
methods. The German government had staked out a radical break with the status quo since 1898.
While too much has been made of the personality of Wilhelm II, and his role in the German turn
to Islam, both European and Ottoman sources spoke of Germany as taking a markedly less
hostile role toward the Ottomans than other European nations. Since much of the talk of the
Ottoman Empire as a moribund, dying state were couched in explicitly anti-Islamic terms, this
was seen to be important, and contributed to a sense that there was grassroots support for the
German-Ottoman alliance among Muslim Ottoman subjects.524
This way of looking at German applied Orientalism as a study of imperialism has larger
implications for the fields of colonial studies. One of the larger splits among political scientists
regarding imperialism is a question of definitions. One school of thought has for decades
regarded “development theory”, the idea that former colonial nations are at a lower “level” of
development compared to the imperial core nations in Europe and North America, as a
neocolonial endeavour that ensnares peripheral lands in new forms of dependence and
subordination to the core nations. The very concept used here, of “core” and “periphery” was
developed to explain the new methods of subordination among former colonial states since their
nominal independence from the European empires in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.525 The
524 Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 16-17. See also Ernest Ramsaur, The Young Turks: Prelude to
the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 141ff.
525 This “World-Systems Theory” is explicated in Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York:
Academic Press, 1974).

196

conservative counterargument to this neocolonial discourse was that agency mattered. If
“developing” nations became enmeshed in unfavorable loans through the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, this was a choice they had made.526 Sovereign states were free to
choose their path to development, and so the lack thereof in some nations was a function of their
inability or unwillingness to do so, or to some structural failure of government.527 The discussion
of formal independence can be couched in terms of agency and home rule, emphasizing
especially democratic or representative political structures where they existed, and neglecting the
material ties of dependency. Take, for example, the history of Bolivia in the 1990s. Under
successive neoliberal presidents, who either were, or relied upon in their cabinets, economists
trained in such core-nation institutions as the University of Chicago, Bolivia entered into
agreements with the International Monetary Fund to consolidate and reschedule its debt, in return
for “structural adjustment”. The IMF then imposed upon Bolivia the privatization of even its
most basic utilities, like water and sewer systems in La Paz, the capital. The metered price of
water to Bolivian households was immediately raised 300%, or more in some areas, by the
American-owned utility management company that won the contract. Only years of protest, and
some bloodshed, was able to even partially reverse the decisions taken by the IMF as part of its
“structural adjustment package”. Though it remained a nominal democracy throughout the
period, Bolivia was forced into a relationship with the United States and other “core” nations that
closely resembled that of a colony. The wealth of Bolivia's people was piped out of the country,
even as the physical water in the physical pipes of the country, part of its material wealth, passed
into the private ownership of foreigners from much wealthier and more powerful countries.528
526 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 27.
527 Ibid.
528 Oscar Olivera, Cochabamba!: Water War in Bolivia (Chicago: South End Press, 2004) is the best overview.
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Despite the neocolonial and core-periphery models in political science, these private,
non-governmental ties of dependency have never been accepted as proof of subordinate or
colonial status among political scientists, let alone among historians. It is time for a larger view
of empire, one that takes into account both material, cultural, and interpersonal relations. In this
way historians can fully utilize the framework provided by Foucault and Derrida to explain
relations of dependency between core and periphery on all levels. The applied Orientalists of
German origin in Ottoman lands operated on all these levels. The process went both ways, with
German conceptions of Islam and of Islamicate societies changing to fit a more dominant
position in the relationship between the two peoples.
The relationship between the German and Ottoman empires during the Kaiserreich of
1871-1918 closely resembled Bolivia's relationship to the United States in the 1990s. Though cut
short by the war, the Ottomans found themselves in an increasingly dependent role, especially in
economic matters. Material resources, such as the mines of Anatolia, were to come under
German control. The infrastructure necessary for the exploitation and export of mineral and
agricultural wealth increasingly passed into German hands as well. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway
project would have meant many more bankers, many more engineers, and many more Germans
in general in the Ottoman Empire, following along the lines of other applied Orientalists, and all
tending to reduce the Ottoman state and its subjects to a dependency on Germany.
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CHAPTER 7: GERMAN MILITARY MISSIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
Applied Orientalism in the Ottoman Empire included soldiers as well as missionaries,
businessmen, and diplomats. Due to the military nature of the Ottoman-German relationship
during the First World War and just before it, these missions have received an outsized amount of
attention in Ottoman-German historiography.529 They have been examined beyond the purely
military aspects of this international relationship only inasmuch as German soldiers were the
primary sources for much of the early English-language history of the Armenian genocide of
1915-1918. Nevertheless these military figures were witnesses to a culture alien to them, and
both high and low-ranking German soldiers contributed their writings to the growing body of
informal, but experienced, literature about the Islamic Middle East.
The earliest histories of the German military missions to the Ottoman Empire focused
mostly on military and political affairs related to those postings. Starting in 1962, Ulrich
Trumpener revised the history of German military figures in the Ottoman Empire to counteract
what he saw as an undue focus on German power over the Ottoman state and army.530 This was
part of the larger struggle in German historiography for and against the “Fischer thesis” of
529 To start, much attention is given to it in M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in
International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966), 475ff. It reduces the German presence merely to the
military, in fact. Carl Muhlmann, Deutschland und die Turkei, 1913: Das Deutsch-Turkische Bundnis, 1914,
und der Eintritt der Turkei in den Weltkrieg (Berlin: W. Rothschild, 1929) is the first major work to focus on this
in German. Glen W. Swanson, “War, Technology, and Society in the Ottoman Empire from the Reign of
Abdulhamid II to 1913: Mahmud Sevket and the German Military Mission” in War, Technology, and Society in
the Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 367-385. Ulrich Trumpener, “German Military Aid to
Turkey in 1914: An Historical Reassessment” in The Journal of Modern History vol. 32 no. 2 (1962), 145-149 is
a brief response to the “Fischer thesis,” which would come to be the core of Trumpener’s work. The same author
would expand further on German military roles in “Liman von Sanders and the Ottoman-German Alliance” in
Journal of Contemporary History vol. 1 no. 4 (1966), 179-192. Jehuda Lothar Wallach, Anatomie Einer
Militarhilfe: Der Preussisch-Deutschen Militarmissionen in der Turkei 1835-1919 (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1976) is
much more comprehensive, and the best monograph on the overall military relationship. F.A.K. Yasamee,
“Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire” in Diplomacy and Statecraft vol. 9 no.
2 (1998) 91-128 focuses on Goltz in English. Finally, a good modern take is Conrad Crease, The Desert Baron
Friedrich, a Warrior for All Seasons: The Military History of Baron Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein
(Charleston, SC: Booksurge, 2009), with a subject much neglected in English.
530 Trumpener, “Liman von Sanders and the Ottoman-German Alliance.”
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German responsibility for the Great War.531 Trumpener focused on the Ottoman-German
relationship, and attempted to show that German negligence toward the Ottoman Empire, and a
willingness to concede the upper hand in the two countries' relationship to the Ottomans, was
responsible for the Ottoman entry into the war in late 1914.532 Due to this narrow focus,
Trumpener never really grappled with the implications of German officers who claimed they
were being “manipulated” by the perfidious Easterners in Istanbul. The focus remained on the
narrowly technical at times, on Ottoman demands for more munitions, the logistics and timing of
shipments of gold bullion from Berlin to Istanbul to aid the Ottoman state's rearmament for war,
and the precise command relationships of German officers seconded to the Ottoman military in
this period. As late as 1996, Trumpener was essentially repeating these arguments in journal
articles and compilations on both German and Ottoman affairs.533
The major revision to Trumpener's work has come from modern Turkish scholarship.
Stanford Shaw, in his two volume history of the Ottoman Empire and the First World War, used
an unprecedented access to the Ottoman archives, now housed in Ankara, to make his
argument.534 Shaw also republished translated primary source documents from both the German
and Ottoman sides to make the case for a relationship among equals between the German and
Ottoman soldiers between 1913 and 1919. In The Ottoman Road to War, Mustafa Aksakal also
delved into the Ottoman primary sources to paint a picture of an Ottoman Empire that was using
German military aid to its own ends, and which entered the war as an act of statecraft, not due to
531 As spelled out in Fritz Fischer, Griff Nach der Weltmacht (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1961).
532 Trumpener op cit.
533 Trumpener’s chapter “Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire,” in Marion Kent, ed. The Great Powers
and the End of the Ottoman Empire (Hoboken, NJ: Frank Cass, 1996), 107ff. See also Y.T. Kurat, “How Turkey
Drifted Into World War I,” Studies in International Hisotry: Essays Presented to W. Norton Medlicott (London:
Longmans, 1967), 291-315.
534 Stanford Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Press, 2005), 2 vols.
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German military, political, or economic dominance.535 Both these accounts center Ottoman
actors, rather than German, and are therefore welcome additions to the scholarship on the late
Ottoman Empire.
In 1835, young captain Helmuth von Moltke, the future architect of victory for Prussia in
the wars of German unification, arrived in Istanbul as a military teacher to help reorganize the
Ottoman Army after the final suppression of the old Janissary corps of convert-soldiers. The
Janissaries were a legacy of the medieval Ottoman state, soldiers taken from Christian parents
and raised as Muslims, trained as a standing force loyal only to the Sultan. Before their final
dissolution in 1826, the corps of Janissaries had become more of a standing threat to the state.
The military discipline for which the Janissaries had been known had dissolved, and the corps
itself was instead civilianized to a substantial degree. They also began to make their posts
hereditary, and the agha of the Janissaries, their commander, was a powerful political force. After
the suppression of the Janissaries, with the thousands of executions that occurred to accomplish
the “Auspicious Occurrance”, as the event was known in Istanbul, the army's morale had reached
a low. The Janissaries had still served their function as trainers and teachers, and this was what
the Von Moltke mission would now replace.536
Von Moltke was the first major contact between the Ottoman Army and the German
lands, but he would not be the last. His illustrious career after his service with the Ottomans,
which created a huge demand for Prusso-German officers with staff training, meant that when
the Ottoman reformists of the Tanzimat, or First Constitutional, period of the 1870s looked for
models and instructors, it was to the relatively new German Army they turned.537
535 Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War, 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
536 Swanson, “War, Technology, and Society in the Ottoman Empire from the Reign of Abdulhamid II to 1913:
Mahmud Sevket and the German Military Mission,” 370.
537 Wallach, Anatomie Einer Militarhilfe, 88.
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The major German military missions in the Ottoman Empire during the era immediately
preceding the First World War were under the overall command of Colmar Freiherr von der
Goltz, whose memoirs of his years in “Turkey” are an invaluable source of information not only
for his own experiences, but those of his subordinates.538 Von der Goltz had long service with the
Prussian army behind him, and was chosen by the Ottomans themselves as a representative of all
that European militaries had to teach them. In the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat by Russia and
its Balkan satellites like Serbia in 1878, the need for reform of the army was a top priority. This,
however, became a political issue in the late Ottoman Empire. The reformers, associated with the
constitutional movement of reform, the Tanzimat, were enemies of the reactionary Sultan
Abdulhamid II. By the time von der Goltz was given his command, therefore, with the
reactionaries firmly in power in Istanbul after 1879, little in the way of funds and manpower was
forthcoming.539 Nevertheless, von der Goltz and his officers represented the typical German
thought on “Oriental” institutions and life before close contact with actual Ottoman realities.
Von der Goltz thought little of Abdulhamid II, deriding him as a friend of the “Stamboul
Effendi”, the elite classes of the capital city. To von der Goltz, the cosmopolitanism of the capital
had “captured and destroyed” the true virtues of the “Turkish nation”, which were those of the
ghazi Islamic warriors of a medieval past that von der Goltz often referred to.540 He often
remarked that “Turkey” was beyond saving, so long as Abdulhamid and the Istanbul nobility
remained in power. It is notable in this context that von der Goltz did not come to his beliefs
before his Ottoman experience from a position of previously existing tolerance of non-European
538 Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz , Denkwurdigkeiten (Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1929). See also, Pertev Demirhan,
General-Feldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz: Das Lebensbild eines Grossen Soldaten: Aus Meinem
Personlichen Errinerungen (Goettingen: Unknown, 1960).
539 Yasamee, “Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire” 90.
540 Goltz , Denkwurdigkeiten, 11.
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cultures. On the contrary, von der Goltz was a noted proponent of scientific racism and social
Darwinism, beliefs that repeatedly entangled him in scandal in Germany during his military
career.541 A “race pessimist” in the same mold as the later writings of Oswald Spengler, von der
Goltz believed that the “races of the East” especially the “yellow race, the power of the future”
had been “awakened” by contact with the European ideals of the Enlightenment, especially the
concept of nationalism.542 These “races” were now destined to assume a place in world history
commensurate with their numbers and territory, which would lead, von der Goltz thought, to the
eclipse of European civilization. At times he spoke of a future war for “racial supremacy” in the
world, fought between the “nations of the East” and Germany.543 At the time of the Boxer
Rebellion in China, in 1900, newspapers in Germany eagerly carried von der Goltz's racist
pessimism, leading to mild rebukes from his superiors about providing views that were in
contrast with official government policy.544
This belief in a sort of racial essentialism actually made von der Goltz more sympathetic
to the Ottoman cause during his time in the East. While working on the education of a new
generation of Ottoman officers, von der Goltz inspected garrisons in the Balkans, where mostly
Muslim Ottoman soldiers warily watched mostly Christian subjects of the Sultan: Greeks, Serbs,
and Bulgars for the most part. In contrast to many of his European contemporaries in Germany
and elsewhere, von der Goltz believed the Ottomans had a “right to rule over the Balkans,”545 and
that the Ottoman administration there was fair, humane, and better than the independent states of
Greece and Serbia could have provided, especially in such a religiously and ethnically mixed
541 Yasamee, op cit.
542 Ibid.
543 Goltz , Denkwurdigkeiten, 39.
544 Yasamee, op cit.
545 Goltz , Denkwurdigkeiten, 128.
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area of Europe. Von der Goltz wrote that the belief of many of his fellow Germans that the
Ottoman administration and army were corrupt and brutal was outdated at best, and motivated by
“Christian prejudice against Muhammadanism” at worst.546 Von der Goltz wrote that the Ottoman
authorities were often provoked by brigands and Christian Balkan nationalists into reprisals, in
the hopes that Ottoman brutality might provoke a response from the Christian powers. This
argument foreshadows almost perfectly the German position on the Armenian massacres that
began in 1915, as we will see.
Von der Goltz did not stop at promoting Ottoman authority in places like Macedonia as
simply better than the alternatives, but believed it to be a positive good for the peoples there.
Again, this initial position was an outgrowth not of tolerance, but of racist essentialism. Von der
Goltz believed that the Ottoman authorities alone could rule these troubled regions, with their
endemic highway robbery and brigandage, with compassion. It was in the “Turkish national
character” to forgive and forget past slights, something he at times seems to have attributed to
Ottoman history, and sometimes to Islamic religious influence on Islamicate Ottoman culture.547
Only Ottoman officers, like the ones von der Goltz was training from 1883 to 1895 as head of the
German military mission to the Sultan's realms, could sort out what was right in Macedonia. The
“Turks have a great right to be [in Macedonia]”, von der Goltz would wright, not just because
they were present on the ground, and had won the area in the past by right of conquest, but
because Ottoman rule was good for the “primitive” peoples of the area, and would serve as a
schooling in modern nationhood for the Christians of southeastern Europe. These positions
would have political repercussions when Ottoman politics again turned in a reformist direction.548
546 Ibid.
547 Goltz , Denkwurdigkeiten, 125ff.
548 Ibid. and also Goltz, Ein Ausflug nach Macedonien. (Berlin, 1894).
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Von der Goltz was a great supporter of the Ittihad ve Teraki (Committee of Union and
Progress), the political arm of the “Young Turk” movement that overthrew Sultan Abdulhamid II
in 1908-1909.549 Von der Goltz advised the new government that only by instilling a modern
sense of nationalism in the disparate peoples of the Ottoman Empire could that state grow strong,
and only through strength could it avoid suffering “injustice”, a euphemism for the partition
among the Christian powers that was, by 1908, a constant threat to the Ottoman realms.550 Von
der Goltz was flattered by missives from officers who took part in the highly militarized
revolution of 1908, many of which he had taught as cadets. They credited his teachings with
inspiring them, and von der Goltz in turn praised them as saviors of their Fatherland, who would
end the long decline of Ottoman rule and restore the authority of the “ancient house of
Osman.”551
Von der Goltz, however, was the exception in this view. He was charged not just with the
education of Ottoman officers, but with those of the German Army as well. Upon his return to
Germany in 1895, von der Goltz spent much of the rest of his career instilling his ideas of
military virtue into German cadets. Many of these officers would end up serving in the Ottoman
Empire during the First World War and before, on future German military missions. While von
der Goltz learned the Ottoman language, and moved with ease among Ottoman officer circles, he
had less day to day contact with Ottoman troops than his successors would.552 The overall
structure of the German military missions between 1880 and 1914 was top-down. Von der Goltz
and the first generation of “military missionaries” instructed the future leaders of the Ottoman
549 Demirhan, Generalfeldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, 87.
550 Goltz to War Office, December 7, 1908, in BA RH 61:1002.
551 Mehmet Effendi to Goltz, undated, and Sevket to Goltz, also undated, BA RH 61:1002.
552 Von der Goltz is said to have learned the “Turkish language”, which must be Ottoman, as there was before the
1920s no agreed-upon written version of “Turkish” as a modern language.
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forces, and later German officers concerned themselves more with the technical and trooptraining aspects of the Ottoman military. The difference between the former and the latter was
profound.553
The new Ottoman officers were trained in a German style that emphasized maneuver in
warfare, and the importance of pre-war planning and preparation. According to German doctrine
of the time, wars should be planned in elaborate sand table games, exercised on “staff rides”, if
possible over the terrain to be used in actual battle, and therefore all the normal friction of war
could be minimized to the extent this was possible.554 Recognizing that minimizing, but never
eliminating, the confusion and contingent nature of warfare was all that was possible was another
part of the Prussian/German military tradition.555 The new Ottoman officer classes were to be
elaborately prepared, but also to be able to exercise a flexibility of mind that would allow them
to react to conditions found in the field, without going to pieces when the pre-war planning met
reality. Von der Goltz would begin in Istanbul a tradition of German-style annual staff rides. The
Ottomans concentrated their planning mostly on the Thracian Plain, where they anticipated a
future conflict with the Bulgarians, and on the mountainous border with the Kingdom of Greece
in Thessaly. British observers of these staff rides would comment on their “professional airs” and
call them “highly organized, in the European style.”556 Von der Goltz was sometimes less
complimentary. “I considered them to be not quite up to German standards,” he wrote,
complaining of the horsemanship of the officers, as well as the generally poor, in his eyes, level
553 Yasamee, “Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the Rebirth of the Ottoman Empire” 93.
554 This is detailed in Edward Ericson, Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913 (Westport,
CT: Prager, 2003), 18. Goltz’s work on the Ottoman staff officers comes in for much praise, though Erickson
believes that it led the Ottomans into disaster, as their plans for the First Balkan War of 1912-1913 were overly
elaborate, a testament to their training.
555 Ibid.
556 HMSO, Correspondence Respecting Events, 1914.
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of education among the low-ranking officers.557 Ottoman officers, Von der Goltz wrote, could not
always read a map.558 Sometimes literally; he had severe doubts about the functional literacy of
the low-ranking officers, and believed them to be overly cautious because they were unsure and
working to cover up their lack of education by awaiting orders, when German officers would
have seized fleeting opportunities and taken more initiative during operations.
The more Von der Goltz saw, the more his sympathy with Ottoman peoples and culture
wore off. Whereas he had written that Ottoman officers “were of the same material [in terms of
potential and education] as German officers” shortly after taking up his post, he was not of this
opinion by 1913.559 At that point, Von der Goltz was convinced there was “something that is not
correct” about the way Ottoman officers were organized.560 If they could make more use of their
Christian subjects, the Ottomans would, according to Von der Goltz, fare much better in warfare.
The “education of Muslims” was dependent upon nothing but memorization of the Quran, which
produced minds that could not “see the opportunities of battle or the next task.”561 And yet Von
der Goltz knew this was wrong. He himself had commented on the well-rounded nature of
Ottoman education, and the way it suited young officers for military life.562 Now it was all
different. The “mullahs” had taken control of education. “Oriental ways of thinking” and religion
were now what he imagined the subjects of Ottoman education were like. Factually, Von der
Goltz was mistaken. The Ottoman education system was segregated, with religious instruction
important, and state-supported, but not mandatory for Muslims or any other millet of the
557 Goltz to War Ministry, January 1913, in BA RH 61:1002.
558 Ibid.
559 Goltz to War Ministry, January 1913, in BA RH 61:1002..
560 BA RH 61:1002.
561 Denkschrift, undated, in BA RH 61:1002.
562 In 1910, Goltz would advise his Ottoman counterparts, not long before his initial retirement, to create a youth
training organization to free young men from the clutches of religious instruction and produce better soldiers.
Goltz to Pertev (Ottoman staff officer), June 1910, BA RH 61:1002.
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Ottoman realms.563 This was something Von der Goltz was unlikely to have been unaware of,
considering that it occurred during the period of the Tanzimat, the constitutional-reformist period
after 1876. Von der Goltz had, early in his experience in the Ottoman Empire, been effusive
regarding the reforms, and how they pointed the way to a “Turkish solution” to the problems of
modernity. The crushing of the Tanzimat reforms by the authoritarian regime of Sultan
Abdulhamid II after 1878 was seen by Von der Goltz as a regression, but not one dictated by
Ottoman society. It was the work of one man and his coterie, desperate to cling on to power
when it was clear they were on the wrong side of history. It was only later writings that began to
make mistakes about the Ottoman education system.
Von der Goltz made these mistakes because his views seem to have changed. While
starting out very sympathetic to Ottoman society, and being somewhat indifferent to the
influence of Islam on that society, he had changed to an essentialist and Orientalist view that
Islam was suffused in Ottoman society, was harmful to that society, and could not be removed
from it. No longer were reforms of the Ottoman Empire possible. “With this material, you cannot
make much,” was the summary quote Von der Goltz would provide upon his return from his last
mission in Istanbul.564 This jaundiced view of Ottoman politics and society was strangely at odds
with the effects of his own work in the Ottoman Army.
In 1897, the Kingdom of Greece began a conflict with the Ottoman Empire.565 Though the
war was ostensibly over the island of Crete, divided between a half-Muslim and half-Christian
population, with the Christian Greeks of the island seeking unification with mainland Greece, the
563 Handan Akmese, The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman Military and the March to World War I (London:
I.B. Tauris), 66.
564 Goltz to War Ministry, Report on Staff Ride, June 3 1911 in BA RH 61:1002.
565 Ariadne Montifidou, “Das Deutsche Engagement im Orient im Spiegel der Unveroefferlichten akten der
Grossen Politik, 12 Mai-12 Juni 1897,” in Suedostforschungen 51 (1992), 251-62, and “Der OsmanischGriechische Waffenstillstand von 1897,” in Suedostforschungen 52 (1993), 73-9.
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war took place mostly in mountainous Thessaly. The area of the Ottoman-Greek border in
Thessaly, on the eastern side of the Greek peninsula, was relatively recently Greek. A convention
of the major powers of Europe had forced the cession of Thessaly to Greece only in 1881. It was,
however, the most likely area of conflict with Greece, and had been the subject of many of Von
der Goltz's training scenarios and staff rides. Training at small-unit levels in the Ottoman forces
had been designed by Von der Goltz to emphasize the skills needed to fight in the terrain of
Thessaly. Due to that terrain, the war would be fought by relatively small units; there would be
no large set-piece battles. A cease fire was likely early on from the start, meaning that the
Ottomans would not have to test their weak logistic system, or worry about replacements that
were not as well-trained as the regular army. This was, therefore, precisely the war that Von der
Goltz had prepared the Ottomans for fighting.
Far from being incapable of reform and modernization, the Ottoman Army performed in
exemplary fashion. While the Ottoman Navy was forced from the open waters of the Aegean by
the Greeks, the army was able to stymie the Greek advance on land, cross the border into Greek
territory, and defeat the Greeks there once again. Only the intervention of the European powers
prevented a greater Ottoman victory.566 In both small-unit tactics, and in the training and
preparation for mountain warfare, the Ottomans showed that they had taken Von der Goltz's
trainings to heart.567 The officers from low to high rankings had also shown themselves to have
adopted a much higher professional standard than was apparent in the last major war, with
Russia in 1878-1879.568 The mobilization of the Ottoman forces had also proceeded smoothly,
with the sparse railroad network being used to good effect in order to concentrate forces quickly
566 Berthold Sutter, “Die Grossmachte und die Erhaltung des Europeaischen Friedens zu Beginn der Kreta-Krise
von 1897” in Sudostforschungen 21 (1962), 214-269.
567 Erickson, Defeat in Detail, 8.
568 Ibid.
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against the threatened Greek advance in the initial stages of the war. All in all, the Ottomans
performed far above the expectations of the European military attaches who observed the
fighting. Reports from British, French, and German observers emphasized these newfound
qualities in the Ottoman Army, and were quick to credit the German military mission for this
success. That these findings were largely ignored in wider European military and political circles
does not indicate that Von der Goltz, who kept a close eye on developments in the Ottoman lands
after his departure, did not learn of them. He did not record his thoughts, however, and so we
cannot say how he was able to reconcile the biases he learned while on detached duty in the
Ottoman Empire with the evidence of the Greco-Turkish War of 1897.
Von der Goltz fits the established pattern of applied Orientalism. From an initial
fascination, however shallow, with “Eastern” culture, language, and religion, to a pronounced
bias against these things as lacking in civilization, or producing an indolence of mind that made
“Orientals” unable to comprehend European methods of learning and organization. While we do
not have any record of Von der Goltz's thoughts concerning the contradiction between his change
of heart regarding Ottoman education and the worth of the officers he trained, no quotation or
memoir passages that indicate he was even aware of the dissonance between his low opinion of,
and bias against, his Muslim officers, and their high degree of performance in the GrecoOttoman War of 1897 or in their subsequent conflicts against Italy in 1911-1912, or in the
Balkans between 1912 and 1913, the contrast is stark. This allows us, if rejection of religious
animus did not already do so, to reject Von der Goltz's later criticisms as driven by an intolerance
learned from close, cooperative work in an Islamicate society. As with other applied Orientalists,
the acceptance of Orientalist tropes came with time. This indicates further that the acceptance of
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those tropes was not agreement so much as finding a framework that fit an existing bias. Von der
Goltz was recalled from his retirement at the outset of the Great War to be military governor of
German-occupied Belgium. There he received a reputation for cruelty, meeting any resistance
with reprisals, and taking hostages to be shot if railroad and telegraph lines were destroyed by
Belgian partisans. While figuring into much Entente propaganda of the time, Von der Goltz's
actions stood him in good stead with his colleagues, and he was in 1915 made a military aide to
the Ottoman government. In this capacity, he quickly fell afoul of both German and Ottoman
colleagues. This period in Istanbul was the “worst time of my career” he wrote.569 Von der Goltz
felt that he was being ignored, and came to believe that a shadowy cabal centered on the former
military attache to Berlin, War Minister Enver Pasha, really controlled the Ottoman Empire. Thus
Von der Goltz jumped at the chance to take a field command. Nominally as chief of staff to an
Ottoman officer, Halil Kut Pasha, he was given command of the Ottoman Sixth Army, tasked
with stopping the British advance on Baghdad. This was a tall order at the time.570
The British had laid plans for an advance into Mesopotamia even before the Ottoman
Empire entered the war in October 1918.571 British influence, mostly under the control of the
Government of India rather than the Colonial Office in London, had already made protectorates
of many of the quasi-independent emirates of the Persian Gulf, such as Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and
Kuwait.572 There had been British contact and coordination with the as-Saud family, rulers of

569 Errinerungen, 293.
570 Edward Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 2001), 60.
571 See Chapter 6, above.
572 India Office to FO, November 23, 1898; FO to India Office, December 5, 1898; Sir N. O’Connor to Salisbury,
December 22, 1898; and India Office to FO, December 27, 1898, in FO 406/14 nos. 35-8; and O’Connor to
Salisbury, July 5, 1899; India Office to FO, July 6, 1899; FO to India Office, with enclosures, same date; and
Salisbury to M. Durand, July 8, 1899, in FO 416/1, nos. 5-8.
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Nejd in the Arabian interior, when they took control of al Hasa, the remaining part of coastal
Arabia under Ottoman control, in 1913.573 Control of the port of Basra meant not just expelling
the Ottoman Empire from the Persian Gulf, but granting British access to the emirate of
Muhammarah in Iran, another quasi-independent client of the British Empire, and one possessed
of oil-rich and strategically-located territories.574 Therefore plans and forces were already in
place and available when war was declared, and the British Indian forces were able to land and
secure Basra easily as early as November 2, 1914. By mid-1915, the concentration of forces for
the British was great enough that further advances were planned, ending in a pell-mell race to
beat retreating Ottoman forces to Baghdad. This was the situation when Freiherr Von der Goltz
took command of the Ottoman Sixth Army in Mesopotamia.
Under Von der Goltz's command, the Ottomans defeated Major General Charles
Townshend's British and Indian troops at the Battle of Ctesiphon, near the ruins of that ancient
city, and just south of Baghdad. The center of Mesopotamia was saved, and Von der Goltz then
took his victorious troops south to besiege Townshend at Kut-al-Amara on the Tigris River. For a
year, the Ottoman soldiers fought off increasingly desperate and well-equipped British relief
expeditions, eventually inflicting more casualties than the Kut-al-Amara garrison had had men to
begin with. During this period, Von der Goltz continued to complain about Ottoman deficiencies,
especially among the lower and middle ranks of the officer corps, many of which he had trained
personally, and nearly all of which had trained on a curriculum he approved. The officers were
“lazy” and could not carry out even routine tasks. Maintenance of weapons among the largely

573 “Lorimer’s Account of the Struggle for the Possession of the Southern Najd,” from “Gazetteer of the Persian
Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia, vol. I,” Calcutta, 1915, reprinted in Tuson, Records of Saudi Arabia, 553ff.
574 Anscombe, Ottoman Gulf, 67, 135. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 198-9.
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illiterate conscript troops was poor, which Von der Goltz blamed on Muslim cultural values, and
not lack of technical aptitude among uneducated peasant troops, which seems the more likely
culprit.575 Even while his army was winning victory after victory, Von der Goltz persisted in
denigrating its efforts. Again, while there is no evidence that he was aware of the strange
dissonance between the actual performance of the Ottoman soldiers under his command, and the
harsh criticisms he leveled against them.576 No passage in his writings suggests that he was. That
dissonance, and its contrast with his earlier opinions, again indicates the applied Orientalism
effect. Closer contact with Islamic and Islamicate societies did not, in this period at least, seem to
create greater tolerance of difference, but rather a greater willingness to subscribe to Orientalist
tropes that had not, up to that point, been common in the German literary and scholarly tradition.
Freiherr Von der Goltz's most consequential intervention in the Ottoman Empire,
however, may have been in connection with the genocide of the Armenians. When the Ottoman
Empire entered the war, a controversy had already raged for years over the fate of the Christian
Armenians of Anatolia. Split between the Russian Viceroyalty of the Caucasus and the Ottoman
lands, the Armenians were nowhere a majority within any political boundaries, in either empire.
Prior to 1914, the Armenian Christians had become the subject of Great Power attention, notably
the Russian and British empires, and in the summer of 1914, after long negotiations, the Ottoman
Empire had been forced to agree to a degree of autonomy for the Armenians. In a complex
charter, six of the vilayets of eastern Anatolia were designated as areas of Armenian settlement,
somewhat less than those claimed by the radical Armenian nationalists of the Husnak and
Dashnak parties in Russia. Within these six vilayets, Armenian rights were to be the subject of
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Great Power intervention if necessary, and Armenian police were to be embodied to dispense
justice within their communities.577 These Armenian police might in the future be paid for or
trained by Russian nationals, though that part of the agreement was still disputed when the
outbreak of war rendered it moot.578 To nationalist Ottomans in Istanbul, this seemed the first
step in the loss of Ottoman Armenia, and raised the specter of sectarian war and ethnic purges,
since the majority populations of those vilayets were still Muslim, though divided between
speakers of Turkish and Kurdish. The possibility of Russian intervention in the event of
massacres or pogroms against Armenian Christians, which had occurred in 1896 and 1906-1907
in parts of Anatolia, made Ottoman authorities both more cautious and more willing to consider
extreme solutions in the event of any Armenian or sectarian unrest in the area. For the Armenian
part, disputed documentary sources of the Dashnaktsutiun, the radical socialist-nationalist party
of Armenians that operated underground on both sides of the Russian-Ottoman frontier, indicate
that Great Power intervention was precisely what the Armenian political parties wished.579 Some
modern pro-Ottoman authors now believe this to have been a concerted plan to provoke
massacres of Armenian civilians in the hope of rescue and independence via Russian or British
intervention, though to call this take on the evidence disputed would be a large understatement.
In the event, the long-awaited Armenian uprising finally occurred in the spring of 1915.
As the initial Ottoman offensive ran into grief at the battle of Sarikamis in Russian Armenia, the
defeated soldiers streamed across the border, spreading tales of the rout. In April 1915, the
Dashnaks staged an uprising that took control of the Ottoman city of Van, and later much of the
territory around Lake Van, in anticipation of a quick Russian advance to relieve them. That
577 Shaw, Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 1, 575.
578 Ibid.
579 McCarthy, Death and Exile, 333.
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advance never came that year, and the Ottomans quickly restored their control over the Armenian
villages. In the face of this ill-timed rising, the Ottoman authorities decided upon a final solution
to the question of the Armenians. The “enemy population” was to be deported to Syria, in what
became a death march across hostile desert terrain. Over the next two years, between one and
two million Armenians would die, aided by massacre and deliberate neglect along their route of
march and in their home villages.580 While there were no death camps, no systematic murders,
the effect was much the same as in later genocides: the Armenians in Ottoman territory were
destroyed as a culture and nearly as a people. The motive, at this late date, matters little to the
descendants of the survivors, but it mattered very much to the Germans in positions of authority
at the time.
Freiherr Von der Goltz was a part of the Armenian deportations from the beginning.581 As
commander of the rear areas through which the Armenians were to be marched, and of the men
who would need to be detached for handling the destruction of the Armenians, his signature was
needed on many of the documents necessary to begin the process. Under the extraordinary
powers granted to the Ottoman Army in war zones, which by this point covered much of the
country, Von der Goltz had the authority to authorize deportation of “enemies” away from the
front lines. This he did. The motives at first seemed to him to be military necessity and national
survival. Von der Goltz minuted to both superiors and subordinates that the Armenians had “fired
the first shot”, and that fate had “decreed the end of Armenian presence in Anatolia” through the

580 Shaw, Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 2, 702. Shaw must be balanced with other sources in this regard.
For example, Ronald Suny, Fatma Muge Gocek, and Norman M. Naimark A Question of Genocide: Armenians
and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). The international
dimensions to the Armenian issue are explored in Manoug Joseph Soumakian, Empires in Conflict: Armenia
and the Great Powers, 1895-1920 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1995).
581 Goltz to Ottoman War Minister Enver Pasha, October 15, 1915, BA RH 61:1002.
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actions of the Armenians themselves.582 To Von der Goltz, this was no different than the harsh
measures necessary against partisans in Belgium. The “taking of hostages and deportation of
enemies” was a matter of military necessity, since no army could tolerate enemies behind its
lines during this war of survival.583 His previous objections to Ottoman harshness against the
Armenians were forgotten for the time being. Germany would have done no differently, and he
was duty-bound, he would later say, to take actions in the interest of Germany's ally, to whose
army he had been seconded. This was a point that would come up in his later thoughts as well.584
Von der Goltz was not content forever, regarding the Armenian deportations. As it
became clear that civilian populations far from the initial uprising in Van were being included,
and that women and children, not just military-age males, were being deported in huge numbers,
he expressed his concern to Istanbul authorities in the War Ministry. The Ottoman Army would
come into “disrepute” through these measures, he said.585 Such things were better left to the
intelligence agency of the Ottoman state, the Teskilat-i-Mahsusa, the Ottoman secret police and
counterintelligence branch.586 This period of buck-passing does not figure in Von der Goltz's later
writings, but is part of the historical record. He clearly started to recognize the nature of the
Armenian deportations as a policy of wholesale slaughter by the end of 1915. Von der Goltz's
first response was to be critical only of the level of involvement he and his subordinate command
had in this process. Later, he would have a more general critique in more ways than one.
By the time the deportations were in full swing, Von der Goltz would shift to a much
more radical anti-deportation stance, and refuse to authorize via his signature any more resources
582 Ibid.
583 Martin Gilbert, The First World War: A Complete History (London: Macmillan, 1994), 367.
584 Goltz to Enver Pasha, November 8, 1915, BA RH 61:1002.
585 Goltz to Enver Pasha, February 5, 1916, BA RH 61:1002.
586 The Ottoman secret police are only now getting their due in English-language publications. See Shaw, Ottoman
Empire in World War I, vol. 2, 1260ff.
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to be used from his command to work on the “Armenian question”, as he continued to call the
deportations, using euphemism to mask the horrors he knew were being committed. In
increasingly strident terms he denounced the measures against the Armenians, warning that the
world would “judge harshly those who did this” in the future, and that anything beyond military
necessity could not be justified under the powers granted to the Ottoman Army by the Ottoman
Parliament in wartime.587 To the end of his life Von der Goltz would keep up his litany against the
Ottoman deportations of Armenians, but besides his belief that the deportations were immoral,
and that genocide was an expected result of the policies in place, he also returned to his critique
of the Ottoman system and Muslim society as a whole.
In true applied Orientalist fashion, Freiherr Von der Goltz would come to see the
massacre of the Armenian people as inevitable. The “unwillingness” of Muslim Anatolians to
live alongside their Christian neighbors had made the Van uprising inevitable. The Ottomans
“have been doing this sort of thing to the Armenians for some time”, he would say, echoing
earlier critiques of the Ottoman state regarding its Armenian policies. Instead of “learning from”
Christians among them, who Von der Goltz believed had more business sense and a higher level
of education, though citing no evidence for this, the Ottomans had decided to push the
Armenians out of society.588 The Armenians and other Christians “could have no place” in an
Islamicate society, because Islam was by its nature fiercely intolerant. Muslims were unwilling to
abide “infidels”, he said, and due to this the Armenians had been “forced” to seek the protection
of Christian powers.589 Seen in this light, Von der Goltz came to believe the Armenians were the
wronged party, and the only wronged party, not just during the war and the genocide, but for
587 Goltz to Enver Pasha, February 5, 1916, BA RH 61:1002.
588 All in Goltz to War Ministry, March 2, 1916, BA RH 61:1002.
589 Goltz to Dr. Julius Grosser in Pera, undated but near the end of his life, BA RH 61:1002.
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decades or even centuries before. No Christian people could have a future under the rule of the
Ottomans, despite the centuries-old nature of that empire, and its long-standing policies
according autonomy to religious minorities.
The career of Freiherr Von der Goltz in the Ottoman Empire is another illustration of the
power of the applied Orientalist framework. Through decades of service and travel in the
Islamicate lands of the Ottomans, Von der Goltz accumulated as much experience as any other
traveler to the “Orient”, and much more than many Orientalist academic figures in Germany
itself. His views also clearly changed over time. From his initial tolerance, prolonged work and
contact with the peoples of the Ottoman Empire caused him to become more rigid in his
thinking, and less willing to ascribe positive attributes to the Ottoman Muslims he encountered,
trained, and worked with. The only clear evidence of his backsliding in these positions was his
initial tolerance and endorsement of the Ottoman deportations. Nevertheless, unlike his later
negative views, Von der Goltz justified those deportations in terms of military necessity and
national survival, both for the Ottoman Empire and for its ally Germany. He did not ascribe
civilizational and general attributes to the deportations at first. While Von der Goltz could, for
example, have pointed to the Ottoman grant of autonomy to the Armenians, and said that by
trespassing on the boundaries of their granted rights the Armenians had justified measures
against them, he reserved such general conclusions instead for his opposition to the Ottoman
measures. While justifying genocide and massacre can never be a moral act, the way in which
such things are excused can point to the motives of the speaker. In this case, it is clear that Von
der Goltz once again made the journey, in microcosm, from initial tolerance and understanding
of his hosts' actions to condemnation of those actions in a very Orientalist tone. Von der Goltz,
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like German missionaries before him, came to think that the only future a Christian could have in
the Ottoman lands was as a rebel, or a protectorate of the European Christian states. This fits the
mold of other applied Orientalists, whose views of the society they enountered in the Ottoman
Empire became more essentialist, and less tolerant, with time and exposure. Von der Goltz is a
particularly vivid example of this, in that his criticisms eventually came to encompass even the
Ottoman Army officers he himself had trained, and those criticisms were in some cases
completely at odds with those officers' actual performances in war conditions. Von der Goltz had
so far accepted the Orientalist framework of Ottoman society and Islamicate civilization that he
could not even praise his own work.
Lower-level German officers were not immune to this same dynamic. While Freiherr Von
der Goltz left much more numerous sources for historians to plunder, lesser German officers on
the various combat fronts of the Ottoman war effort also played their roles in the story of applied
Orientalism. One such incident can be related from the Ottoman Yemen.
The Yemen front was one of the more distant theaters of combat in the Middle Eastern
section of the Great War. The British had the Aden Colony, an appendage of India since the
1830s, but that basically covered the port city of Aden in south Arabia itself, and not even much
of its hinterland. In the years before the Great War began, the British agents in Aden had begun
making protectorate treaties with the tribes of that hinterland, creating a series of alliances that
covered much of the future South Yemen of the twentieth century. This stretched north to the
oasis city of Sheikh Othman, and east to cover the tribes and clans of the Hadramaut, adjacent to
the lands claimed by the British-protected Sultanate of Oman. A convention in 1914 attempted to
delineate the British claims in Arabia. The Ottomans never ratified this treaty, and few modern
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maps depict its terms, but it shows the ambitions that would soon flare into warfare in South
Arabia.590 The British claimed a large area of southern Arabia, from the Yemeni hinterlands of
Aden, across the “Empty Quarter” deserts of modern southeastern Saudi Arabia, to Qatar. The
claims of the British Empire at the 1914 negotiations were based upon the treaty relationships
Britain had begun to form with the local leaders in the claimed areas.591
When the Ottoman Empire went to war with Britain in late 1914, Aden was the least
concern of the Sultan's statesmen and military leaders. The Hijaz Railway only penetrated as far
as the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, and Aden lay hundreds of miles further from those
railheads. There were few Ottoman soldiers in the Yemen and the Asir vilayat just north of it, and
those that were there were already tied down in fighting a low-level rebellion that had begun
several years before. The Asiri and Yemeni leaders were of suspect loyalty, as was the Sherif
Hussein of Mecca to their north.592 Therefore, local supplies and reinforcements could not be
counted upon. Nevertheless, the Ottomans advanced across the prewar border and seized the
oases just north of Aden which supplied the city with fresh water. The British position was
delicate for over a year thereafter, until reinforcements from India were diverted along their
journey to Egypt and stabilized the situation. The British threw back a few minor Ottoman
expeditions toward the boundaries of Aden, but Ottoman troops remained in British territory for
the rest of the war.593
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In the midst of this war on the fringes of Arabia, a German landing party from the SMS
Emden appeared toward the end of 1914. Hellmuth von Mücke was a Leutnant zur See and
executive officer of the Emden when that ship began the war in Qingdao, in China.594 As part of
Admiral Maximilian von Spee's East Asia Squadron, von Mücke and the Emden were detached
to raid Entente shipping in the Indian Ocean. While Admiral von Spee and the rest of the East
Asia Squadron would round Cape Horn at the southern tip of South America, defeating a British
force off of Chile, then being themselves defeated and sunk at the Battle of the Falkland Islands
in the South Atlantic, Emden lived a charmed life shelling shore installations in Malaya and
British India, and preying upon the merchant shipping that moved unescorted through what were
thought to be Entente-controlled seas.595 While in the Cocos Islands to the northwest of Australia,
the Emden finally ran out of luck when it encountered the Australian cruiser Sydney, and in the
ensuing battle Emden was sunk, on November 9, 1914. While this was occurring to Emden, von
Mücke and several of his sailors were in a shore party on the island itself, tasked with destroying
a wireless station. They immediately plotted to seize a nearby schooner and escape, making their
way back to Germany via the Ottoman Empire, which they had just learned entered the war,
“making us very sure of our plan.”596
Emden's wayward sailors made their way to the port of Hodeida, in the Ottoman Yemen.
There they hoped to travel to the terminus of the Hejaz Railway, in Medina, and use that route to
make it to Ottoman Syria, thence across the Mediterranean to Austro-Hungarian territory, and
back to Germany.597 While briefly stranded in the Ottoman Yemen, they were dragooned by their
allies into helping fit out Ottoman ships on the Red Sea, but several of them sank without
594 Hellmuth von Mücke, The Emden (Boston: Ritter and Sons, 1917), 4.
595 Von Mücke, Emden, 10.
596 Von Mücke, Emden, 97.
597 Ibid.

221

accomplishing anything. Von Mücke and his crewmen then had to negotiate with local Bedouin
for sustenance, and with Ottoman officials who claimed to be in touch with Istanbul for money
assistance to make their way home again. During this time, von Mücke would keep notes and
journals that he would later be able to turn into a coherent narrative of the trip.598
Von Mücke did not start out completely attuned to Orientalist tropes about the Ottoman
Empire. His first impressions of the people he met were of a “hardy and warlike” folk, and while
this may have owed something to the exoticism of the “Orient” in his mind, his stereotyping was
at least not intended as negative toward his hosts.599 Soon, however, he changed his mind
considerably. The Ottoman officials were “that kind that you hear about in the East”, and were
“obsessed with baksheesh [bribes].”600 They were lazy and indolent as well, and von Mücke
soon became suspicious about the connections to the capital his hosts enjoyed, and whether his
messages to the German embassy in Istanbul were even being passed on. He could not tell at
what level the corruption might lie, but suspected that even top officials in Istanbul might be, for
mysterious reasons, keeping himself and his crewmen as bargaining chips, and not letting them
contact Germany.
Von Mücke would soon come to feel the same about the locals he and his men found
themselves living and surviving alongside. The local Bedouin were “treacherous, and cannot be
trusted with anything.”601 Von Mücke became paranoid that the local tribal leadership was in the
pay of the British, and would soon sell out the wayward Germans to their enemies. The
magnitude of von Mücke's suspicions only grew as the months passed, and he and his men
remained stranded. The British would soon land, and all of the “treacherous Arabs” would join
598 Von Mücke, Emden, 187.
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them.602 Muslims and “Orientals” in general could not be trusted, according to von Mücke.603
They had learned from their culture habits of intrigue and betrayal. They could “lie easily and
look at you with calm” while they did so.604 During a sojourn in Mecca, on Mücke would wax
eloquent about his distaste for the double-dealing he was sure was not just a product of wartime
suspicions, provincial loyalties and ambitions, or individual elements.605 It was, without doubt in
his mind, the result of “Oriental” perfidy, an ingrained cultural, nearly genetic propensity for
deception and greed.
Von Mücke and his band of German sailors finally made the train on May 10, 1915. They
reached Istanbul within days, and from there were repatriated to Germany, sidestepping the
dangerous Mediterranean voyage they had been contemplating.606 Back in Germany, von Mücke
would get some renown in the future as an anti-Nazi far-right wing political figure, and would
spend time in Hitler's concentration camps as a political dissident. His worm's-eye-view glance
at the Ottoman realms while working in the volatile Yemeni frontier zone would be the subject of
accolades for the rest of his life. His story is useful in that he was not assigned to the Ottoman
Empire by his superiors, nor did he volunteer. Our next case, however, is of a middle-ranking
officer who would climb the promotion ladder due to his service in the Ottoman Empire. Despite
the differences between the two, they would reach many of the same opinions about the people
they served, lived, and worked among in the Ottoman Empire.
Colonel Otto von Lossow was an attaché attached to the German embassy in Istanbul at
the time of the outbreak of the First Balkan War in the autumn of 1912. The Bavarian was
602 Ibid.
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quickly seconded to the Ottoman 2nd Army fighting a losing battle against the combined
Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian forces in Macedonia.607 Like von der Goltz, what he saw among
the Ottoman officers and their soldiers moved von Lossow to conduct his own venture into
applied Orientalism. Unlike von der Goltz, his opinions, formed in his time on the previous fall's
maneuvers, were not positive. Von Lossow wrote that the Ottoman soldiers were “lazy, illiterate,
and indolent subjects” and a natural “slave people.”608 They were incapable of learning to use
modern equipment like the relatively simple bolt-action rifles the Ottomans had bought from
Germany, let alone the modern Krupp artillery guns that had been bought at great expense in a
deal brokered by none other than Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz himself. Von der Goltz had, to
von Lossow, made a great mistake in believing the Ottoman people could produce a soldier ready
for such modern equipment.
The Ottoman officers were even worse in von Lossow's eyes. Disdaining their language,
von Lossow complained about the Ottoman officers' inability to learn decent German or French,
then complained further about their inability to communicate effectively with soldiers who spoke
a dozen languages and dialects native to the Ottoman Empire.609 One wonders how many
languages an Ottoman artillery captain would have had to master to meet von Lossow's exacting
standards. The Ottoman officer corps was incapable of “any physical and mental labor” because
they lacked the very virtues that von der Goltz claimed to have proudly instilled in them, of
striving to better the nation, and putting themselves below the goals of the army and the state. To
von Lossow, the Ottoman officer class was still operating from a view of the army officer as
gentleman, above technical concerns or physical labor, and given to a sort of amateur's view of
607 Wilhelm Gust, ed., The Armenian Genocide: Evidence From the German Foreign Office Archives (New York:
Berghahn Books, 2013), 105.
608 Lossow to Liman von Sanders, Lossow No. 74, in Gust, Armenian Genocide, 687.
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military operations. Somewhat contradicting that, he claimed these officers also did not view
themselves as separate enough from the welfare of their solders. “Turks”, von Lossow claimed,
can only “ruled with a knout” and only by harsh discipline given by their betters can they be
trained to “order, breeding, work, and discipline.”610
Franz Karl Endres, though a captain in the Bavarian army, was promoted to major in the
Ottoman forces.611 His lower rank made him even more closely involved in troop training, and
therefore more accustomed to day to day interactions with common soldiers in the Sultan's
armies. In late 1912, his observations were even harsher, however, than von Lossow's had been.
Endres believed that the German military missions in the Ottoman Empire should be
immediately disbanded, because their task was hopeless. His dispatches to his superiors in Berlin
even said that this step, though radical, would allow for the “inevitable” division of the Ottoman
lands among the Christian powers to be undertaken without too much embarrassment for
Germany.612 Staying in the Ottoman Empire would only delay the salutary “end of Muslim rule
of Christian peoples, and even of themselves.”613 The Ottoman officers he found to be indifferent
to both the welfare of their men, and heedless of their tasks. This he attributed to “Eastern
laziness” and indolence, a cultural and religious factor that could not be eliminated by German
example or training.614 The soldiers were, as von Lossow also believed, largely incapable of the
use of modern weapons, illiterate and unwilling to sacrifice their lives for the good of the army
and the state, factors which Endress believed necessary for discipline. “Rationality and
education” were lacking among these soldiers, and they showed unwillingness to tolerate
610 Ibid.
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conditions in the field, something Endress believed their officers indulged them in. Endress
recounted how one Ottoman officer refused to drill his Anatolian recruits in the rainy Balkan
weather because they were not yet acclimatized to conditions so far from their native climate. Far
from a “rational” reaction, Endress counted this decision as sentimentality, and said that he had
to abuse the Ottoman officers and men in terms that would “be unthinkable in Germany” in order
to get any good results at all.615
Endress did not hesitate to attribute these problems to Ottoman politics, especially to the
revolution of 1908 in which the army had taken a leading role, and which von der Goltz had
praised so highly from afar. Endress believed that a “democratic” spirit had taken hold in the
army, because commissions were no longer bought, or given to those with noble titles like
“Pasha”. “You cannot expect the sons of porters and serving people to have any authority,”
Endress wrote, in the belief that officer promotion based on merit had ruined the Ottoman
army.616 These new officers, raised up based on ability, fired up to serve the new reformist order
after 1908, were, in Endress' eyes, either too solicitous of the welfare of their men, or too little.
Either way, they were doing no good, and he believed that the defeats the Ottomans suffered in
1912 were attributable as much to the immutable qualities of race, class, and Islamic religion as
to the logistical shortcomings he also documented in great detail. Ironically, Endress believed
that the Ottoman officer class was imbued with arrogance, which prevented them from truly
understanding or caring about the discipline the German missions were seeking to install in their
society.617
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Shortly after Endress wrote these dispatches, the Ottoman army recovered remarkably,
and counterattacked the Bulgarians to drive them from the defenses of Istanbul and recover
Edirne, in what Western sources count as the Second Balkan War of 1913.618 His
recommendation that the German military missions be disbanded likewise proved less than
effective. At the beginning of 1914, a new military mission, more expansive in scope and
responsibility than any before, was sent by the German government to reform the Ottoman
armies shattered in the Italo-Turkish and Balkan wars of 1911-13.
Ironically, the most discussion of what this work has termed “applied Orientalism” has
been had over the last of the prewar German military missions, even though that mission had the
least to do with common Ottomans or even Ottoman officialdom. The Liman von Sanders
mission of 1913 was the subject of a major international controversy, and as a result its head
spent much of his time intriguing with other Europeans, and had little to say about the Ottomans
he worked with.
Otto Liman von Sanders was a fast-rising star in the German Army before his Ottoman
service. Promoted to Generalleutnant in 1911, he was slated for corps or even field army
command in case of war, before being tapped to run an emergency military mission to Istanbul in
July 1913, to help rebuild the Ottoman forces, and especially the defenses of Istanbul, after the
catastrophic losses of territory and material in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. Liman von
Sanders thought of himself as following in the footsteps of the first Von Moltke in doing this, and
others also foresaw great things in his future if the military mission fulfilled its tasks. However,
the entire endeavor was immediately embroiled in controversy. The British press saw it as
emblematic of German influence over the Ottoman state, and pointed darkly to the Berlin618 See Erickson, Defeat in Detail, 138.
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Baghdad Railway project, and the interests of Deutsche Bank and other German corporations in
the Ottoman lands as proof that the Liman von Sanders mission was part of a scheme to expel
Entente influences from the Middle East. The Russian response was governmental. They
protested strongly to the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman statesmen at the time also saw Russian
approaches regarding a Russian protectorate of some sort over the Ottoman Armenians as related
to this-a threat to get the Ottoman government to send Liman von Sanders and his military
engineers home to Berlin. Liman von Sanders therefore spent much of his correspondence with
the German government talking about his own political position, and very little of it discussing
the people and places he encountered.619
Once war broke out between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente, Liman von Sanders
was not to enter into Orientalist questions due to other factors. He quarreled constantly with the
German Embassy, asking for more engineers, sappers, and heavy guns, especially naval guns, to
better protect the approaches to Istanbul. Liman von Sanders also resented the sending back of
Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, seeing this as an attempt to supercede his authority with an older
hand at Ottoman affairs. There seems to have been a social element as well. The “von Sanders”
part of Otto Liman's surname came from an ennobling less than a decade old. The appellation
was his wife's family name, his own father having been a salesman of possible Jewish descent.620
This may have made Liman von Sanders acutely aware of the ancient pedigree of Von der Goltz,
and he railed at the Von der Goltz appointment as being due to suspicions about his worth that no
amount of service and rapid promotion had dispelled. Only when the older Von der Goltz was
sent to Mesopotamia was Liman von Sanders able to relax somewhat.621
619 Otto Liman von Sanders, Fünf Jahre Türkei (Berlin: A. Scherl, 1920) is the best source.
620 Trumpener, “Liman von Sanders,” 180.
621 Ibid.

228

The one field command Liman von Sanders would hold, toward the end of the war, was
that of the Ottoman armies defending Palestine and Syria against the British imperial forces
pushing north from Egypt along the eastern Mediterranean coast. Even here, he spent most of his
time praising the role of the tiny German Asienkorps of specialists and machine-gun troops in his
formal dispatches. This makes the Liman von Sanders correspondence less useful for a study of
applied Orientalism than it might otherwise be.622 Yet it is notable that the Ottoman soldiers
under Liman von Sanders' command in the final year of the war did not receive any such
praise.623 This negative evidence is the best that can be done regarding Liman von Sanders' worth
to this study. The controversial circumstances of his appointment meant that he spent too much
time proving himself up to the task, and not an agent of influence before the war, to waste time
on the everyday observation and evaluation that applied Orientalism largely consists of. Despite
being arrested for war crimes in relation to the deportation of Armenians and Greeks during and
after the war, and held on Malta for a year, Liman von Sanders was released and retired the
following year from the German Army.624
The service of German military officers in Ottoman lands in the period between 1835 and
1918 provides much fodder for the study of applied Orientalism. These officers were, for the
most part, highly educated by the standards of their society, and imbued with a sense of
adventure. It is notable that most of the officers highlighted in this chapter volunteered for their
service in Ottoman lands. They wished to go, and they in many cases were accustomed to the
idea of cultural difference. Like Von der Goltz, they for the most part saw themselves as
“civilizational ambassadors”, come to assist a potential or actual ally in the Islamic East, not as
622 Trumpener, “Liman von Sanders,” 184. Sanders, Fünf Jahre Türkei, 58.
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conquerors and not as superiors. This attitude of cooperative learning is especially interesting to
see from Colmar Freiherr Von der Goltz, who held positions of high responsibility in the
Ottoman Army throughout his tenure in the “Orient”. Nevertheless, eventually all of the subjects
listed here followed the same pattern of disillusionment and growing prejudice. That bias and
disdain was expressed, not on a personal level, but a civilizational one. It was not individual
soldiers, administrators, or subjects of the Ottoman lands that aroused their ire, not a department,
a law, or a custom. It was the nature of the people they lived and worked among, and they
especially identified it as due to the Islamic and Islamicate nature of that society. The problem
with the Christian Armenians was that they lived among Muslims. The problem with the
Ottoman Army was due to innate Islamic influences, a culture that could not be erased. This bias
was strong even when it made little sense, as in the nature of Ottoman education being seen as
less secularly-oriented than it was; and when it made the observer look badly, as when Freiherr
Von der Goltz repeatedly disdained the very soldiers he had trained, despite their better-thanexpected performances in several conflicts. This conclusion, that the soldiers examined here
were learning their prejudice “on the spot”, as it were, leads to other judgements becoming more
difficult. For example, what are we to think of the Von der Goltz memoranda, and the about turn
he made about the Armenian deportations, in the light of the changes in attitude chronicled here?
Could his judgement about the need for separation of Christian and Muslim peoples have
affected his initial sign off of the deportation orders? Did his later decision to oppose further
genocidal measures against the Armenians have anything to do with his by-then enormous sense
of disregard towards the Ottoman Army and the Ottoman Empire itself? Moral judgements of
Von der Goltz's actions become more difficult in this context. Similarly, the Endress case has

230

implications for the oft-repeated tale of how the Ottoman performance in the First World War,
especially the tenacious defense of the Gallipoli peninsula, caught European observers by
surprise. If Endress' observations of Ottoman performance were driven by pseudo-social-science
nonsense and a casual bigotry toward Muslim societies' military and organizational abilities,
were the opinions of other European professionals in that era so effected? The implications of the
study of applied Orientalism therefore argue for re-examination of the literature on military
affairs, as well as that on political and social policy. It is highly likely that many of the extant
sources are tainted in this way, which need not reduce their usefulness, if they are read carefully
and with an eye on Orientalist language and thought. As with the other chapters, we see here the
value of studying this amateur Orientalist discourse, which ends up recapitulating much of the
more refined and specialized Orientalist literature, with the added benefit of personal
experiences.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
Martin Hartmann’s story encapsulates very well the entirety of the encounter between
German applied Orientalists and the Islamicate civilization of the late-Ottoman realms.
Hartmann’s career was the epitome of the applied Orientalist. The very institution of the
dragomanate, once it evolved to include Europeans of Christian origins among its ranks, invited
the sort of amateur observation under study here. Hartmann, however, turned his amateur status
into a professional one later in his career. By 1912, he was writing regular pieces in Der Welt des
Islams, the journal of the Islamic Studies Association which he helped found in Germany. By the
time of his death in 1918, Hartmann was a leading Orientalist scholar and writer in German
academic publications, and a lecturer in the Arabic language.625
My thesis is that German Orientalism was indeed different and that this difference was
caused by the nature of German imperialism in Islamic lands. Because German penetration of the
Ottoman Empire was economic, cultural, and religious, and did not encompass formal political
control of Islamic territories, Germans of the Kaiserreich approached Islam differently than other
Europeans. I divide German Orientalists into “theoretical” Orientalists, those figures in Germany
who wrote about Islam without living among Muslims, and those “applied Orientalists” who
encountered Islam in everyday life, and presumed to speak to Germans at home regarding it. My
work concentrates on the applied Orientalists, to demonstrate that applied Orientalism as
practiced in the Kaiserreich era constituted a change in the German view of Islam, and of
Muslim peoples. An example would be, the German diplomat Martin Hartmann, who was often
in trouble with home authorities regarding his support of Arab separatism from his post in Beirut.
625 Martin Kramer, “Arabistik and Arabism: The Passions of Martin Hartmann” in Middle Eastern Studies, vol.
25 no. 3 (July, 1989), 283.
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Hartmann was not an intellectual, but his reports are full of typical Orientalist tropes on the
“warlike nature” of the Arabs, and their utility for German international goals. At other times,
Hartmann believed that Islam itself was a “peaceful view of things” that would make for docile
Muslim subjects if Germany ever sought to extend political dominance over the Levant to protect
Christians converted by German missionaries.626 Despite his trouble finding an audience among
his superiors, Hartmann was enabled by his position as diplomat for a European power seeking
greater influence in the Muslim East. Had Hartmann been instead governor of Beirut, interested
in governing the Muslim population of the Levant, there would have been less need of his
amateur Orientalism. The Germans interested in a discourse that justified and rationalized
conquest and dominance were the ones actually on Muslim ground.
The German encounter with the Ottoman Empire in the late-Nineteenth and earlyTwentieth Centuries is a lively field of study in the last two decades. German colonial studies
have been enlivened by the discourse around the German “Sonderweg.” The idea that Germany
had a “special path” to nationhood that made the rise of the National Socialists and the Holocaust
inevitable has caused a reevaluation of Germans abroad generally. Events like the massacre of
the Nama and Herero peoples of German Southwest Africa at the turn of the twentieth century, or
the brutal suppression of the Mayi-Mayi uprising in German East Africa shortly after, have
assumed the role in some scholarship of the precursors of the Holocaust.627 A German national
civilizing mission, paired with a more authoritarian state structure than that in France or the
United Kingdom, and an aggrieved sense of a late-arriving nationalism that had missed out on
the partition of the Earth, combined to create a colonial reality where genocidal brutality in the

626 Kramer, “Arabistik and Arabism,” 90.
627 Casper Erichsen and David Olusoga, The Kaiser’s Holocaust (London: Faber and Faber, 2010).
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face of native resistance was possible. When Adolf Hitler, in his Second Book, wrote that he
wished the German nation to apply the tactics of genocide used on Native Americans in the US
Western territories to the Slavic East of Europe, the circle is complete.628 The Sonderweg had
gone forth to the colonies, and come home again to roost in Eastern Europe, with devastating
consequences.
This reevaluation of German colonialism is useful and has much explanatory power, but
it does not go far enough in its concepts of what German colonialism actually was. As shown in
the chapters above, and especially in Chapter 6, German activity in the Ottoman Empire between
the foundation of the German Empire and the end of the First World War constitute an
understudied field of colonial endeavor. This is a colonialism that did not seek formal political
empire. As stated, Martin Hartmann was not to be governor of Beirut, but merely a consul who
had extraordinary influence, influence that deepened as the German-Ottoman relationship
developed. In a way, the German development of influence in the Ottoman Empire mirrored the
cultural need of earlier German academic Orientalists to see in the “Orient” a foil to Western
civilization, Germany could balance between the two. The East would “redress the balance of
power in Europe,” an eventuality feared by British and French officials, and welcomed by
German. The economic opportunities in the Ottoman Empire and the fields for cultural and
military influence were vast, and came at the direct expense of German competitors, as with the
businessmen who attempted to supplant British hegemony in places like the Persian Gulf, or
French influence in Anatolia. The question, often asked in literature on German activities in the
Ottoman East, of whether or not the international crises over things like the Baghdad Railway
scheme, or the Hejaz Railway, or the 1913 arrival of the military mission of Otto Liman von
628 Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf (New York: Enigma Books, 2006).
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Sanders, exacerbated the international situation in Europe is not only beyond the scope of this
study, but moot as far as its conclusions are concerned. These German activities existed, and
therefore created fields for applied Orientalism.
The other side of the equation concerning the general reevaluation of German-Ottoman
relations in the final decades of the Ottoman Empire’s existence is mostly on the side of modern
Turkish studies. Subaltern studies generally, which seek to re-center the discourse about
colonialism and European exploitation to give voice to non-European actors, has had its
influence in this field. Much of the writing has utilized newly-accessible Turkish archives on the
late-Ottoman period to return agency to the statesmen and parliamentarians of the Ittihad ve
Teraki governments after the Revolution of 1908-1909.629 Studies such as the important work of
Mustafa Aksakal give a much more nuanced portrait of an Ottoman government that, far from
being used by the Germans as a tool of imperialism and German expansion, often wielded the
Germans as a cudgel against their own enemies. The Ottoman Empire chose a German
relationship as much as the Germans chose an Ottoman relationship. Both sides, according to
Aksakal, were therefore expecting gains.630 With a powerful protector, the Ottoman state, as we
have seen in Chapter 5, was able to abrogate the hated Capitulation agreements, for example.
The return of Ottoman economic sovereignty was a concrete example of the gains the Ittihad ve
Teraki expected from its German alliance. The return of lost territories like Egypt, and Kars in
the Caucasus, was a further expectation. For this, according to Aksakal, the Ottomans sold the
Germans on an Orientalist fantasy of “a jihad made in Germany,” a universal call to religious
629 Stanford Shaw, The Ottoman Empire in World War I (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Press, 2005) stands out
for both its length and thoroughness, as well as its reprinting of translated Ottoman documents inaccessible to
other researchers.
630 Mutafa Aksakal, “Holy War Made in Germany? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad” in War in History, vol. 18
no. 2 (April 2011), 184-189.

235

rebellion that the Sultan would undertake in his role as leader of all Muslims and heir to the
Prophet Muhammad. This would cause widespread uprisings in the British and French colonies,
helping Germany to win its world war. That this did not happen is taken by Aksakal as evidence
of Ottoman empowerment in the German-Ottoman relationship. Since the Ottomans knew the
idea of it was fanciful, they were trading concrete diplomatic, political, and economic gains for a
fantasy.
To this idea of Ottomans utilizing Orientalist ideas against their originators we must add
the later works of Stanford Shaw. With access to Ottoman archives in Ankara unprecedented
among non-Turkish academics, Shaw was able to publish, as well as analyze, a great many
previously untapped primary sources from the Ottoman side. Shaw used these sources to show
that the Ottoman war effort was always subordinated to national interests and especially to the
attempt to create an Ottoman or Pan-Islamic nationalism that could supersede the loyalty
previously felt to the disempowered Osmanli dynasty. Shaw’s work is extremely important for
showing how this project to create Ottoman nationalism did not depend upon European ideas
exclusively, still less upon European, even German, initiatives. At the same time, Shaw is able to
demonstrate how these late measures came too near the end of the empire, and could not arrest
the growing anti-Ottoman nationalism of the Armenians, Arabs, and other groups tearing the
empire apart.
Shaw’s work, however, unlike Aksakal’s, still affords the Germans a major place in the
late-Ottoman story. The Ottomans needed the German connection, especially in the economic
field. While Shaw and other recent scholars agree with older work, like that of Ulrich Trumpener,
that the German economic connection was important, the emphases are entirely different. While
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Trumpener’s major goal was to exonerate the German imperial project in the Ottoman Empire by
showing how little return was ever realized, the “Shaw school” of thought emphasizes that this
constitutes less a German failure than an Ottoman triumph. It is also important to the modern
scholarship that German intentions, while not always matched by returns, were tending toward a
deeper connection, one in which Germany would inevitably be the superior partner to the weak
Ottoman Empire.631
This is still not expansive enough. The German project in the Ottoman Empire is too
often being examined for what it could have been, or was intended to be, and little enough for
what it was. The German projects detailed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 are the evidentiary basis
for the discussion of German imperialism in Chapter 6. Germany’s project in the Ottoman
Empire was a vast web of informal connection, cultural and economic influence, and even just
local relationship-building, all of which were creating a new reality on the ground. It is those
realities that this work studies and which are reflected in the thoughts and writings of the applied
Orientalists detailed in these chapters. With these realities in mind, we can turn to the questions
raised in this study, and whether the evidence even allows for definitive answers to them.
The questions this project sought to answer were whether applied Orientalists, as I have
termed them, were a part of the Orientalist discourse in a way that had been overlooked by other
scholars; whether the German branch of Orientalism was truly different, in the Kaiserreich era,
from its British and French contemporaries; and finally, whether it was German imperial projects
and German imperialism in the Ottoman East more broadly that altered a pre-existing German
discourse on the “Orient” in ways that were instrumenalist and aiding of that imperialism. It is
worth an answer, as final as can be given, to each of these questions.
631 Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).
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German applied Orientalists were absolutely part of a larger Orientalist discourse. The
pages above have many instances in which the applied Orientalists interacted with a pre-existing
discourse in German academia which stretched back to the eighteenth century. As detailed in
Chapter 2, there was a discourse that, while as diverse as any other nation’s, nevertheless had a
few clear tendencies. For one, German academic discourse on Islam tended to see the Islamicate
East for what it was, as a hodgepodge of traditions in law, religion, and culture. Fewer
distinctions were made in German academic circles than in British or French about the difference
between the Islamic and pre-Islamic eras in the “Orient.” Many of the German studies of
importance were of a literary and philological nature that interrogated the Koran and Bible
equally as texts, and often had as much to do with religious disputes between Catholic Germans
and Protestant Germans as anything these works were ostensibly about. Litigating the present
through the past, German scholars created a different sort of Orientalist literature that was not as
devoted to differentiating, and reducing to essentials, an Islamic civilization that it was not
interested in controlling or competing with.
Enlightenment German discourse in the eighteenth century followed its French
predecessors in some ways, but it was the philosophes like Montesquieu who had the greatest
impact. The late-blooming of German discourse on the “Orient” allowed it to bypass latemedieval trends in thought on Islam that saw the societies of the East, with their diversity and
their general alienness, as a useful foil for the absolute monarchies of Europe. French scholarship
diverged most from this template after the French invasion of Egypt under Napoleon Bonaparte,
in 1798. The “fanaticism” of the “half-savages” that appeared in French scholarship increasingly
from that point on served as both explanation of resistance to French rule and an excuse for that
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rule. Presumably, colonial control of Egypt and other parts of the Ottoman East would bring the
French values of the Enlightenment and the Revolution of 1789 to “backwards and barbarous
lands.” Thus far, Edward Said’s notion that Orientalist discourse was shaped by the necessities of
colonial rule appeared to have great explanatory power. In Germany it operated in a negative
sense. Germans lacked anything like the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt or even a cohesive
nationalism that could set itself over the Ottoman Empire, or anyone else. Indeed, that lack of a
single German nationalism may have been why the Germans remained in their eighteenth
century mode of Orientalist discourse for longer than might otherwise have been the case.
According to scholars like Todd Kontje, this uniquely German discourse was also
interested in “siding with the enemy,” in the sense that it viewed Islamic and Islamicate
civilization as a useful template for the religiously and linguistically diverse German “nation.”
To critics who see it difficult to isolate a German “strain” of Orientalist thought before the
German Empire was consolidated between 1864 and 1871, Kontje and other scholars who
believe as he does invoke Orientalism as a part of that very nation-building project. German
literature on the “Orient” sought to selectively identify with “Eastern” elements against the “rest
of the West” in order to establish a distinctive German identity that had not previously existed.
The “Orient,” and especially the Ottoman Empire, made for an implicit contrast with the German
situation.632 While Kontje sees these definitions as aiding a more humane and nuanced German
approach to Orientalism, it also operated in other ways that foreshadow the turn in attitude of the
applied Orientalists.
Returning to Martin Hartmann, one of the important innovations of his later writings,
both of the applied and academic sort, is an obsession with imposing categories of national
632 Todd Kontje, German Orientalisms (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 4.
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distinction in an Ottoman Empire that lacked them in many ways.633 As we have seen, the millet
system, still in operation in parts during Hartmann’s tenure at the German consulate in Beirut,
meant that distinctions in the Ottoman realms had most often been defined by religion.
Language, culture, and shared history mattered, of course, as they have always mattered.
However, most Ottoman identities were either more local, defined by the horizons of village and
town, or larger, encompassing all Orthodox Christians whether they were within the Ottoman
Empire or without, to use just one example. For a Catholic in Ottoman Lebanon, for example, the
dictates of the popes in Rome mattered almost as much as those of the Sultan in Istanbul. Since
personal status laws, which was the major way in which courts and local administrations acted in
the lives of most Ottoman subjects, especially rural ones, mattered so much, and the Ottoman
state allowed autonomy to its various religious sub-units based on religion, Ottoman identity did
not correspond to ideas of European nationalists. There were no hard borders between Armenian
Christians and Muslim Turks and Kurds, as we have seen. Populations tended to be mixed, and
the exact locale within the empire that one lived mattered less than the religious portion of
identity. Hartmann would have known of all this, and yet his categorization and imposition of
nationalist categories became one of the defining themes of his work.
Both as a diplomat and later as an academic, Martin Hartmann abandoned what he had
learned from the German tradition of Orientalism or had imbibed through its influence on
German culture, and insisted upon rendering the “Orient” as a realm of not just another
civilization, but of multiple competing nationalisms in embryo. Hartmann, during his work in
Beirut, became more and more interested in the cause of Arabs within the Ottoman Empire.
Hartmann even came to believe that Christian Arabs could become a sort of vanguard party of
633 Martin Hartmann, Der Islamische Orient: Berichte und Forschungen, (Berlin: W. Peiser, 1910).
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national culture formation within the Arab lands of the Sultan. Within the Ottoman Empire at that
time, in the 1880s, there were few distinctions between Arab-speakers and other Muslims within
the empire. What mattered was their specific confession. Shi’ite Arabs, like the Ismailis in Syria,
had always been somewhat politically suspect. Shi’ism had long been identified in Sunni
Ottoman circles with Iran, and during the early period of serious Ottoman-Iranian contests for
power, this mattered a great deal to authorities already wary of anti-Ottoman conspiracies and
potential insurrections. By Hartmann’s time, however, this past prejudice had long since softened
into a much less malignant form of discrimination. Christian Arabs Hartmann saw as part of the
Ottoman polity, almost right up until the end of the empire, though the increasing European
interventions in Ottoman affairs, some of which used Ottoman Christians as pawns or excuses,
began to erode this status very gradually. Hartmann’s obsession with Arabism was something
else entirely. Hartmann professed to see in the Arab peoples of the empire a nation in the making.
Far from identifying with the Islamicate East as a realm of confessional difference but cultural
solidarity, which is Todd Kontje’s point, Hartmann had altered this into imposing German ideas
of nationalism and national formation on another people, in ways that did not quite fit the
situation at hand. Having eliminated the possibility that this was something taught, that it was
part of the evolution of German Orientalist scholarship, we are left instead with the idea that it
was Martin Hartmann’s lived experience in the Ottoman East that made the difference. Applied
Orientalism is a real category because it helps explain the changes in figures like Hartmann that
straddle the academic and “applied” worlds of discourse.
The second question answered here is answered by the first. The identification of German
Orientalism as “different in kind and in content” from that of the British and French is both
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correct and incorrect. It is correct only if the terms are limited to the academic discourse that
existed up to the start of the twentieth century. By that point, the applied Orientalists had already
begun an intellectual transformation within the German-speaking community with experience in
the Islamicate lands of the East.
As detailed in Chapter 3, even the most innocent activities, those of missionaries and
teachers at the German mission stations in the Ottoman Empire, were subject to this process.
Identification with Christians in their care over their Muslim neighbors, among whom the
missionaries were not allowed to proselytize normally, may have been inevitable. What was not
inevitable was the change seen in all these cases from identification with Islamicate society to
distrust of that same society. In the cases in Chapter 3, we do not see ephemeral political
changes, like the Revolution of 1908-1909 in the Ottoman Empire, as being to blame for any of
these attitude differences. Rather, it was lived experience that was very distant from those larger
events in Istanbul that are the cause. The changes in writing go far beyond the mere identification
with those in the care of the mission stations to a wholesale criticism of the very concept of
Islamicate society. Rather than Ottoman society being tolerant of difference, and the guarantor of
religious freedom through the millet system and other administrative measures, the very presence
of Islam becomes seen as an existential danger to the Armenian Christians of Anatolia. Christians
and Christianity “could not long exist in this land” if the Ottoman government were
maintained.634 The Sunni Muslim nature of the dynasty and much of the Ottoman administration
was therefore an impediment to the missionaries’ work, something they believed alongside their
charges. In this particular case of mission stations, the changes may even have been independent

634 Jeremy Salt, “Trouble Wherever They Went: American Missionaries and Ottoman Syria in the Nineteenth
Century” in Muslim World vol. 92 no. 3, (Fall 2002), 287-289.
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of any alterations in German government policy or German business activity in the Ottoman
Empire. Rather, this is a pure case of lived experience altering the viewpoint of applied
Orientalists in a direction that is rather more like the traditional, post-Said conception of
Orientalist literature in English and French. It is essentialist, ascribing attitudes and tendencies to
an entire religion and culture, rather than to individuals. It is prejudiced, seeing increasingly
through the eyes of one side, the Christian side, in what were essentially political and economic
disputes between communities. This is a pure Orientalist discourse, lacking the polish of
academia in many cases, but received in the same manner, and in the Biorn case, forming a major
Orientalist text in the decades to follow.
In other cases, as with the diplomats of Chapter 4, the businessmen and entrepreneurs of
Chapter 5, or the military officers of Chapter 7, we have an applied Orientalism that is changing
due to lived experience that is increasingly effected by German activities. The growth of German
enterprises in the Ottoman East led to a situation where German (or Deutsche Bank) officers,
found themselves increasingly in conflict with Ottoman authorities. Their priorities were not the
same as their ostensible hosts. A von der Goltz or a Kaufmann had need of support from the
home government in the course of their duties, as a matter of course. Increasingly during their
tenures, however, they became advocates in their dispatches home, not of more cooperation with
local authorities, but of more conflict. They became, as in the case of Colmarr Freiherr von der
Goltz, doubters of the human material they themselves had trained. Like Otto Kaufmann, they
became convinced that a government they had extolled as friendly, cooperative, and “tolerant
beyond most others” was instead bigoted, narrow-minded, and an obstacle to all German plans.
The changes seem to be not only substantial, but even harmful to careers. Von der Goltz, for
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example, was overruled repeatedly, and his advice to end the military connection to the Ottoman
Empire was never followed. In fact, that connection only substantially deepened, and further
military missions were sent after his tenure ended. In the case of Otto Kaufmann, his career
never moved on from his time in Istanbul, and he was likewise consistently ignored. The changes
were not driven by policy, or careerism. They were driven by the experience of being part of an
imperial project that increasingly saw the Ottoman Empire’s very existence as an obstacle, as
German influence and ambition grew.
Chapter 6, discussing German imperialism, contains the answer, therefore, to the final
question asked in this study. German imperialism has been defined too narrowly. German
Orientalism was not different from its French and British counterparts, when German political
and imperial projects dictated a similar pattern to German-Ottoman interactions to those that
might be experienced in a colony. Part of the previously mentioned new discourse on Ottoman
agency in the German alliance is an emphasis on the many fronts of conflict between the powers.
Even the core Ottoman goal of abrogation of the Capitulation agreements was, as seen in Chapter
5, antithetical to German interests by 1914. German capacity to halt these Ottoman political and
economic maneuvers was limited, as per Mustafa Aksakal. That the German desire to halt these
developments existed is testament to the growth of German power and ambition in the Ottoman
East. This can also be seen in the expansion of the Baghdad Railway project, detailed in the same
chapter. German ambitions and plans continued to grow in that project until the First World War
intervened. The project was destined never to be fully completed. That it fulfilled Ottoman needs
as well is less relevant for the German subjects treated here. It represented a growth of German
plans that increasingly put Germans in charge in Ottoman lands. By the end of the First World
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War, German dictates in the military, diplomatic, and economic fields would be much more
important than they had been before the conflict. It is true that War Minister Enver Pasha, often
singled out in previous decades as a German agent in Istanbul, was certainly only enacting a
general Ottoman policy that was decided upon internally to the ruling party. The myth of German
supremacy in the Ottoman Empire in 1914 is just that. By 1918, with Germans commanding half
the Ottoman Army and Deutsche Bank’s Baghdad Railway project the largest employer in the
private sector, German dominance was becoming much more real. The Ottoman collapse and
subsequent civil war short-circuited this trend, and the Allied confiscation of German business
interests after the Great War was finished has tended to obscure how true this was.
A major issue hanging over these conclusions is the role of the Armenian massacres that
began in 1915. To what extent did these events, which many of the applied Orientalists had direct
knowledge of, effect their change in attitude from supporters to critics of Islamicate Ottoman
society? There was a definite influence, as seen in the chapters above. Everyone from military
officers to missionaries was required, by the enormity of the massacres and the outrage they
generated, to take a post-war position. Since we now have access to their wartime dispatches and
diaries, we can say that the Germans shown in this work did not differ much in their
condemnation of the atrocities against the Armenians. Even in cases where the outrage was
directed solely at the foolishness of such massacres from the point of view of the war effort,
condemnation was the norm.
In many cases, this showed two of the trends detailed here in action, as well. The
disparate goals of the Ottoman and German governments as the war went on is illustrated in the
German condemnations, in official correspondence, of the Armenian death marches. This is
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mirrored in the applied Orientalists with knowledge of those happenings. This was part of the
general trend toward a German-centered viewpoint as German interests and ambitions in the
Ottoman East grew during the war. Some diplomatic dispatches were explicit about the need to
stop the Ottoman government from its anti-Armenian measures, lest the public outcry in the rest
of the world create problems for German post-war investments in the Ottoman Empire.
The other trend exemplified in the writings of applied Orientalists on the Armenian
massacres is the tendency for lived experience among the Ottomans to override earlier
tendencies of admiration or warmth for the Ottoman state, society, and system. The subjects of
this work had already decided that the Ottoman government was a bad system for Christian
subjects of the Sultan long before the Armenian massacres. In many cases, these decisions had
firmed during earlier Armenian rebellions, such as the Cilician rebellion of 1906, events in which
the cause and apportionment of blame are far less clear than the massacres of 1915-1916. It
therefore seems that the Armenian massacres exacerbated pre-existing trends. Those bloody
events do not seem to have been the inspiration for the critical turn of the applied Orientalists.
Not all modern scholars of Orientalism have ignored the German example. Nina Berman,
in her major work on the subject, in fact asks that what I have called “applied Orientalism” be
examined more closely in the future.635 Previous studies, like Berman’s, or those of Marchand
and Kontje, have been either too broad to focus on the key changes in the German-Ottoman
relationship in the last Ottoman decades, or else did not define Orientalist writing broadly
enough to capture the experience of the Germans who actually knew the Ottoman Empire best,
those who lived and worked there.

635 Nina Berman, German Literature on the Middle East: Discourse and Practices, 1000-1989 (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2013), 23.
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This study is part of the scholarship on Orientalism, while at the same time pointing the
way to a broadening of the intellectual history of Orientalism beyond the literary roots of Edward
Said. Orientalist discourse is inherently political, and the diplomatic, military, and economic
fields especially cannot escape its influence. This study also shows the need for a broader
definition of imperialism. The discourse on modern imperialism, or neo-colonialism, has long
encompassed forms of coercive influence that are economic and cultural in nature, not merely
the formal, flag-planting colonialism of the past. Core-periphery theory in international relations
even posits that coercive relations between the industrial-capitalist core nations and those of the
“developing world” are inevitable under the current international structures and as part of a
system where power and wealth is so concentrated. This expansion of “imperialism” can be read
back into the past and must be if German colonialism is to be seen in its full extent. The growth
of German relationships and interests in the Ottoman Empire was absolutely part of the German
imperial project during the Kaiserreich period. Any future evaluations of German colonialism,
whether in support or opposition to the Sonderweg thesis, must take this fact into account.
The relevance of this work to the contemporary political climate is clear. In modern
Germany, intolerance and fascism thrive in the face of the breakdown of liberal institutions, and
especially of close contact with Muslim refugees from Libya, Eritrea, and Syria in the face of
material disparities. In a Germany under nearly a decade of fiscal austerity policies, the prospect
of foreigners of a different ethnicity and, especially, a different religion receiving favorable
treatment from a government seen as stingy toward its own native-born citizens has driven a
rightward trend in politics, and a right-wing defection from mainstream conservatism to
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something darker. The Alternativ fur Deutschland party, on an explicitly racist and antiimmigrant platform, has made great strides. However, this is not a new phenomenon in Germany.
Gastarbeiter, many of them Turks and Kurds from the post-Ottoman Turkish Republic,
have been coming to Germany, predominantly the west of Germany, for many decades. Despite
being born in Germany, the younger generation of these immigrant communities is denied
German citizenship, and many of the benefits that accrue thereto. Walled off from mainstream
German society, they are living proof of the lack of integration that Germany has always been
willing to tolerate. Like the observation made by Vann Woodward about the pre-Civil Rights Act
American south, the “immigrant problem” in modern Germany is largely a native-born German
problem.636 Contrary to liberal theories, integration has not proceeded because of the
unwillingness of the German public and government to let it proceed, and closer contact with
Muslims, whether guest workers or refugees, has produced right-wing backlash, not
understanding and harmony between the differing peoples.
The problems seen here, of Orientalist tendencies like essentializing, historicizing, and
“otherizing” are being reproduced in German cities of the twenty-first century. In a sense, the
AfD voter who believes that “Turks can never be European” and that “Christian values” in
Europe are endangered by Muslim immigration is as much an applied Orientalist as the actors
recounted in this work. Like them, familiarity has bred, if not contempt, then at least an
increasing intellectual distance. It is instead liberal intellectuals who advocate tolerance,
acceptance, and a common humanity that are denounced as out-of-touch elitists, not
understanding the plight of the common German who fears for their job, or their family's safety.

636 C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955), ix.
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If this is the problem, nothing here can point the way to a solution. However, admitting
that there is a gap in our knowledge of cross-cultural interaction is a good starting point.
Orientalism has long been studied as an intellectual exercise, devoid of real-world, material
content. In part this may have to do with the peculiar intellectual background of Edward Said,
who derided the soft power influence of Germany in the Muslim lands of the Ottoman Empire
and Persia. Said's background in literature, combined with his theory's wide applicability to
history and anthropology, may also have stymied later researchers.637
In Germany's case, the intellectuals were only telling part of the story of modern German
interactions with Islamic peoples and places. The Islamicate space of the Ottoman Empire was an
especially rich field for German missionaries, diplomats, and businessmen. Even those, like
Hartmann that remained sympathetic to Islam as a religion and to Islamic societies as political
entities came to see things differently through their direct contact with Islam as lived.

637 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1979).
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Zürcher, Eric Jan. "The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice, 1844-1914."
International Review of Social History 43, no. 3 (1998): 437-449.
----------. Turkey: A Modern History 3rd ed. London, I.B. Tauris, 2006.
Aksin, Sina. Turkey from Empire to Revolutionary Republic: the Emergence of the Turkish
Nation from 1789 to the Present. Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press,
2007.
Amr, Saleh Muhammad. The Hijaz under Ottoman Rule, 1869-1914: Ottoman Vali, the Sharif of
Mecca, and the Growth of British Influence. Riyadh: Riyadh University Publications,
1978.
Anderson, Margaret Lavinia. ""Down in Turkey, Far Away": Human Rights, the Armenian
Massacres, and Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany." The Journal of Modern History 79
(2007): 80-111.
Anscombe, Frederick F.. The Ottoman Gulf: the Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
Berridge, Geoff. Gerald Fitzmaurice (1865-1939), Chief Dragoman of the British Embassy in
Turkey. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007.
----------. British Diplomacy in Turkey, 1583 to the Present: a Study in the Evolution of the
Resident Embassy. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007.

256

Bobroff, Ronald. Roads to Glory Late Imperial Russia and the Turkish Straits. London: I.B.
Tauris, 2006.
Chalabian, Antranig. General Andranik and the Armenian Revolutionary Movement. Southfield,
MI: Antranig Chalabian, 1988.
Chapman, Maybelle Rebecca Kennedy. Great Britain and the Bagdad Railway, 1888-1914.
Northampton, Mass.: Unknown, 1948.
Charmley, John. Splendid Isolation?: Britain, the Balance of Power, and the Origins of the First
World War. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999.
Coursons, R.. The Armenian Rebellion: its Origin and its Object. 2nd ed. London: Messrs.
Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1896.
Crease, Conrad. The Desert Baron Friedrich, a Warrior for All Seasons: the Military History of
Baron Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein. Charleston, S.C.: Booksurge.com, 2009.
Farah, Irmgard. "German Press Politics and Propaganda Activities in the Ottoman Empire, 19081914." Arab Historical Review for Ottoman Studies 1 (1990): 123-132.
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